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1Chapter One
I. Introduction 
A democracy is defined by self-rule, liberty and equality, with the 
continuance of any democracy contingent on the good decisions of its electorate to 
act on behalf of the whole democracy’s best long-term interests. A functional 
democracy depends upon engaged citizens with the capacity and skills to make wise 
long-term decisions that will foster both the people and the continuance of 
democracy.  What is the best way to reliably produce citizens capable of wise self-
rule, and thus perpetuate democracy, without falling prey to the many challenges to 
the spirit of democracy?  I undertake to answer this question through an 
interdisciplinary exploration of the particular challenges and potential of character 
education in higher education in the United States.  
Civic education1 necessarily implies character education, for to teach a 
student how to be a good citizen should coincide with the teaching of a student how 
to be a good person.2  Increasingly, colleges and universities are once more taking up 
their historic mantle of character education, but there seems to be no real consensus 
of what the curriculum should contain, nor agreement of what character education 
means in a pluralistic democratic society such as ours.  It is even contentious to 
1
 Civic education is also variously called character or moral education.  Although each term has 
slightly different implications, they are all getting at the same concept – that of teaching young people 
the social and ethical skills and knowledge needed to survive and thrive within a given society.
2
 I am making the foundational assumption that the characteristics of a good citizen are coterminous 
with the characteristics of being a good person.  
2define which characteristics and values foster the democratic ideals and are desirable 
to promote in students and young citizens.  Without a clear goal, how can we hope to 
consistently pass on our democratic values to future generations?  At this time, the 
nation is more ideologically fragmented than at any previous time in living history.  
With the rise of immigration, multiculturalism, an ever-widening gulf between the 
rich and poor, whites and African Americans, republican and democrat, as well as 
increasing citizen apathy and alienation, the perceived “smelting pot” homogeneity 
of the 1950’s era has been shattered.  We can no longer expect that simply living in 
America provides everyone with comparable values and beliefs.  If we truly value 
our liberty and democracy, it is incumbent upon us, as a culture, to take pains to 
identify and pass on those democratic characteristics that foster the preservation of 
that liberty and equality that is the hallmark of democracy.  
It is at state colleges and universities that many freshmen from rural and 
small town backgrounds first encounter the broader world of myriad cultures and 
belief systems, thus, it is appropriate, I argue, to help young citizens to learn to have 
some means of interacting with other cultures and religions that includes respect and 
tolerance without losing sight of their own beliefs and values.  For our democracy to 
survive the increasing pressures of multiculturalism and expanding international 
conflict, we must find some way to encourage a sense community engagement that 
sees individuals as not only American citizens, but also citizens of the world, without 
the loss of liberty and the devaluation of the individual, as occurs in fascism and 
communism. This position is known as Communitarianism, where focus is on 
strengthening social bonds between the individual and others, thereby promoting 
3social responsibility, at the international level as well as the local level.  It is my task 
to offer a possible model for the approach of this kind of civic education.
Twenty-five centuries ago, Plato warned that democracy erodes into tyranny 
when the citizens of the polis become too self-indulgent and greedy, when self-
interest supplants civic engagement.3  To prevent this, the ancient Athenians took the 
education of the character of their youth very seriously.4  As we shall see in Chapter 
Two, the Greek Paideia, or educational system, was all-inclusive, with the express 
goal of fashioning ideal citizens to create and partake in an ideal society and culture.  
The ancients, from the heroic age of Homer through to the fall of the Roman Empire, 
all aspired to create the highest and best expression of civilization (according, of 
course, to their own culturally-determined standards).  How well they succeeded is 
evidenced by the two millennia reign of Hellenistic values and culture, which 
underpins and informed the founding of our own culture, and by the fascination and 
admiration Hellenic ideals still inspires.
In America, the task to produce good citizens generally has fallen by default 
to the nation’s public school systems in recent years.  Prior to this, character 
education was performed by the family, religion and society.  But with the 
breakdown of religion as a dominant social institution, the loss of the extended 
family and rise of the atomic family and single and absentee parenting, families and 
religion can no longer be relied upon to provide a roughly uniform standard of 
democratic socialization of children.  Thus, this job is increasingly thrust onto the 
society itself in the form of public primary and secondary education. Yet, the 
3
 Plato, Republic, Book VIII, 562a – 566b
4
 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapter 13, 1103a15
4meaning of civic education as a school subject has itself changed over time in 
response to the changing needs of the modern era, as the role of citizen shifted over 
time, and the contents of civic education in public have changed accordingly.  
While institutions of higher education used to be conscious of their moral-
shaping potential,5 many colleges and universities have increasingly regarded
character education as outside their purview as a long-term trend.  Claiming to 
protect the rights of oppressed minorities, some of academe claimed to purge herself 
of all perceived nests of racism and prejudice.  Civic education programs were 
sometimes abolished in Ivy League and state colleges alike.6  In some institutions, 
civic and moral education was and is emphasized.  But in the late 1970’s, the 
idealism of the ‘sixties wore off, revealing trends towards rampant political and 
economic misconduct, the rising influence of special interest groups upon 
government, chronic low voter turnout and lack of civic involvement that indicated a 
critical failure to fulfill the mandate of citizen education for at least the last thirty 
years. I contend that it is this failure to properly educate the consciences and 
characters of the last two generations (at least) in America, as well as a toxic cultural 
belief system that threatens the future integrity of our democracy.  If we wish to 
avoid the fate of Plato’s democracy’s slide into tyranny, then we must find a way to 
reverse this trend.  As educators, it is our responsibility to prepare the young to take 
up their places as productive citizens within our democratic culture.  Yet, to not 
teach the young how and (more importantly) why they need to tend to their 
5
 Bok, 1990: 13
6
 Bok, 1982  119 - 120
5democracy and cultural beliefs undermine our very efforts to prepare them to take 
part in it!
Current scientific thought holds that character is formed by two means:    
 1) biological predisposition and 2) enculturation, thus settling the old Nature versus 
Nurture debate in a tie.7  Biological predisposition is roughly just as important as 
enculturation (or socialization) to the proper development and unfolding of a human 
being.  But it is sometimes very difficult to discern where culture leaves off and 
biology begins, and vice versa.  
Social psychology states that society is prior to the individual, and that 
individuals are only explained within the context of society.8  The self is created 
when the individual begins to become aware of how others see them and adjusts their 
social behavior accordingly.  We unconsciously see ourselves as others see us, and 
we come to address ourselves as other address us.  We unconsciously put ourselves 
in the position of the other and act like them.  According to Social Psychology, it is 
this awareness that begins the development of self-consciousness.  Therefore, the 
personality is seen as only arising within a community, partaking of that 
community’s institution and conduct, utilizing the language of the community as a 
medium for acquiring personality and social roles.9
Belief systems and worldviews play an important role in the enculturation 
process, for what an individual expects to be true generally tends to become true for 
them, as they interpret their experiences through that particular filter, further 
complicating the boundary between predisposition and environmental influences.  
7
 Pinker, 2002: viii
8
 Mead, 1934: 7
6Belief systems establish the plausibility structure, which in turn determines what is 
acknowledged as real and true, and what is deemed imaginary or false.  Examples of 
this abound in cross-cultural exchange, for instance many Asian language-speakers 
cannot differentiate between an ‘r’ sound and a ‘v’ sound.  Which phonemes are 
recognized by a particular language group are entirely culturally derived and varies 
widely, while the native tongue of an individual not only determines how they speak, 
but also how they think.  Another example would be that of primal tribal peoples, 
such as in New Guinea or the Amazon, who have never seen or used computers, 
questioning the reality of the Internet, which cannot be seen or touched except 
through a technology of which they have no knowledge or experience.  How children 
are enculturated will stick with them and shape their worldviews for life.  Therefore, 
I shall consider how belief systems interact with enculturation.  
I will include a discussion of broad religious movements where religion 
intersects with education to illustrate how beliefs affect our worldview and our 
motives for educating our young.  What we believe shapes what we experience, 
because what we value informs our decisions and our interpretations of our 
experiences.  A single objective event can be interpreted in a myriad of ways, such as 
a car wreck being viewed as an “accident,” as an intentional attack, or as “the will of 
God.”  Each of these interpretations will lead to very different responses to the same 
event.  In a world growing ever smaller through the wonders of technology, we must 
consider the consequences of our beliefs and the possible impact of our beliefs on 
others.  
9
 Mead, 1934: 162-163
7We must constantly ask: what is a society trying to accomplish with its 
approach to education?  Is it vocational training?  Personhood training?  Citizenship 
training?  We must ask: what is the motive and goal(s) of education in the United 
States?  The Founding Fathers of this nation saw education as citizen training crucial 
to the success of democracy.  For the last century, the goal of public education in 
America is to pass state mandated tests of minimal competency and churn out 
minimally skilled workers to work in urban factories and rural farms.10  But changes 
in the economy and technology in the last fifteen years made a high school education 
insufficient to secure a good paying job and to catch the fast-track to the American 
Dream.  Higher education has been cited by President George W. Bush as the 
solution for the outsourcing of jobs to foreign countries.  But is this use of education 
as vocational training sufficient to preserve the future of our democratic values in the 
face of the multiple threats of terrorism, multiculturalism and economic upheaval?  
How do we hang onto those beliefs and values that have historically defined the 
American spirit without surrendering them for the promise of immediate personal 
security or profit?
Sociology offers us two functional models of education.  In the dominant 
view, education is seen as an organized network to socialize and process 
individuals.11  The other view of education is more controversial, and holds that 
education is an allocation system that confers success and failure onto individuals.12
The organized network view performs its socializing function by providing a 
network of rules, creating classifications of people and knowledge, creating 
10
 Toffler, 1971: 57 - 58
11
 Meyer, 1977: 55
8competencies for professionals and determining access to social roles according to 
the amount of education, thus focusing primarily upon individuals and less upon 
social impact.  The allocation view of education claims that education functions as a 
legitimizing large scale classification system that initiates individuals into higher 
status, roles and behavior.  This view holds that education is the means by which 
ruling elites maintain and perpetuate their control of society.13  As such, in this view 
the impact of education transcends the education of individuals and has widespread 
effects upon the whole society.  
The allocation view of education raises critical questions about the true 
motivations of education.  This view argues that academic credentials help maintain 
social inequity by protecting the existing power structure through the allocation and 
distribution of social roles and personnel under the guise of merit and equality.  But, 
proponents argue, the system is determined by biased standards established by an 
entrenched ruling class with the unspoken purpose of supporting and maintaining the 
status quo.14  Each of these views has broad political and social implications beyond 
the scope of this work, but from these brief descriptions, we gather that education 
carries serious impact upon both the future of individuals and upon society at large.
Education is the most easily controlled means of enculturation and ensuring 
the creation of good democratic citizens.  To employ education as the means of 
shaping citizens requires a holistic model of human potentials and a delineation of 
desirable characteristics within a democracy (which must respect all individuals as 
equal) in order to determine what is possible and what are the most effective ways of 
12
 Meyer, 1977: 56
13
 Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977: 7
9developing desired potential, while also determining ways of decreasing other 
unwanted potentials. The criteria for determining which characteristics are desirable 
and which ones aren’t desirable must conform to strict democratic standards of 
equality and liberty, or else be prey to abuse and corruption. 
Some uniquely human capacities only develop under the influence of culture, 
such as the capacity for language and abstract thought.15  Without language and 
socialization, some higher level human capacities simply never emerge.   It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to consider deeply the biological aspect of the question, such 
as the ethical implications of genetic engineering of morality (eugenics), as 
interesting and controversial as that topic is.  But we will look at some of the 
underlying biological functions and tendencies that often unconsciously drive culture 
and individual behavior.  
Formal education is our nation’s primary mode of enculturation, one that is 
revisable to meet new conditions and information in ways religious and familial 
modes of learning are not.  As we shall see, the task of civic education has changed 
form and content over the centuries, as the needs of each civilization dictated the 
definition of citizen according to its own standards and values.  But civic (or 
character) education in a post-modern pluralistic democracy is tricky business.  So 
tricky, in fact, that the effort was mostly abandoned as too risky in the era of the 
Civil Rights Movement.  The use of indoctrination and brainwashing techniques by 
the Nazis under the guise of character education had left an unpleasant connotation 
to the whole enterprise at the close of World War II.  Similar techniques were used 
14
 Bourdeiu and Passeron, 1977: 18, 129-130
15
 Pinker, 2002: 60
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on indigenous and minority peoples in the U.S.A. and Australia, as their cultural and 
religious identities were systematically stripped away, often with disastrous results 
for the cultural identities of those peoples.16  It came to be held by many that 
character education bordered on cultural genocide of minorities, and thus had 
racist/supremicist overtones.  The rise of multiculturalism exposed the traditional 
modes of American character education as biased, and thus not universally 
applicable.  By the 1970s, in some schools civic education had been reduced to a 
single semester in the sixth grade, in which students were taught how the United 
States government is organized and elected, but nothing was offered in how to be a 
good citizen in the larger culture.  It was believed by some that it was better to teach 
the barest minimum, just the mechanics of the federal and state structures, rather than 
to risk the possible abuses of character education.  
By the 1980s, the excesses of the era revealed a narcissistic society and an 
increasing fragmentation of the larger culture.  In the decade after the Watergate 
scandal, voter confidence in the government was failing and would continue to 
decline, along with voter turnout, until the recent chronic lows.  Many citizens were 
so disaffected and alienated that they believe the whole political system too corrupt 
to be salvaged and in need of abolition.  One of these alienated citizens was the 
Oklahoma City Murrah Federal Building bomber, Timothy McVeigh, who believed 
he was striking the first blow in a coming civil war against the United States federal 
government.  Fortunately, very few are driven to such extremes.  Most of the 
16
 The deterioration of the Native American and Australian Aborigines are prime examples of this 
process, where children were removed from their indigenous families and adopted into white families, 
where the children grew up knowing nothing about their birth culture and history.  The result of this 
was the loss of many native practices and beliefs, as the chain of cultural transmission was severed.
11
disaffected simply drop out of civic involvement, the obligations of citizenship too 
much of a burden to take time out from the many demands of work and family.  
Many find the intricacies of modern politics too confusing, too corrupt and too 
exasperating to willingly participate in.
Yet, if the citizens refuse to participate, what happens to the democracy?  By 
the 1990s, the multitude of social ills caused by a culture-wide failure to prepare 
children for life in the world forced public education to take on more and more of the 
burdens traditionally borne by the extended family, despite concerns about the 
potential for abuse or indoctrination.  Increasing exposure to immigrants from 
different cultures and value systems forced the schools to address issues of morality, 
gender, religion, nationality, race and culture in ways unthought-of in the more 
homogeneic Christian society that gave birth to this nation.  Increased exposure to 
the threat of new and different beliefs caused polarization among different elements 
of society, while more and more political and economic power was appropriated by 
multi-national corporations and special interest groups.  The sum total effect of these 
is the fragmentation and alienation of the average citizen from the political process, 
revealing the glaring need to create new ways to bring cultural diversity into 
harmony.  I contend that this civic fragmentation is indicative of a more fundamental 
personal fragmentation and alienation of the citizens themselves.  By being 
indoctrinated into a culture that splinters their identity, without developing means to 
cope and transcend, citizens are crippled and stunted civically and morally, resulting 
in the social vices listed above.
12
Education is often held up as the panacea for all of society’s ills, filling in the 
gaps where parenting and culture have failed.  Character education in primary and 
secondary education has been under serious review and development since the mid-
1980s.  Some forerunners in top tier research universities also began to address this 
issue in the 1980’s, but the topic of character education in higher education is only 
now seriously addressed in a renewed way in the public universities and colleges.  
Character education for college-aged students is emerging as another means to help 
prepare our young to live in an ever-shrinking global village.  Students seeking 
careers in fields as diverse as politics, business and science are finding that their 
career fields are increasingly exposing them to alien cultures and belief systems, 
some of which can seem hostile or threatening to the emerging sense of self.  In an 
age of terrorism and multi-national corporations, increased sensitivity to the beliefs 
and worldviews of others could literally make the difference between life and death, 
war and peace.
Character education for the college-age student brings up questions and 
concerns quite different from those raised for children.  Questions of morality, 
selfhood, autonomy, values, enculturation, religious orientation, and political impact 
are all involved when considering how to prepare young adults about to enter the job 
market and life, in general.  Civic education in a public institution of higher 
education presents its own set of challenges, as educators must also navigate the First 
and Second Amendments complications not applicable to children while teaching 
students how to be good citizens of the nation and the world.  How these questions 
13
are addressed will make an important impact on the future of our democracy and of 
our planet, even as it impacts the emerging selves of the students.  
Sociologists, ethicists and religious leaders all have stressed that one does not 
really ever know themselves without also knowing others and vice versa.17  But how 
are we to come to know others whose ideas are so different from our own, when it 
seems that we have no common denominator, no foundation for understanding?  If 
we only know our own tradition’s beliefs and worldview without questioning them 
and challenging them with the beliefs of others, then our identity is unexamined and 
untested, risking becoming stunted and ingrown.  We don’t know how to relate to 
others if we don’t know how to self-reflect.  In learning about ourselves, we learn 
how to engage others as we engage ourselves.18  I will argue that an education 
grounded in self-knowledge, character and experience is more likely to inculcate 
judgment and engagement than one oriented to achieving high test scores and 
vocational training.  I shall propose a theoretical approach that protects the autonomy 
of students while connecting them to the wider community of the world.  Drawing 
from Plato, Aristotle, Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, J.J. Rousseau and others, I 
explicate a grounding for education that engages learners with themselves and others 
in a larger context.  A grounding in critical thinking and self-knowledge is offered as 
antidote to the selfishness, greed and ethical misconduct rampant in industry and 
government.  
Current research in Social Cognitive Psychology supports the thesis that 
individuals with high levels of self-knowledge receive many benefits, personally and 
17
 Mead, 1934: 50
18
 Baumeister, 1999: 23
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socially, from their enhanced self-understanding.  Certain beliefs about the self are 
demonstrably more efficacious than others.  It only makes sense to teach people 
which ways of thinking about the self are clinically proven to be beneficial and 
which ways of thinking about the self have been proven to be problematic, if not 
self-defeating.  Many forms of depression and emotional distress are due to 
ignorance and poor mental hygiene.  It seems obvious that we are morally obligated 
to alleviate these relatively easily correctable evils amongst the citizenry.  The 
underlying assumption is that happy, moral and well-adjusted citizens will create a 
happy, moral and well-adjusted society.   
It is true that while you can lead a student to the font of wisdom, you can’t 
make him think.  But shouldn’t we as educators use every means at our disposal to 
improve the quality of citizens under our tutelage?  After all, we will leave the future 
of our nation and democracy, as well as the world, in their hands.  
The development of my thesis is as follows:  In Chapter Two, I describe the 
Communitarian – Neutral Liberalism debate over the Formative Project, (or a 
republic’s conscious attempt to fashion good citizens) which provides the larger 
canvas on which the question of civic education is played out.  I start with a 
historical overview of the Formative Project, beginning with its origins in ancient 
Athens, through what Alasdair MacIntyre calls “the Enlightenment Project,” (the 
inspiration behind the founding of America), up to the rise of the Civil Rights 
Movement and the ascension of Neutral Liberalism.  In this, I show how the mandate 
and contents of education in general and civic education in particular shifted over 
15
time, paralleling the shift in the meaning of language of virtue identified by 
MacIntyre.  
In Chapter Three, I explore the Communitarian response to Neutral 
Liberalism, through the lens of its implications for civic and moral education.  I 
discuss the distinction of Positive and Negative Liberty and how this is a crucial 
orientation to the application of democracy.  I then explicate the Communitarian 
arguments in favor of the Formative Project and shall address objections.
In Chapters Four and Five, I offer a model for civic education founded in 
self-knowledge, supported by current research in the field of Social Cognitive 
Psychology.  I introduce the term Epistemic Responsibility, by which I mean being 
aware of and taking responsibility for the short and long-term consequences of one’s 
beliefs and worldview.  In applying this to higher education, I argue in favor of 
teaching students about the pragmatic and logical consequences of many dominant 
world belief systems when objectively analyzed as part of an inclusive global 
dynamic.   I also advocate the teaching of evaluative and critical reasoning skills so 
that the students are able to make their own well-considered value judgments, both 
civically and personally.  I support my theory by drawing from historic sources, such 
as Plato, Rousseau, and Kant.  This chapter also includes a consideration of the 
connections of self-to-self and self-to-others, in both a personal and a global sense. 
The Sixth and final chapter will conclude this study by distilling out the essential 
principles developed in this work and by responding to anticipated objections to the 
Formative Project, as well as to my model and theory.
16
Chapter Two
The Foundations of the Communitarian-Neutral Liberalism Educational Debate
“In short, efforts to create a serious program of moral education 
seem caught between the evils of indoctrination, on the one hand, and 
the hazards of ethical relativism, on the other.  Escaping this dilemma 
is the key to success in helping students to develop stronger ethical 
standards and a greater concern for the welfare of others.  How this 
can be managed and whether it can be done at all are questions that 
still await an answer.”
Derek Bok19
What I characterize as the Communitarian-Neutral Liberalism educational 
debate stems from two entirely different conceptions of liberty, democracy and 
citizenship.  Both models are driven by internally consistent cultural ideals and belief
systems, arising within a larger historic socio-economic nexus, and each arrives at 
very different conclusions about the role of the citizen and society as a whole.  Yet, 
both of these views are consistent with the dominant American cultural values and 
standards, each expressing a different interpretation and understanding of the same 
values.  As a result of these different ideas and beliefs about liberty, democracy and 
citizenship, differences in the duties, rights and responsibilities of citizens are 
reflected in competing views of the rights and duties of citizens, society and 
government.    
This is especially important when it comes to the area of education, for in 
education the society perpetuates itself by (more or less) consciously teaching its 
19
 Bok, Universities and the Future of America, 1990:78
17
young which values are socially acceptable and which ones are not.20  This in turn 
shapes the future of the society itself, as students become citizens, who themselves 
give birth to the next generation of students to be inducted into the society’s values 
through education.  Both of these competing systems of democratic ideals of liberty 
are present to one degree or another in today’s society and educational aspirations, 
and both have much to offer.  But the shortcomings of both must be transcended if 
we are to craft engaged citizens capable of perpetuating our democracy beyond the 
twenty-first century. Neutral Liberalism focuses on the rights of the individual and 
has been instrumental in securing civil rights and protections for minorities during 
the Civil Rights Movement, (there have also been song Communitarian currents in 
the Civil Rights Movement and its successors). This altruistic position stresses the 
importance of the individual, sometimes at the expense of the community, in an 
effort to prevent vulnerable individuals and populations from being exploited in the 
huge cogs of government and industry.  These values are reflected everywhere 
throughout our culture.21  It was an important stage in the liberation of minorities 
from historical oppression, and protecting them from exploitation and indoctrination 
by the majority. As socio-political philosopher, John Rawls (the patron saint of 
Neutral Liberalism) contends, the quality of a democracy depends upon how well the
minorities are treated.22  Neutral Liberalism loosely defines liberty as the civil 
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, protected by the 
20
 This function of education is questionable when seen from the allocation view of education, which 
holds that the primary purpose of education is to maintain and secure the current power structure at 
the cost of non-elites’ potentials.  Bourdeiu and Passeron, 1977: 129 - 130
21
 “The needs of the one outweigh the needs of the many.”  Captain Kirk in the Paramount film “Star 
Trek III - The Search for Spock”
18
government, legal system and armed forces.  Neutral Liberalism has been the 
dominant stance in America since the New Deal and World War II, and is 
responsible for the creation of social support institutions such as Welfare, Social 
Security and Medicare.
The Communitarian position arose in response to the perceived flaws in 
Neutral Liberalism, such as relativism, selfishness, alienation and loss of community.  
It holds that a balance must be found between minority rights and the needs of the 
whole city/state/nation.  Communitarians advocate a return to the ancient models of 
the republic, in which liberty is defined by self-rule, not by government-guaranteed 
rights and dependence upon the state.  Unlike the ancient models, the 
Communitarian position, minorities protect minorities because they are actively 
engaged at all levels of government (not disenfranchised and in need of special 
protection) and are included within the whole of the society, as are all citizens.23
Communitarianism emphasizes communal values and builds a commonly defined 
good.  Instead of the citizens being passively dependent upon the state for the 
guarantee and protection of rights, Communitarians holds that all citizens must 
actively engage in self-governing to procure and maintain their own civil rights.  I 
advocate an infusion of this view into the current educational landscape.
To see how these two competing approaches arose and developed, and the 
consequences they precipitated over time, I shall give a brief historical overview of 
22
 “Social and economic inequalities are to meet two conditions: they must be: (a) to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged; and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions 
of fair opportunity.”  Rawls, “A Kantian Conception of Equality,” 1999: 258
23
 Communitarian Michael Sandel tells us: “The liberal begins by asking how government should treat 
its citizens and seeks principles of justice that treat persons fairly as they pursue their various interests 
and ends.  The republican begins by asking how citizens can be capable of self-government, and seeks 
the political forms and social conditions that promote its meaningful exercise.” Sandel, 1996: 27
19
the conceptual foundations of the two views in question.  This overview is not meant 
to be definitive or exhaustive, but merely to provide the reader a context in which to 
appreciate how this debate unfolded and developed throughout western history.  The 
theoretical underpinnings of the differences between Neutral Liberalism and 
Communitarianism will be considered in the following chapter.  
In Sources of the Self, Charles Taylor asserts that meaning only makes sense 
against the background of something other than self.24  He claims that we can only 
understand the self against the background created by three main sources: 1) culture, 
2) significant others and 3) strong evaluation.25  These external sources of identity 
entail that ethical phenomena affirm the independent value of choices, in opposition 
to the radical subjectivism that drives much American behavior.  We often don’t 
realize what we know, except through interactions with others.  And it is well known 
in education that the best way to really understand something yourself is to try to 
explain it to someone else, hence the reliance on group work and student 
presentations in the classroom.  No one exists in a vacuum - we only come to 
understand who and what we are in the context of the social milieu of others, with all 
their traditions, values, beliefs and social structures.
“Individualism,” however, is a fundamental value in our democracy, and, like 
all deeply held values, this ethos has its negative points as well as its positive.  Along 
with the rise of individualism, we have also experienced a sense of loss of meaning, 
often manifested as a nostalgic looking back to a past perceived to be superior to the 
current experience of alienation and corruption – “the good old days…”  Taylor 
24
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refers to this loss of meaning as the “disenchantment of the world,” the root cause of 
our existential discomfort.26  When individualism becomes self-centered and 
neglects its vital connections to others, it goes sour, turning into self-absorption and 
egoism.
In The Ethics of Authenticity, Taylor examines the moral ideal of authenticity, 
defined as being true to oneself.  Drawing on both Anglo-American and Continental 
philosophy, Taylor claims that authenticity is an idea not usually understood by the 
majority of Americans.  Taylor observes that there are many moral concepts tied up 
in the idea of authenticity, and that these concepts can be articulated creatively, 
through art and literature, for example.  He seeks a clarification of the idea of 
authenticity through the discussion of subjectivism and relativism.  Subjectivism 
denies the validity of value judgments independent of chooser.  All value judgments 
are held to be expressions of individual taste or opinion.  Relativism holds that all 
choices are equally valid within their own context, meaning that every choice is 
justifiable within some conceivable context.  In subjectivism and relativism, there are 
no hard and fast standards by which to make value judgments, and every choice must 
be made according to private standards alone.  This places vast pressures on the 
individual, as they are held totally responsible for any bad choices, without providing 
any education in making wise choices beyond personal preference and advertising.  
This often leads to lives crippled by damage, guilt and shame for unwise decisions in 
youth.
26
 Taylor, 1991: 4
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In his critique, Taylor identifies three “malaises” of modernity.27  The first is 
the loss of meaning and moral horizon.  While he acknowledges the major 
achievements of modernity, individualism is seen as a source of anxiety, as well as 
fulfillment.  Authenticity is a very important idea in our modern culture, albeit 
poorly understood.  Each person is held to be a unique self, obligated to live up to his 
or her own unique potential.  Although the individual is freed from many past 
constraints, our traditional moral horizon is lost.  These moral horizons delineated 
the traditional ways of making sense of meaning beyond individual purpose.28  Loss 
of those horizons meant the loss of a larger context to life, which provides the 
individual with the sense of having an established place in the cosmos in which they 
belong.  Isolated individuals cannot generate this larger context of life; it must be 
created by the combined efforts of groups and cultures.29
Modern individualism is skeptical of the need for the larger communal 
context.  The individual is sometimes held to be the sole author of values through 
acts of volition.  This view holds that the act of choosing is what imparts value, as it 
is believed that there is no meaning beyond that affirmed by the individual.  Taylor 
holds that this type of individualism drains the world of meaning – the 
disenchantment of the world.30  In seeking to rise above individualist subjectivity, 
science creates a mechanistic worldview, but it excludes any expressions of larger 
27
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 “...[T]he family is no longer commonly regarded as the unit to which we owe our primary loyalty.  
Instead, more and more people seem to view it merely as a convenient arrangement to be discarded 
when it grows too burdensome.” Bok, 1990: 58
30
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purpose, as in the case of modern biology,31 which excludes basic reference to 
purpose in the description and explanation of natural processes, further diminishing 
the importance of context. 
This leads to the second of Taylor’s modern malaises, the rise of 
“instrumental reasoning,” that is, the manipulation of circumstances to fulfill desires. 
Science is valued for the sake of “progress” as control, and not for the enlightenment 
or moral force it brings to human life.   In instrumental reasoning, or the type of 
thinking that sees all things and people as merely means to an end, rationality is 
focused on maximizing efficiency and pay-offs.  The growth of instrumental 
reasoning has been hastened by the loss of a cosmic order, for without traditional 
beliefs systems to serve as moral compass, the individual’s own desires are elevated 
to serve as the prime motivator in life.  Instrumental reasoning leads to critical social 
problems, such as the unequal distribution of wealth, disregard for the well-being of 
the environment, devaluation of human life by impersonal institutions and the 
glorification and worship of technology and the “iron cage of modernity,” in which 
the individual is trapped in the impersonal institutions which control our lives32
Finally, the third malaise of modernity that Taylor identifies is the threat to 
our freedom and democracy when citizens focus only on themselves and blot out the 
rest of the world.  This leads to shrinkage of interest in democratic processes and 
participation in the world at large, as the nation is run by a juggernaut government 
31
 Actually, the cutting edge of biology is recanting the mechanistic view of the universe in light of 
very recent discoveries about the cell membrane as the source of cell intelligence, and not DNA, as 
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with purposes of its own and little public control.33  As Tocqueville noted so long 
ago, a self-absorbed citizenry would rather pursue their own interests than participate 
in self-government so long as the government’s functioning is sufficiently effective 
and does not interfere with their private pursuits.34  But individual liberties are lost 
through the imposition of instrumental reasoning and by the social structure.  A 
current example of this is the recent Supreme Court ruling in which individual home 
ownership is now subject to seizure under eminent domain if the city deems the land 
could be more profitable to state and private development.  
This culture of self-absorption has serious implications for our national 
security, at home and abroad.  Ignoring the effects of corporate colonialism and the 
ever-widening gap between the rich and poor has led to severe erosion of 
international good will towards America.  As Immanuel Kant taught us, good will is 
the foundation of all ethics.35  Without this general good will, American citizens 
everywhere are targets for terrorists and radical extremists willing to die for their
belief in a larger theologically framed worldview.  As a nation, America reflects the 
atomism of the individual citizens, alienated from many in the world community of 
nations.  America consumes twenty percent of the world’s resources while only 
constituting at most five percent of the world’s total population.  We act as though 
our right to compete in a free market and accrue unlimited profit at any cost excludes 
us from any moral obligation towards the third world nations we exploit for their 
cheap labor and resources in the name of expanding markets.  But as other nations 
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develop to the point of becoming serious competitors with America, we will no 
longer be able to continue in our accustomed ego-centric ways.  Regardless of 
whether Americans want it or not, the world is changing and we will have to adapt or 
be left behind.
The primacy of instrumental reasoning puts major emphasis on statistics and 
outputs, in both institutions and in thought.  In our capitalist culture, market 
phenomena are often the ultimate determinant of policy.  Market functions are used 
as the justification for decisions throughout the Western culture.  Some Americans 
see their government as serving in the role of protector of the market economy.  The 
rise of instrumental reasoning not only entails the increased influence of market 
functions; it also includes the dominance of our culture by technology.  Technology 
is our “magic bullet,” to solve all problems, the ultimate means to every end.36  But 
we still are in need of critical evaluation of the relative benefits of technology.  We 
have yet to delineate its limits and how best to use it.  Moral issues about topics once 
considered science fiction, such as cloning and genetic engineering, are being forced 
on our courts and legislators.  How can we be sure that the market will make the 
wisest choices for humanity’s best interest?  Caught between market and 
bureaucracy, modern individuals are trapped in the “iron cage” of modernity, as 
described by Weber.37  This is not to deny the positive benefits of technology, such 
as medicine and computers, but rather to highlight the need for insight and wisdom 
in the applications and uses of technology and bureaucracy. 
36
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Taylor rejects the totality of the “iron cage” view and its accompanying sense 
of helplessness and alienation.  He points to the current fulfillment of Tocqueville’s 
prediction of “Soft Despotism,” that is, the degeneration of meaning and 
participation in self-government, as everything is run by the big machines of 
government and industry with little citizen control.38  While the government may 
seem democratic and moderate, perhaps even responsive, it is still a form of tyranny 
if the people are isolated from the forces that govern their lives.39  Although few to 
none of the victims of the World Trade Tower attacks were directly responsible for 
the policies the Muslim extremists so violently reject, it is those innocent citizens of 
many nations who paid the price of the policies of multinational corporations and the 
U.S. government.  We are now held hostage in our own airports and subways.  The 
critical failures of the local, state and federal responses to the aftermaths of 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita, created massive loss, suffering and expense which was 
foreseeable and could have been avoided. These recent crises further expose the 
breakdown of the relationship between citizens and government.  But freedom can be 
lost in less dramatic ways.  We lose freedom through the imposition of instrumental 
reason by the social structure.  Examples of this are urban sprawl and the necessity 
for private transportation to get anywhere, which supports car manufacturing and oil 
production, rather than investing in public transportation.  This is another example is 
38 ibid.  112 – 113  
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 Taylor identifies a vicious circle of political helplessness: “…the more fragmented a democratic 
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the domination of public elections and legislation by lobbyists and special interest.40
Yet, the average citizen, while concerned over this loss of freedom, is content to 
allow the erosion as long as they are not too inconvenienced. The reason is that the 
problems are too huge and overwhelming for a single individual to overcome, 
leading to a kind of cultural denial.
Taylor takes authenticity seriously; his central contention is that people are to 
be true to themselves, eschewing denial and embracing self-knowledge.   In order to 
do this, we must be clear on what selfhood means.  Taylor claims that the self is only 
articulated and understood in the context of dialogue with others.  We require 
relationship to others in order to come to know ourselves.  This sense of self is also 
tied to what Taylor calls “strong evaluation,” or those things that we value most 
highly.  A clear understanding of what it is to be a self requires that an individual 
reflect upon those objects of strong evaluation and the belief systems that inform 
them.  This critical examination of one’s own beliefs and values creates the self-
knowledge required of an authentic individual.  For me, authenticity implies the 
actualization of self-knowledge, for I must know what I love and what I believe in 
order to be true to myself.  If I am ignorant about myself, I will not be able to 
accurately assess my capabilities or convictions, thus rendering my judgment poor 
and my commitments shallow.  The self is articulated through creativity and 
exploration, as in artistic endeavors and in dialogue with others.  It is this core self 
which is the essential chooser inside each individual, and it is more fundamental than 
further weakened by the lack of a common experience of action, and a sense of hopelessness makes it 
seem a waste of time to try.” Taylor, 1991: 113 
40 ibid. 9  
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autonomy, or the exercise of choice, for I must have opinions and beliefs in order to 
act as an agent and make choices.
Thus, thinking of the self as a unique person and fulfilling the self requires 
special attention to individuality and to the relations of the self to significant others 
and those values most deeply held.  There are many pressures against authenticity.  
One of these pressures opposing authenticity that Taylor identifies is Neutral 
Liberalism, specifically, the position that the state must not impose any religious or 
moral values on citizens.  Being a Communitarian, Taylor believes that the state 
must and should take a side in the discussion of what constitutes both the “good 
life,” and “good character.”  For the Communitarian position, society should try to 
define what it means by “good character” and what the communal ideals should be, 
based on commonly shared beliefs, goals and needs.  However, this position is 
problematic in a diverse culture, as different individual definitions of the “good life” 
and “good character” are debatable according to differing worldviews and belief 
systems.
To better understand where we are now, it is helpful to have and 
understanding what has come before, leading up to the current state of affairs.
A Historical Overview of the Formative Project
It is important to understand the history of what the goals of education have 
been in our culture and how they have changed in order to understand where the 
culture is heading in order to better appreciate our current dilemma.  I shall begin my 
discussion with a look at the primary educational approach of the ancient Hellenic 
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world, expressed in one form or another from the time of Homer until the fall of the 
Roman Empire.  The Hellenic culture was founded upon the concept of the Greek 
Paideia, a culture-wide approach to education, aimed at producing virtuous elite 
citizens to perpetuate their democracies, republics and empires.  As Alasdair 
MacIntyre famously noted, the meaning of the word virtue has shifted over time 
from its origination in the ancient Mediterranean culture, yet our modern language 
and discussion of virtue has not kept pace.  This work is a preliminary attempt to 
remedy that oversight, as it specifically pertains to character education.  
I)  Ancient Ideals
The Formative Project, or the effort to fashion good citizens, has a long and 
varied history.  In the West, we look to ancient Athens for the foundation of our own 
culture.  Yet, the ancient Greek view of education and its role in culture and politics 
is markedly different from our modern view.  The ancient Greeks used what they call 
the Paideia to prepare their young for the privileges and duties of citizenship within 
the polis (city-state).  There is no English equivalent to the term Paideia, but the 
closest definition I have found is the general education that prepares young for an 
active participation in the life of the nation (polis), including a grounding in the 
Athenian worldview of a unified harmonious cosmos, and a teleological view of 
human nature41.  “The aim of the paideia was the proper formation of students, 
41
 “In approaching the problem of education, the Greeks relied wholly on the clear realization of the 
natural principles governing human life and the immanent laws by which man exercises his physical 
and intellectual powers.   To use that knowledge as a formative force in education, and by it to shape 
the living man as the potter moulds clay and the sculptor carves stone into a preconceived form – that 
was a bold creative idea that could have been developed only by that nation of artists and 
philosophers.  The greatest work of art they had to create was Man.  They were the first to recognize 
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intellectually, morally and religiously.”42   The undertaking of the education of the 
youth was considered to be a community project, and as such, the whole community 
was responsible for the quality and content of the education received.  This is based 
on the conviction that the individual and the community are inextricably bound, as 
the quality of individual citizens combine to create the quality of the nation (polis). 43
Therefore, it was culturally assumed that by producing the best possible citizens, 
they could produce the best possible nation (polis).  This teleological view of 
humanity gave rise to some of the most celebrated poets, politicians, sculptors, 
architects, philosophers, generals and dramatists in the history of the West, and this 
ancient democracy became the inspiration and set the paradigm for our own culture 
and democracy.  
The ageless excellence of the ancient Athenian people and culture was no 
accident – they planned and consciously worked hard at creating what they 
considered to be the best possible civilization and the optimal Man.  Of course, this 
worldview spawned its own horde of ills and challenges, and I will discuss those in 
due time.  At this point, I wish to examine the motivation behind the Greek’s 
education system, which reflected their tendency to think in terms of wholeness and 
unity.  They thought big and lived big, seeing cosmic significance in every action 
and decision.  We still venerate them for the depth and breadth of their understanding 
and daring.  





 “In early Greek history, every branch of intellectual life grows straight from the same root, the life 
of the community…  Thus, to describe the Greek polis is to describe the whole of Greek life.  The 
polis is the social framework of the whole history of Greek culture…”  Jaeger, Vol. I, 1939: 75)
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The Greeks struggled to attain Arête’ – another Greek concept that has no 
contemporary English equivalent – but is often roughly translated as “manly valor.”  
But the idea goes far beyond machismo, for it is more widely understood to mean the 
excellence of human merit, in this case, the combined excellences of the Athenian 
aristocrat.44  Athenian virtue entailed the successful fulfillment of one’s designated 
role, with the roles and the standards of success and failure clearly defined.45  The 
sense of self in the heroic age (a view passed on to future Hellenistic thinkers) is 
inextricably connected to their social role, demanding a highly culture-specified type 
of accountability requiring equally culture-specific excellences and virtues.46  The 
Athenians strove after the highest personal excellence according to the standards of 
their day and society.  
Athens gave rise to many philosophers and teachers during the classical and 
ancient eras whose wisdom still reverberate into our own era, but two of the most 
influential in the field of education are Plato and Aristotle.  Both were heir to the rich 
Homeric tradition, which enunciated the Hellenic ideal that is the target of arête and 
the paideia.  Neither of them questioned the wisdom nor necessity of teaching arête, 
both agreed that character education is critical to the creation and success of a 
nation.47  Both Plato and Aristotle agree that the virtues arise only within the socio-
44
 “…[P]erhaps we ought not to translate the word arête in Homer by our word ‘virtue,’ but instead by 
our word ‘excellence’…”  MacIntyre, 1984: 181
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fulcrum upon which (as in Archimedes’ epigram) the world, the political world, could be moved.”  
(Jaeger, Vol. 2, 1939: 6)
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cultural context of the polis.48  Where they disagree is about exactly how to go about 
achieving the vision.
a) Plato
Taking the Delphic injunction Know Thyself seriously, Plato’s teacher and 
inspiration, Socrates, perfected the technique of the elenchus, or the dialectic through 
which one challenges common assumptions with common sense and logic.  Through 
the process of undergoing the elenchus, all of the individual’s personal beliefs and 
cultural assumptions are questioned, with the eventual result of the realization of the 
limits of one’s actual knowledge and the broad extent of opinion and supposition.  
By removing false beliefs and assumptions, wisdom is eventually achieved.  The 
elenchus is the Platonic means of achieving self-knowledge, and thereby excellence, 
through taking responsibility for one’s own moral education.49   A good way to start 
is by identifying the limits of what one really knows about such important things as 
truth, piety and justice.  Plato, and Socrates before him, sought unity through the 
perfecting of the self through the process of elenchus, questioning and answering, 
chipping away all false, conflicting and unsupportable beliefs, until only true, 
unconflicted excellence remains.  In the process of the elenchus, it is through the 
shock of cognitive dissonance and subsequent acknowledgement of seeing how far 
we fall short of our ideals that the dross is burned off.  Perfection is achieved through 
48
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 “The core of the unified moral conception is it the dialectical activity of Socrates, ‘the patron saint 
of moral philosophy,’ and its implications: the development of a moral practice that contrasts with 
sophic education, usually thought of as ‘Socratic elenchus’; the crucial notions of unity of arête and 
that arête is knowledge; and the psychological and political consequences of Socrates’ moral practice.  
All of these implications have as their guiding notion ‘self-education’: the idea that we must each take 
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submission to the process of exposing one’s own flawed thinking and then taking the 
personal responsibility for correcting it accordingly.50
In the Republic Plato specifies in detail the kind of education his ideal polis 
would employ, drawing heavily from the then-living example of the militaristic 
democracy of Sparta,51 which had dominated the Athenian militarily during the 
Peloponnesian Wars and later politically in the form of the Thirty Tyrants.  I can’t 
help but wonder if there isn’t a bit of ‘Stockholm Syndrome’ in Plato’s choice of 
Sparta as his role model, yet, the type of education outlined by Plato is consistent 
with the ideal of the paideia, in which the whole individual is to be educated in order 
to be part of an ideal society.  To modern individualistic eyes, the communistic 
Spartan model hardly seems desirable in its harshness, yet its discipline and focus 
assured its historical efficacy, as we still tell of their bravery and civic sacrifice.
Plato’s description of his conception of an ideal society also mirrors what 
Plato took to be the ideal citizen, for both polis and man were to be perfectly 
balanced within an orderly cosmos, with each part performing its own specified 
function, without interfering in the functioning of the other aspects of the society and 
soul.52   We can see how closely the ancients connected the individual to the 
community, for without a good environment and proper education, even the most 




 “…Plato’s ideal, like other theories of paideia, was largely based on the Spartan model, although 
the spirit of it was quite new…. The great social problem of all later Greek educators was to 
determine how individualism might be repressed and the character of every citizen might be 
developed on one communal model.  The Spartan state, with its rigid authoritarianism, appeared to be 
the solution of this problem in actual practice; and as such it occupied Plato’s mind through-out his 
life.” Jaeger, Vol. I, 1939: 80
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society cannot but help produce the ideal citizens, and ideal citizens cannot help but 
produce an ideal society.  They are reciprocal.  As is already obvious, this view has 
many challenges, for the whole thing hinges on how virtue, or arête, is defined, and 
further the Platonic model is predicated on a thought experiment, not really intended 
to be implemented.54  Many of Plato’s ideas of what an ideal society consists of are 
questionable to modern sensibilities, such as the total subjugation of the individual to 
the state, and state’s assignation of fatherhood according to the calendar, and so 
forth.55 While Aristotle agreed with the universal assessment that the polis was 
critical to the creation of virtue, his views were less theoretical than Plato’s and more 
pragmatically focused on how to achieve arête in an imperfect world.
b) Aristotle
As Plato’s student and a fellow-product of the Greek culture, Aristotle had 
many of the same cultural assumptions and beliefs as Plato, but he articulated these 
in his own distinctive fashion.  Whereas Plato was describing both the ideal of man 
and state, as well as the many stages of its decomposition, Aristotle, in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, described a more practical approach to how to cultivate virtue.  
Like Plato, Aristotle believed that arête was a goal to be sought and highly prized.  
But for Aristotle, arête or virtue are highly desirable because of their instrumentality 
in the achievement of eudaemonia, the teleological goal of human life.  Eudaemonia, 
like many Greek terms concerning the human psyche, has no exact English 
translation and is most often interpreted as meaning ‘happiness,’ but a preferable 
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translation is ‘flourishing,’ as flourishing has a more holistic and stable implication 
consistent with the Greek ideal.  Eudaemonia is held to be man’s highest good.56
The virtues and arête are both the means to attain the goal and part of the attainment 
of the goal of happiness (or flourishing) itself, for it is through consistent right action 
and right choices for the right reasons in the right circumstances that one creates the 
ideal person deserving of attaining eudaemonia.  In striving for the ideal of the 
golden mean through the moderation of one’s actions and the cultivation of virtue, 
one becomes habituated to the patterns that contribute to the achievement of 
eudaemonia.57  For Aristotle, practice could literally make perfect, provided one had 
the necessary prerequisites.  Plato was not concerned with the happiness of 
individuals, but rather, he was more interested in the total harmony of the city.58  But 
the underlying assumption is that if the city is in total harmony, then the individual 
citizens that constitute it must likewise be in a subjective state of total harmony.
To achieve the lofty goal of eudaemonia, one must be virtuous.  Aristotle 
defines virtue as functional excellence.  The example he gives is the eye – the virtue 
of the eye is good sight.59  The virtues must be educated, for virtue lies in the middle 
of any two extremes, and is specific to each person, occasion and instance, and 
therefore cannot be subject to a universal standard.  Through instruction and practice, 
intelligence turns tendency into the habit of virtue.60  For Aristotle, virtue must be 
learned and rehearsed until it becomes second-nature, and the citizen is virtuous 
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without having to consciously will or choose to be virtuous, but rather, it happens 
automatically through conditioned response.61  Aristotle also affirmed the unity of all 
the virtues and their total dependence upon the polis for their discovery and 
development.62
Plato believed eudaemonia was to be achieved through the elimination of all 
non-perfection through the process of the elenchus, while Aristotle believed it could 
be achieved through the acquisition and cultivation of the appropriate habits of 
virtue.  Both of them stressed the importance of education to the creation of a 
functional society and citizen, and both were willing to go to extremes to get it.63
We must remember the historic context of these two influential teachers, each of 
whom was fashioned to suit the changing needs of Greek society.  When Plato was 
writing, it was soon after Athens had reasserted her independence from foreign 
domination, and was still recovering from years of war, subjugation and privation.  It 
seems entirely predictable that someone like Socrates would arise to question the old 
status quo that had failed to protect them from the travails of the Peloponnesian War 
and its aftermath.  
Aristotle, on the other hand, was writing during a time of Greek ascendancy, 
a time when Phillip of Macedonia and Aristotle’s tutee, Alexander the Great, were 
conquering unprecedented amounts of territory, peoples and goods.  Again, it seems 
reasonable, given the social context, that Aristotle should not wish to rock the boat 
61
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by speaking truth to authority, and only systematized the beliefs already extant.  As 
the Macedonian Greek fortunes rose, so also did the belief in Greek cultural 
superiority spread.  Like Plato, Aristotle also espoused a fondness for the role model 
of Sparta, renown for its extreme anti-individualism and as an invasive state.64  No 
doubt he found this view helpful in securing the lofty position of tutor to the son of a 
Greek conqueror.
The Greek system was the inspiration for both the Roman and Medieval 
Scholastic approaches to education.  With some modification to be consistent with 
Christianity, this basic teleology was prevalent until the rise of Industrialism, when 
western culture moved from an agricultural-based economy to an industrial-based 
economy.
II.) The Enlightenment Project
The advent of Christianity had a profound affect upon the culture and belief 
system of the west (and east as well, but this work is primarily concerned with the 
culture and education in the United States and its roots), including a profound affect 
upon the motivations and goals of education.  Although much of the language and 
stated goals of education remained unchanged since Hellenic times, the worldview 
and, more importantly, the cosmological view of Man’s place in the universe caused 
a massive shift in the application of education.  The concept of Original Sin, 
advanced by Paul and Augustine, popularized a view of humanity unknown to the 
Hellenes.  In the Christian view, humanity was born in a corrupt state, due to the 
historical failings of the species’ progenitors.  As a result, education was still seen as 
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necessary to the perfecting of the virtues, but the starting place had changed:  instead 
of assuming that man is fundamentally good and simply needs to cultivate good 
habits, as the Hellenistic cultures did, Medieval Christian culture assumed that man 
was inherently evil and a specific kind of theological education was necessary to 
rectify the race.  Education was seen as necessary only to the clergy and the elites, 
without any concern for training citizens (in the few places where citizenship still 
existed) at all, as eras of political upheaval and feudalism required quiescent 
peasants, not free-thinking equals.
This is a profound difference in worldviews, which changes the context in 
which education takes place.  Hence, virtue is still deemed necessary, but for a 
different telos (goal).  Instead of seeking personal and civic fulfillment through 
eudaemonia, the Medieval Christian culture sought salvation from damnation, 
implying a more pessimistic orientation.  Reliance on reason was replaced with 
reliance on faith and grace, as human reason, taken alone, was held to be too fallible 
to depend upon.  The emphasis on the negative aspects of humanity can be 
sociologically understood as a reaction to the fall of the Roman Empire and the 
resulting social chaos and degeneration.  Without the stability provided by Pax 
Romana, the world must have seemed bleak indeed, and as there was no end in sight 
to the devolution of civilization, it is understandable why emphasis would be placed 
on seeking a better afterlife, as living a virtuous life in during the Dark Ages was not 
the guarantee of happiness and success promised by Aristotle (who, nevertheless, 
was considered a guiding light by the scholastics).
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As Europe became more stable economically and politically, the Renaissance 
was born in the wealthy city-states of mercantile Italy and spread throughout Europe.  
It does not seem unreasonable to link (at least in part) the growing economic stability 
with the rising optimism and appreciation for that which is good in humanity, as is 
evidenced in the Renaissance.  At this point, Plato was re-introduced back into 
western culture, inspiring the new humanism, which relied more on human capacities 
for reason and conscience than on revealed truth.  With the faith in human ability 
restored, scientific inquiry emerged (slowly at first, and then with increasing alacrity) 
as a valid method of gaining knowledge about the world and the self.  Education, 
although limited primarily to the wealthy, became more and more open to the new 
knowledge generated by science, and less and less dominated by history and
theological doctrine.  
Protestantism rejected much of the perceived corruption and superstition of 
the Roman Catholic Church, but it also shattered the mostly homogeneous 
worldview shared throughout the West since the consolidations of the Middle Ages. 
As the Church lost power and influence, she fought back with inquisitions and witch-
hunts, but she could not fight back the tide of the Protestant Reformation.  In 
America particularly, the Puritan belief in the value of work and individual efforts 
revived a social belief in human capacity.  Reason once again became acceptable and 
the world saw a proliferation of invention and “natural” philosophy.  Thinkers such 
as Rousseau, Kant, and Hume sought to find a new ground for a morality that had 
lost its universal grounding during the Renaissance and Reformation.65
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With the resurrected belief in the ability of human intellect to save humanity, 
the intellectual elites in western culture attempted to create a utopia founded upon 
logic, reason and technology.  It was believed that human ability was sufficient to 
solve any problem, natural or social, and that because of the intrinsic value of 
humanity, each citizen is guaranteed certain “inalienable” rights by sheer virtue of 
being part of the species. As such, many consciously undertook the so-called 
“Enlightenment Project,” which was to raise humanity out of the mire of superstition 
and fear through the application of reason and technology.  
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was believed widely that
rationality could save humanity from its own vulnerability and mortality.66  To this 
end, science was invented to predict and control nature. Our own nation was created 
out of this matrix of humanistic optimism and Protestant industriousness.  The 
Founders believed that the creation of America was a providential act, lending sacred 
significance not only to the American goals of equality and liberty, but also lent an 
air of righteousness to our politics.  This belief in the inspired nature of our national 
policies still lingers and has troubling implications for international relations with 
nations operating under very different religious worldviews.  At this point, public 
informed and able to critically evaluate in order to participate in the self-government
of the new republic.  Yet, like the ancient democracies that the United States was 
modeled upon, the definition of citizen was extremely limited and only applied to a 
small segment of society.  As noted in the previous chapter, modern critiques about 
the motives of education within society are important considerations, questioning 
what the goals of education truly are: are they truly to benefit the individual and 
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society through the dissemination of skills and knowledge, or is education merely 
another tool of political power and social control?
Alasdair MacIntyre tells us that the Enlightenment Project failed when those 
seeking a universal foundation for morality failed to find a metaphysical grounding 
for ethics that everyone could embrace.67  They thought they could manipulate life as 
effortlessly as Mozart seemed to manipulate music with mathematical precision.  
What they failed to recognize was that the source of that beautifully balanced and 
predictable music was himself erratic and unpredictable.  You can’t control genius. 
All of these attempts to rectify morality failed.  Based upon the same structure 
exposited by Aristotle, they all assumed human potentiality, rationality and some 
telos (although they disagreed over what that telos would be) to aim for.  The 
foundation of Christian values within this system added a layer of Divine Law not 
present in the original Greek model.  These new values carried with them an implicit 
belief in revelation and absolutism that rendered reason untrustworthy, which in turn, 
led to the divorce of reason from faith and morality.68  It is believed by some that this 
split between reason, faith and morality eventually caused the Enlightenment Project 
to falter and fail.69
a) Rousseau
Rousseau set Europe aflame with revolutionary spirit when he stated that most of 
the monarchial governments in existence at the time of his writings were not 
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legitimate, and were ripe for a justifiable revolt.70  Rousseau based this claim upon 
an even more incendiary claim in the basic goodness of human nature.  Denying the 
Christian doctrine of Original Sin, Rousseau maintained that man’s basic nature is 
fundamentally good, if entirely self-centered, and only becomes corrupt through the 
exposure to the evils of society, where he is made into a slave of social convention.71
As such, Rousseau was a historical pessimist, who did not see humanity as moving 
towards a future utopia, but rather, saw the species in a state of degradation and 
devolution.72  Rousseau focused on culture in political life more than any other 
philosopher of his era.  The Social Contract, the tacit agreement to live in a 
civilization and to abide by its rules and standards in order to receive its protection 
and benefits, can only be effective if supported by institutions and practices.73  For 
Rousseau, civic virtue is founded on moral self-interest, in which the free individual 
gives up his Natural Liberty in order to gain security and Civic Liberty. 74  Civic 
Virtue entails the sublimation of the citizen’s own wants and desires to the good of 
the community, gaining his own satisfaction through the satisfaction of everyone. 
This is in contrast to private self-interest, in which the individual identifies with her 
wants and desires as parts of herself, and demands special priority of her own
desires.75 76  This is a very similar position to that of Communitarianism.
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Rousseau worried about the loss of the citizen’s sovereignty by the government, 
usurping the power of the General Will of the citizens (which Rousseau saw as the 
sole legitimate authority in a government) for its own ends.77  The weakening of the 
General Will of a nation is caused, in Rousseau’s thought,  by the weakening of 
social ties, resulting in a loss in the unity of the state and a rise in private interest.  
This echoes Plato’s warning about a rise in self-interest leading to a democracy’s 
slide into tyranny.
 Rousseau advocated the abolition of social evil and tyranny through revolution, 
while at the same time abhorring the danger and evils engendered by revolution, this 
resulted in a seeming conflict unresolved in his writings.  On the one hand, he seems 
to foment rebellion, while simultaneously fearing it and warning against it.78
Although he claims to not have meant to incite revolution, revolutionaries in France 
and Europe, in general, were inspired by his thought.
Rousseau believed that humanity had been corrupted by social conditioning, 
subscribing to a belief in the “Noble Savage.”79 The domestication of humans, 
according to Rousseau, was a corrupting influence that resulted in making humanity 
competitive, exploitative and paranoid, for dependence upon others was deemed to 
conflict with humanity’s natural independence and selfishness.80  Christianity, he 
held, contributed to this corruption through the diversion of attention away from this 
life and onto an afterlife, through the persecution of non-believers, and through the 
rise of a powerful priesthood, which vied with the state for supreme power. The only 
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cure Rousseau saw for this was the creation of ardent patriots, who ruthlessly 
repressed their own individualism and lived for the success of the state, with 
revolution only as a last resort for a flailing humanity.81  For Rousseau, the old 
Homeric values of manly virtue and strength were the long lost pinnacle of mankind, 
now doomed to inequity and vice due to corruption and weakness.82  He outlined the 
grounds on which patriots could justifiable rebel. But Rousseau never expected this 
to happen, for his belief was the future was so pessimistic that his guidelines would 
most likely not be utilized, as people are too cowardly to rebel and the corrupt 
government in need of over-throwing too powerful.83 84
Rousseau dared to write about freedom and the sovereignty of the people in order 
to keep these ancient ideals from dying out altogether.85  Rousseau warned against 
the corruption of progress, civilization, and modernization in the hopes of delaying, 
if he could not altogether stop, the inevitable decay of humanity.   He tried to 
minimize and diminish the bad effects of political enslavement, to keep alive the 
ancient ideals of freedom and moral health, and to teach humanity how to live under 
permanent tyranny.   For Rousseau feared that the future would hold only the loss of 
human vitality through social vices, leaving humanity a species of petty criminals.86
80
 Melzer, 1983: 300
81
 Rousseau, 1968: 108
82
 Melzer, 1983: 303
83
 “Culture of the wrong sort creates self-interested individuals for whom free-riding is inevitable, 
hence for whom successful political life is unattainable.  But culture of the proper sort creates 
individuals who face political cooperation with a sense of membership in and loyalty to a group.” 
Trachtenberg, 1993: 72
84
 Melzer, 1983: 305 and Rousseau, 1968:  89
85
 Melzer, 1983: 311
86
 Melzer, 1983: 317
44
87
  Rousseau calls upon humanity to recall their innate goodness and to eschew the 
corrupting influences of luxury, inequality and other socially derived evils.  In his 
treatise on education and character formation, Emile, Rousseau expounds the 
protection of emerging spirit of young and the rejection of willing slavery.  Rousseau 
saw education as a preparation for life, much as the ancient Greeks and Romans did, 
often referring to the Spartans and Romans as role models.  Rousseau would likely 
take issue with the modern view of education as vocational training.88
While our society socializes us to be obedient to authority, Rousseau would teach 
the youth to be resilient and self-reliant.89  I will consider Rousseau’s view of the self 
in detail in Chapter Five.
b) Kant and the Birth of the Modern Era
Immanuel Kant did not address the question of moral education directly, but 
his work to establish a universal morality had a profound affect upon the theoretical 
framework undergirding education.  For instance, the Social Constructivist schools 
of sociology and education have adopted a primarily Kantian model and 
epistemology.  This attempt accompanied a growing faith in human capacity to 
discover and master the laws of nature.  The rise of science led to specialization, 
which effectively destroyed the ancient belief in the unity of knowledge.  Ethics was 
reduced to the rarified strata of meta-ethics and highly abstract normative ethics.  
With the shattering of the homogeneity of the Roman Catholic Church and 
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proliferation of Protestant sects, Kant sought a universal foundation for morality, not 
dependent upon belief or religion.  Kant and the Enlightenment Project rejected the 
ancient Greek (and scholastic) teleological framework of virtue theory.  Kant wanted 
to ground morality on human reason, not virtue, since virtue is subject to 
interpretation.90  For Kant, in order for people to be considered truly rational, the will 
(or reason) must be free.91  To be a rational being implies the obligation to live under 
a self-imposed moral law.92
Kant divides the world into two realms: that of the sensible – the empirical 
world of the body and appearances; and the intelligible world of ideas and reason, in 
which things are known in themselves.93  Although the intelligible world is causal to 
the sensible world, the intelligible world cannot be known directly.  As individuals 
partake in the intelligible world, they cannot directly observe themselves, and as they 
partake in the sensible world, the self that is knowable is only mere appearance and 
not the true self.94   Since morality cannot be proven empirically, and individuals 
cannot gain self-knowledge through introspection, Kant must rely on human reason 
and duty to compel morality.  This is a complete rejection of the ancient Delphic 
injunction to “Know Thyself,” as Kant denies that this is even possible.  
The implications for moral education shift from a holistic training for 
citizenship to a formulation of maxims and universal duties. As all individuals are 
independent moral agents, others are never to be used merely as a means, but are 
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always to be considered to be ends in themselves, and given due proper 
consideration as such.95  The shift from holism to lawmaking called for teaching an 
entirely different skill set to students.   Kant’s endeavor to find an objective 
justification for morality divorced moral worth from outcomes, and a rejection of 
teleology.  For Kant, only a good will has moral worth, as it alone is incorruptible 
and unconditioned.96  This undercuts the ancient view of virtue and arête, rendering 
practices and habits secondary to the cultivation of the good will.  Therefore, 
students must be taught a universal formulae for determining morality and duty 
(called the Categorical Imperative - the Ten Commandments and Golden Rule were 
Kant’s inspiration). This is unmistakably the influence of monotheism on meta-
ethics, which stresses the law and justice above balance and compassion.  But critics 
tell us that Kant failed to provide sufficient support for his system, instead he merely 
asserts its truth.97
In response to Kant’s failure to give the framework he intended, Kierkegaard 
took the next logical step into what MacIntyre calls “emotivism,” meaning the belief 
that personal preference is the legitimate ground for all evaluative pronouncements.98
Kierkegaard, seeing that reason was unable to ground morality and faith, placed the 
burden on choice.  Hume tried to ground ethics in desire.  Bentham responded to 
Kant’s failure with the hedonic calculations of utility, while Mill responded with the 
division of pleasure into higher and lower varieties.99  The collective attempts of 
these philosophers to find a universal justification and grounds for moral truths 
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hastened the growth of relativism, as each new universal solution was only universal 
for some. 
c)   Founding of America
With the rise of technology and the Industrial Revolution, culture in the West 
shifted radically from a rural agrarian-based society to an urban production-based 
society.  This shift not only changed the traditional basic structures of society (for 
example, the shift from large, self-sufficient extended families to smaller, nuclear 
suburban families), but the mandate of education also changed again.  Instead of the 
purpose of education being to produce functional citizens, princes and leaders, the 
purpose of education became to produce minimally skilled workers.  The rise of the 
factories changed everything, as the end of the industrial era in our own day is 
changing everything once again.  
Liberation from the burden of manual labor allowed leisure for 
unprecedented numbers of individuals.  The success of science and technology 
created the sense that all of humanity’s problems could be solved by human reason 
and technology.  It then seemed reasonable to believe that all of humanity’s myriad 
issues could be reduced to a few simple equations discoverable through the 
application of reason. The rise of science and technology brought forth an age of 
revolutions in the west, as the new worldview supplanted the old, replacing a 
universal homogeneous cosmology with a worldview predicated on empirical 
observation of specific phenomena.  Taylor credits the rise of what he calls 
“Instrumental Reason,” which entails the use of rationality to maximize efficiency 
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and profits, with the hastening of the loss of cosmic order.  Without a deity as the 
foundation of morality, individual desires and preferences are elevated to the role of 
prime motivator.100  I hold this to be roughly equivalent to MacIntyre’s idea of 
“Emotivism.”  The shift from the universal to the specific also took place at the level 
of the society, with the rising demand for individual rights.  An increased emphasis 
on autonomy led to the overthrow of many ancient monarchies.  The democracies 
and republics that replaced them looked back to the Hellenic thinkers for inspiration 
and role models.  Innovation and technology increasingly became the order of the 
day, as science found solutions to many of life’s perennial problems, promising a 
bright and easy future.
As America entered the twentieth century, both technology and the 
population grew at unprecedented rates, causing even greater social change.  As the 
democratic ideal of equality was expanded to become more and more inclusive, 
individual rights became the focus of political thought and innovation.  Hence, 
access to affordable public higher education was included as a civic right – a right 
that large numbers of World War II veterans exercised en mass after the conclusion 
of hostilities.  Through the G.I. Bill, higher education became widely accessible to 
the middle and lower classes, immigrants and minorities alike.101  Increasingly, 
higher education became vocational training of highly specialized knowledge to 
accommodate the burgeoning number of college students seeking higher paying jobs.   
By the 1960s, in the name of protection of minorities and families, character 
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education was abandoned in favor of vocational training, and Liberal Education 
began its decline.
c) Civil Rights Movement/Rise of Neutral Liberalism  
The Civil Rights movement sought to correct the many abuses of oppression, 
slavery and segregation for women and minorities.  Focusing on claiming the 
equality segment of American Dream, the suffragettes and sit-in participants 
embodied an expanded definition of citizenship.  This expanded sense of citizenship 
was supported by a complex framework of federal laws and shifting social values.  
Traditional class boundaries broke down with the rise of the middle class during the 
1950s and 1960s, and the emphasis turned to making sure that citizens’ rights were 
being respected and upheld.  The 1960s and 1970s saw the largest expansion of civil 
rights in the history of this nation.102  The protection of those hard-won rights for 
minority students created a vast bureaucracy in higher education to oversee and 
administer to them, known as Affirmative Action.  Though often condemned by 
detractors as the application of racial and gender quotas, Affirmative Action was 
intended to correct glaring abuses of the past.  In an age of growing litigation, 
Affirmative Action also had the responsibility of protecting state schools and 
universities from prosecution, making them the buffer between the students’ 
constitutional right and the institute of higher learning.  Along with the protection of 
the rights of women and minorities, religion also played a significant role advancing 
the protection of students’ rights.  With the rising tide of multiculturalism, state 
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schools had to cope with students coming from many divergent traditions, belief 
systems and worldviews.  In order to provide a more level playing field, it was 
thought prudent to drop character education classes or programs that contained any 
vestiges of religious, racial or gender bias.
Derek Bok identifies five reasons for the change from the ancient view of 
education (in which all education contained a moral element), to the modern view 
(where moral education, if addressed at all, is often marginalized in public higher 
education).  First, Darwin and evolutionary theory undermines the teleological view 
of the unity of all knowledge; Second, the rise of academic research and empiricism 
further removed traditional values from education; Third, the professionalization of 
curriculum placed importance on research and funding, not the modeling of moral 
character by faculty; Fourth, the social change caused by the shift from a rural 
agrarian culture to one of urban industrialism; and finally, the widespread practice of 
awarding tenure for research and publication, and not for good teaching.103  We shall 
see the political and social ramifications of this shift in educational goals and ideals 
and their impact on the Formative Project in the next chapter.
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A) Communitarian Complaints Against Neutral Liberalism
Neutral Liberalism holds that each citizen is entitled to protection of her or 
his personal liberties under the law.  Presidents and pundits extol the virtues of 
Liberty and Freedom, and the power of Democracy to transform terrorist threats into 
peaceful markets and allies (whether or not this is true is another debate).  But what 
do they mean by this magic-like condition known commonly as Liberty?  Michael 
Beatty tells us: 
The dominant narrative in the West is the narrative of 
emancipation that posits the happiness of individuals as the 
ultimate aim of all social and political institutions.  Happiness 
requires freedom.  Thus, the narrative of emancipation 
evaluates all institutions by their liberation or emancipation of 
individuals.  Modernity, then, is the story of the growth of 
individual freedom and its corollary, liberal democracy.104
As the dominant theme in our culture, liberty dictates  the justification of all 
social and political institutions seek their justification for existence here.  But we 
don’t really know what liberty actually entails in practical life, as its definition seems 
to vary from case to case, making it very difficult to discern where we are and how 
we are doing with respect to liberty. 
 One individual’s liberation can be another individual’s coercion, as 
evidenced by debates over choice versus right to life, or over separation of church 
and state versus individual free speech, or over Affirmative Action versus reverse 




against the rights of another.  
Are there certain criteria by which we can recognize and evaluate liberty?  
Are we all using the same definition, or are there subtle differences which hide an 
unexplored world of political and social implications?  Politicians on the campaign 
trail rarely define such emotionally-laden terms as liberty, allowing each potential 
constituent to fill in the blanks for themselves in order to appeal to the widest 
possible audience.  
Is liberty just having the freedom to do whatever you want, whenever you 
want?  Does liberty mean having an open market and the ability to choose between 
different brands and prices of merchandise?  Or is liberty the holding of free 
elections that elect government representative of the citizens?  Is liberty the 
guaranteed government protection of inalienable individual rights, for minorities as 
well as the voting majority?  Does liberty in the United States mean the same thing 
as liberty in other nations?  Should we apply the same criteria and standards of 
liberty to other countries as we apply at home?  But, most critically, what do we 
mean when we use liberty to justify war?  If we are not clear about why we are 
killing and dying, how can we honestly claim that our cause is just and our sacrifices 
not in vain?
The answers to many of these questions are not immediately obvious or 
simple to identify, and are beyond the scope of this work.  But we must take up the 
question of the interpretation of liberty, where it relates to the inculcation of 
democratic values in our children and young adults.  Throughout the history of our 
democracy, different voices have meant different things when speaking of liberty.  
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Yet all use the same terminology to reach radically different conclusions.105  As we 
explore the primary ways that liberty has been employed historically, we shall see 
how its meaning comes to bear on our topic of moral and civic education.  The study 
of social and political theory begins with the basic disagreement over the goals and 
ultimate purpose of a society, each of which has far-reaching implications and 
intentions.106  This disagreement is over the nature of liberty, one of the two 
founding principles or ideals of the United States of America.  The other main 
American principle is that of equality, which conflicts with liberty just as often as it 
nurtures liberty. 
There are two primary ways of defining liberty, according to tradition.  Isaiah 
Berlin most succinctly distinguishes the two as Negative Liberty and Positive 
Liberty.  Negative Liberty is defined as the ‘freedom from interference,’ while 
Positive Liberty is defined as ‘freedom to… (fill in the blank),’ or autonomy.107
Berlin describes Negative Liberty as equivalent to the extent to which no one else 
controls or interferes from the outside with our will.  The more outside interference 
that exists, the less freedom exists, even resulting in outright enslavement, even if the 
individual in question appears superficially to be free from observable constraints.  
Under this definition, coercion is seen as the deliberate interference in the actions of 
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others to prevent the execution of a chosen action, and so, must have a human 
source.  This allows the exclusion of natural impediments, such as disease or 
physical handicap, from being considered coercive, but does not excuse human-
generated handicaps like poverty or class status.108  The elimination of interference 
with the individual requires that they be granted certain protected rights; in America, 
these government protected rights were enacted through the Bill of Rights, amended 
to the United States’ Constitution, which promises its citizens, no matter how poor or 
insignificant, ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.’ This is the definition we 
most often hear espoused by adherents to Neutral Liberalism:  Liberty is seen is the 
guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens equally and the protection of minorities.  
Prior to the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s, racism was an institutionalized 
leftover from pre-Civil War slavery.  Jim Crow laws still prevailed, with minorities 
marginalized and harassed.  
Embracing the rhetoric of exponents of Neutral Liberalism such as John 
Rawls, the middle decades of the twentieth century became devoted to securing more 
and more rights for under-privileged and exploited groups, even while those same 
protected minorities were essentially barred from actual participation in government 
on the local, state and national levels due to ingrained prejudice and lack of 
resources.  Many past injustices of racism and intolerance were finally recognized 
and addressed for the first time in the middle of the last century, even if many remain 
unresolved to this day.  Americans became tempted to think of any form of 
constraint as enslavement, as more and more emphasis was placed on individual 
choice as exercised in a free marketplace of ideas and goods. American freedom was 
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expressed in the choice of religion, location, way of life, speech, and most 
importantly, in the marketplace.  Anything that enhanced individual freedom was 
justified, and anything that obstructed individual freedom was challenged.  
Adam Smith’s eighteenth century utilitarian concept of the “Invisible Hand” 
holds that somehow all personal interests harmonize naturally, since individual 
freedom is assumed to be the ultimate good, and universal freedom would be the 
highest possible good.  This view also holds that selfishness is good for progress 
because it drives economic markets and invention.109 This view assumes an 
underlying harmony and balance of individual human self-interest that is often 
lacking in an age of faceless multi-national corporations and global bureaucracies.
But freedom from oppression and coercion alone are not sufficient to create 
the multi-cultural utopia promised by the Neutral Liberal theorists and proponents. 
Bias, cultural prejudice and intolerance can run very deep, and the rights of the 
minority can and will conflict with the will of the majority.   As I noted above, far 
too often one citizen’s liberty is another citizen’s oppression, as in the case of those 
who complain that religious holiday symbols on state property is a violation of the 
separation of church and state, versus those who complain that the removal of 
nativity scenes and the Ten Commandments from state property is not only 
discrimination, but also ignores the assumed will of the majority of citizens, as the 
majority of citizens are overwhelmingly Christian.  
Obviously, with so many competing interests, each with a valid point to 
make, it is common for the needs of some not to be met, and for the powerful to 
oppress the weak, despite ever-increasing new rights granted by the government.  
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How are we to adjudicate between rival claims when both sides have viable but 
conflicting arguments, based on the same principle of liberty as seen through 
different prisms?  Who must the government protect – the minorities or the majority?  
The interests of the one (or the minority) often conflicts with the interest of the 
many.  Who shall be asked to give up their rights so that someone else’s rights might 
be preserved, if all are considered equally entitled?
Mill, Locke and Tocqueville each believed in the necessity for a minimal area 
of inviolable personal freedom in order to develop properly as a whole human being.  
This requires a boundary of some kind between the impingement of the government 
and the personal promise of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” however that 
individual should construe it. But the difficulty lies in where to place that 
boundary.110  The necessity of living with others requires that we be willing to give 
up some of our radical liberty in order to live together in peace and relative 
security.111
The question becomes: how much liberty is it permissible to give up for the 
promise of protection and access to markets without being subject to oppression 
and/or exploitation?  This is what John Rawls sought to address with his creation of 
‘the Original Position,’ in which the principles for organizing a totally equal and just 
society are sought.112  In order for each individual to retain as much natural liberty as 
possible, absolute equality must be sought.  To a great extent, our social and political 
policies are founded on the belief in creating an even playing field for people of 
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diverse backgrounds.  The willingness to give up a bit of one’s own freedom in order 
that all others might be more free is at the heart of Neutral Liberalism, with the 
underlying unquestioned assumption that limited freedom for all is a higher good 
than unlimited freedom for an elite few and oppression for the rest. This is in accord 
with the utilitarian principles of Mill and Bentham.  And public policy attempts to 
take up this noble and lofty ambition through legislation and public policy.  
But even the noblest and loftiest of ambitions can go awry in application.  
Affirmative Action is a prime example of the state’s attempt to provide equal access 
to minorities, but this is considered reverse discrimination by those groups 
accustomed to privileged access as part of the majority.  It has been appropriately 
assigned to the courts to weigh the arguments on these kinds of value judgments that 
pit individual or minority rights against the will of the majority.  But the decisions of 
the courts cannot help but be affected by whichever definition of liberty they may be 
employing, and the prevailing definition is usually decided emotionally and 
politically, not through careful rational analysis and consideration of alternatives and 
implications.  The Bill of Rights was enacted to protect the individual or minorities 
from the power of the majority, yet its application in the courts is likewise affected 
by the prevailing political milieu, granting more or less weight to the rights of the
minority depending on the current environment.
The other interpretation of freedom, that of Positive Liberty, is defined as 
self-rule in which the individual is an agent unto themselves, and not the instrument 
of another.  It means to be conscious of one’s self as an doer of one’s own 
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purposes.113 The perennial problem with this self-mastery is that one can be free of 
outside interference and still be a slave to one’s own passions or nature.  Isaiah 
Berlin answers this challenge with a call to self-governance and self-control.  By 
building the locus of liberty into the individual and not the government, political 
bodies cannot give liberty nor take it away.  In this sense, the concept of freedom is 
derived directly from the concepts of self, and is not dependent upon prevailing 
political opinion.  
This approach employs a dualistic model of the self: a higher self, which is an 
idealized self controlled by reason – the autonomous self; and a lower self, which is 
controlled by passion and desire, the empirical self.114 The impulsive lower self 
should be subject to the cool rulership of the higher self.  This view parallels 
Aristotle’s distinction between the rational self and the irrational self, or perhaps 
more recently, Freud’s distinction between the Id and Superego, with Ego serving as 
the go-between.  Positive Liberty holds that no matter what the physical 
circumstances, and individual can always choose what attitude they will take 
internally towards the external circumstance.  It is through education and self-
knowledge that individuals learn how to strengthen and exercise this inner freedom.  
This position is similar also to that held by the Stoics and Epicureans, who believed 
that inner peace and contentment is not dependent upon external contingencies, but 
rather believed that any unwanted desire, pain and fear can be transcended, leaving 
the individual no longer at the mercy of “the slings and arrows of outrageous 
fortune.”  
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Berlin suggests that people may project their higher selves onto a social 
context, such as race, tribe, church or nation, which then impinges upon the lower 
selves of the community (such as naughty members of the collective) and brings 
them into line with the collective ideals.115  Rousseau refers to this projection of the 
individual higher self onto the state as the General Will, to which each citizen must 
subject themselves.116  Through this projection, the collective selves gain a higher 
freedom by taming their bodily natures.  The obvious problem with this arrangement 
is that it can suppress and coerce individuals into conformity with the majority view, 
whether the dominant view is accurate or not.  
Two vital questions arise:  First, at what point is it permissible to coerce an 
individual for their own good?  Rousseau believed that an individual can and should 
be coerced into freedom for his or her own good, for in their state of ignorance, 
citizens will not understand the benefits of the liberty being offered until they have 
tasted it.  
Democracies are dependent upon an educated and well-informed public who 
can make informed and well-considered decisions, for themselves, for their 
communities and for their nation; to that end, we have state mandated primary and 
secondary education.  Consistent with Beatty’s concept of the dominant Western 
narrative of emancipation, it is argued that a minimum mandatory education is 
necessary to equip a democracy’s citizenry with the minimum skills needed to be 
productive and participate in that society.  To provide less than this is considered to 
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deny the principle of liberty, as a totally illiterate and uneducated citizen will not be 
capable of independence in a literate society.  Nor could they easily inform 
themselves objectively on political issues in order to make up their own minds.  The 
continued existence of academe is thereby justified as furthering the goals of liberty 
and independence.117  Hence, in America and most other democracies, children have 
compulsory education for their own good, and to abridge or terminate this process is 
considered un-American and bad parenting. 
This, in turn, leads to other important questions: How much compulsion is 
too much?  Is there a universal minimum for coercion or does each individual have 
unique tolerances – do some students require a firmer hand, while others need more 
space to figure it out for themselves? When does coercion for the others’ own good 
become oppression and tyranny?  Who decides what that boundary is and using what 
criteria?  What should be included or excluded from the curriculum? Who decides –
using what standards?  Who should be considered qualified to teach or develop 
curriculum?  Who watches for abuse?  How are abuses reported and dealt with?  This 
list of questions is just the beginning of an avalanche of concerns regarding public 
education.
Secondly, what if the majority (who control public policy in a democracy 
through the election of their chosen representatives and their obedience to 
legislation) is wrong, deceived or manipulated?  Hitler would not have been able to 
For Rousseau, the rights of the individual were subordinate to the preservation of the harmony of the 
state.
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do what he did if the vast majority of Germans did not go along.  One of Socrates’ 
most stinging criticisms of democracy is the observation that democracy glorifies 
‘mob rule,’ which is notorious for often being extreme and reactionary, established 
in fear.118
The Founding Fathers subscribed to a humanist belief in the innate nobility of 
humanity that, given freedom from oppression and external coercion, will naturally 
blossom into creativity and prosperity.  This nation was founded on a profound faith 
in the goodness of human nature, which undergirded the call for majority rule.  They 
believed that rulership by popular vote would not only correct the many abuses of 
the ancient monarchial system that concentrated power into the hands of an elite few, 
but the founding generation of America also believed that the common sense of the 
majority would balance out extremes in public policy, resulting in a mostly 
conservative state resistant to radical change.  But the founders of America never 
foresaw the use of the internet, media, advertising and public relations firms to 
disseminate “spin” to the masses.  If public opinion is swayed and manipulated by a 
slick ad campaign, a catchy jingle or a politician’s oft-replayed public faux pau 
calculated to maximize impact by highly-skilled specialists backed by meticulous 
research, then it follows that the conditions which the Founders assumed as baseline 
to American society and government no longer apply.  If this conclusion is correct, 
then the majority cannot be depended upon to balance out the more radical political 
extremes as in the past, as they are under the influence of advertisers and spin 
doctors.  Unless the electorate is capable of seeing through sophisticated public 
relations campaigns in politics and social issues, we no longer have true free will in 
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our politics and democratic culture.  Instead of a true democracy as envisioned by the 
Founding Fathers, we will have a form of mob rule, controlled by whoever is most 
effective in stirring up the passions of the mob - exactly the danger in democracy that 
Plato warned against over two millennia ago.
 2) Arguments For and Against the Formative Project
When national politics began to focus on civil rights in the middle of the 
twentieth century, anything that smacked of ‘old school’ elitism was suspect, as the 
emphasis shifted from maintaining the political status quo of the dominating 
Caucasian males to empowering minorities to claim the civil liberties long promised 
but usually denied them.  At the middle and late decades of the twentieth century, the 
Formative Project was mostly abandoned by the educational system, which was 
straining to adjust to the challenge of integration and feminism, (however, the Black 
Civil Rights and Feminist Movements also had strong Communitarian features). The 
old system of inculcating the Protestant Anglo patriarchy’s ethos was no longer 
suited to an emerging multicultural and mixed gendered nation.  During this time, 
politics were focused on the ‘Equality’ aspect of democracy.  This led to a primary 
focus on Negative Liberty, when oppressed minorities found the voice to demand 
their constitutional rights in numbers too large to ignore or suppress.  There was a 
shift from an elitist model of education (in which the goal was the training and 
preparation of future leaders and landed gentry), to a more egalitarian view of 
education (based upon the principles of utilitarianism, which sought to maximize the 
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individual’s happiness).119  Political fervor began to focus on guaranteeing rights, 
rather than on actually including and empowering these newly ‘equalized’ minorities 
in government.  Hence, we still find that the vast majority of our elected 
representatives are wealthy, white, land-owing males, with just a handful of women 
and non-Anglos.  
Social Political theorist Michael Sandel identifies two primary objections to 
the revitalization of Positive Liberty (which includes the Formative Project), what he 
calls Civic Freedom: first is the objection that the world has become so complex that 
it is unrealistic to revive this interpretation of liberty; the second objection doubts 
that Positive Liberty is something early twenty-first century Americans would find 
appealing.120 These objections are based on the argument that average modern 
peoples do not have the leisure to learn and debate about public concerns.  Further, 
we live in a highly diverse mobile society inside of global markets, a condition 
which does not foster community involvement.  Another argument against Positive 
Liberty is that the rise of Procedural Liberalism (the government granting and 
protecting of rights for citizens) is seen as an improvement over historic civil abuses 
and that the loss of community and self-government is worth the gain in tolerance 
and individual choice.  
Underlying these objections, Sandel claims, are two fears of republicanism: 
that of elitism and coerciveness.  The Formative Project is seen as coercive, as it is 
decidedly not neutral about its emphasis on virtue, and elitist, as virtue has 
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historically been tied to class role.  But Sandel claims that virtue is not necessarily 
intrinsic to republicanism or elitism, as virtue can and should be taught publicly 
through the auspices of the Formative Project.  Yet, the Formative Project is often 
suspect in democracy, because it runs the risk of becoming coercive, a form of ‘soul-
craft.’121  Like Sandel, I agree that such ‘soul-craft’ need not be destructive of the 
students’ individual will, as Rousseau’s approach tends toward.122  But rather, moral 
education within the Formative Project can gently promote independence and 
personal sound judgment through persuasion and habituation, instead of through 
authority and punishment.  Unlike Rousseau’s assumption of the need for a unified 
republic, Sandel argues that a return to a republican construal of Liberty does not 
require mindless conformity or coercion to achieve it. 
Neutral Liberalism (or what Sandel calls Voluntarism, defined as respecting 
the rights of freely choosing selves) was supposed to avoid the risks of the Formative 
Project as it detached itself from the concept of self-government and focused on 
individual choice.  Thus the Formative Project was narrowed to teaching tolerance 
and respect in public elementary schools.  This approach eliminates problems of self-
rule, as well as debate over what constitutes ‘the good life,’ thus making morality no 
longer a publicly debated issue, but more one of personal preference.  Sandel points 
out several problems with the view of citizens as free atomistic agents: this view 
leaves out the real obligations and beliefs of citizens, thus assuming a range of 
options which may or may not be viable for all citizens.  The bracketing of morality 
in order to avoid a public debate over ‘the good’ is not satisfying emotionally nor 
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socially, for without public moral debate, Sandel claims that the public focus will 
shift to exposing the vices and scandals of politicians.  Another result of this 
Voluntarist view is the loss of mastery, in which freedom becomes equated with the 
accumulation of more rights, but less actual citizen control over their own lives.  
Sandel claims that current political conditions prove that liberty cannot be separated 
from self-governance because a Liberal Procedural republic cannot inspire moral and 
civil engagement.  Hence the dire need for a national Formative Project.123
Rousseau argued that a choice must be made between creating a man or a 
citizen, as the two were diametrically opposed to one another.124  For Rousseau, man 
is atomistic, independent, selfish and free because his powers equal his needs.  
Whereas citizens are part of a larger whole, dependent upon society, but still free 
within the confines of the General Will.  A citizen is a natural man stripped of his 
independent forces.  Rousseau believed that both natural man and citizens are created 
through what we now call enculturation.  Current thought in Social Psychology 
would agree.125  Human nature itself is plastic enough to accommodate whatever 
programming shapes it.  No matter what we do, through our educational processes, 
we are creating one kind of individual or another.  As we saw above, one of the 
most-cited fears of moral education is the fear of indoctrination.  But no matter what 
approach we take to moral education, whether we are for it or against it, no matter 
what our beliefs tell us is right, we are indoctrinating students.  The essential nature 
of education is indoctrination of one variety or another.  Even teaching students how 
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to evaluate and think for themselves is still a form of indoctrination, as it still has a 
specific agenda informed by particular values, which tend to result in predictable 
dilemmas and triumphs.  Indoctrination cannot be avoided in education.  The Big 
Question is ‘what is being indoctrinated and by whom?’  The real fear behind 
indoctrination is loss or abuse of power, as students are in a vulnerable position 
relative to the faculty.  The fear is that students will be warped according to a 
professor’s or a university’s bias, rendering them pliable to manipulation by 
unscrupulous individuals, corporations or movements, or infringing on their First 
Amendment rights.
Another fear generated by the Formative Project includes that of colonization 
or imperialism, in which students are taught to how to exploit those less fortunate, 
inculcating prejudice and intolerance.  Serious concerns are also raised over the 
content of the Formative Project and the criteria for evaluation.  Moral content has 
traditionally come from religious sources, yet the Formative Project cannot 
undertake to teach morality without drawing from some source, and religious sources 
are not appropriate for state universities.  State schools in particular must be careful 
not to teach morality in any manner which could be construed as religious 
proselytizing, which would violate the students’ First Amendment rights.  Yet, the 
curriculum must at the same time be acceptable to the majority, who support state 
universities with their taxes.  The question arises: is it possible to teach morality 
without abstracting it to meaninglessness or reducing it to enforcing rules?126
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Derek Bok offers a five-part suggestion for the restoration of moral 
education. These are: 1) offering courses in applied ethics; 2) the discussion of rules 
of conduct with faculty and students; 3) the fair administration of rules of conduct; 4) 
employing high moral standards and emphasizing community service and 5) 
consistently relating to students according to the institution’s stated ethical 
standards.127
While these suggestions are a good start, I contend that they are not enough.  
Bok’s approach will prove as ineffective as the previous attempts he disparages, for 
he is still looking at the student as subjects to be molded according to some master 
plan.  But, regardless of how good Bok’s intentions are, his model does not go far 
enough, for it still objectifies the students, rather than engaging them in their own 
moral journey.  The challenge for the future of the Formative Project, if it is to have 
a future, is to balance exposure to ethical reasoning with praxis in a manner that does 
not violate civil liberties.
This chapter has traced the history of the debate over moral education in 
America and described our current dilemma.  Next, I will explicate my proposal to 
help remedy this situation.
proven ineffectual or degenerated into crude attempts to impose particular doctrines or piety rules of 
behavior.  Despite these problems, moral education is too important to discard just because prior 
effects have failed.  Besides, universities cannot avoid the task whether or not they relish the 
responsibility.  Like it or not, they will affect the moral development of their students by the ways in 
which they administer their rules of conduct, by the standard they set in dealing with ethical issues 
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Sociologist and educator, Parker J. Palmer claims that every epistemology 
implies an ethic – every way of knowing creates a way of being.  In our culture, the 
primary mode of academic epistemology is “Objectivism,” which holds that reality is 
“out there,” waiting to be discovered apart from individual bias and subjectivity.128
But social cognitive science has shown this to be false – there are as many 
interpretations of reality as there are selves to perceive “reality,” and none of them is
completely unbiased or free from subjectivity.  Furthermore, each individual exhibits 
different ‘selves’ in different environments.129  So, how can we ever really know 
what reality is “out there” without reference to our own subjective experiences and 
biases?  Without our subjective biases and beliefs, we have no criteria or framework 
with which to evaluate or understand the raw data of experience.  What we believe 
determines and colors what we perceive “out there” as reality, as our beliefs filter our 
knowing into pre-established forms and patterns.130  We cannot know that which we 
have no concept for; without a pre-existing framework with which to recognize new 
experiences, then raw sense data remains just that – raw and unknown.  And our 
primary mode of objective epistemology further alienates us from our deeper selves 
and our communities, as attempts to remove subjectivity splinter awareness as the 
objectivist individuals try to divorce themselves from what they claim to know.
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At this point, I would like to introduce the term Epistemic Responsibility, by 
which I mean taking responsibility for all of the consequences of an individual’s 
beliefs.  ‘Reality’ as we experience it, is a product of interpretation, which is totally 
dependent upon belief, founded upon an assumption of radical free will.  All beliefs 
create outcomes, whether acknowledged or not, intended or not, foreseen or not.  
True maturity and participation occurs when we recognize this and take seriously the 
choosing the beliefs to which we subscribe.  When we take conscious responsibility 
for all of the consequences of our beliefs, conscious and unconscious, intended or 
not, we become epistemically responsible.  Epistemic responsibility can be expressed 
in a whole range of degrees, from the totally unaware but self-involved individual 
(such as your garden variety party-obsessed teenager or redneck) to fully mature and 
self-actuated individuals who accept responsibility not only for their own belief 
outcomes, but who actively work to help others recognize and husband their own 
self-beliefs (Christ or Buddha come to mind).  
In the Republic, Plato sets the groundwork for the general question of 
epistemic responsibility with the main topic question:  Why be just?  Is there some 
reason, beyond the fear of being caught and punished, for being a good person?131
Plato goes through an elaborate political analysis of many systems of government in 
order to answer this most basic of questions.   Although Plato’s keen insights into 
political orders and devolution are of great interest, the political critiques are not the 
driving purpose of the Republic.  Plato’s burning question, “Why be just?” has even 
greater impetus in the current age of transitioning values, when corruption and crime 
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seem to pay much better than an honest minimum wage job at ‘Mickey-D’s,’132 and 
slacking off and playing video games are much more fun than working hard to earn a 
solid education and become a good citizen. Plato answers this question by using the 
political analyses as a means of illustrating dysfunction in individuals just as much as 
it is a description of the strengths and weaknesses of governments.  Using the 
political analyses as instruction aids, Plato claims that there is a good reason to be 
just – that to be unjust is harmful to the psyche of both the individual and the 
polis.133  For Plato, injustice occurs when there is an imbalance in the functioning of 
an individual or a state, when one part inappropriately seizes power and usurps the 
proper functioning of another internal component.  I contend that this imbalance that 
Plato discusses, both in the state and in the individual, is primarily generated by 
faulty and unexamined belief systems.
Epistemic responsibility carries a strong indictment of ‘spin,’ bullshit, 
hypocrisy and deliberate lying to gain one’s own ends.134  The use of hypocrisy, 
lying and spin are seen as indicative of an imbalanced belief system that holds that 
the hypocrite, liar or spinner’s goals and intentions somehow trump the value of the 
truth and the autonomy of others, a wide-reaching charge in a world saturated in 
advertising and polarized agendas.  This idea has broad implications for ethics in 
general, but, beyond a general enunciation of the concept in broad strokes, I shall 
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confine myself to a focus primarily on how this idea applies in the field of civic or 
moral education.  
We all have countless beliefs, many of them contradictory and conflicting, 
while some beliefs are just downright self-destructive.  Usually, we only reflect upon 
our beliefs in times of crisis – when, for whatever reason, our beliefs have failed us.  
Rarely do we reflect upon the beliefs by which we steer through the seas of life 
without being forced to such reflection by pain and dire need.  Any scion of 
bureaucracy will recognize this as crisis management – notoriously the worst style of 
management in terms of both efficiency and efficacy.  When our lives flow 
smoothly, we have no pressing need to review our belief systems for inconsistencies 
and out-moded beliefs, so very few people bother to put forth the focused effort to 
examine the coherence and efficacy of their beliefs.  Mid-life crises, traumas and 
life-threatening illness are the most popular occasions for a subjective epistemic 
review and revisions, forcing us to re-visit past decisions and events in a new 
perspective.  When we do re-evaluate our beliefs under the pressure of the crisis du 
jour, we often make hasty assumptions and judgments that we must later correct.  
Everyone knows that decisions made under stress and duress are of notoriously poor
quality, yet this is the preferred method of personal and collective belief management 
espoused by our culture.  The accumulated result of two hundred years of this 
approach is record levels of stress and stress-related illnesses, as well as a cultural 
cycle of escalation of rhetoric in almost every sphere of life, as knee-jerk and 
extreme reactions become the order of the day.  Time, energy and resources are 
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wasted in useless over-reaction in the personal daily lives of individuals as well as at 
all levels of social and political interaction.  
The true subject of self-knowledge is beliefs about the self, because this 
determines and limits our capacities.  When I don’t know who I am, I don’t know 
what I believe, and so I will change my beliefs to suit the needs of the moment 
without considering the implications or long-term repercussions.  And if I don’t 
know what to believe, then I don’t know how to be in the world or how to relate to 
others.  If I do not know these things, then any talents and skills I may have will be 
greatly undermined, as will my self-esteem.135  Without the full benefit of my talents, 
skills or self-esteem, it is very difficult to be happy, much less to defend myself 
against the assault of peer pressure and media generated values.  I will acquiesce to 
whatever sounds good, destroying integrity and self-esteem as I re-make myself to 
try to fit in and be happy.  But I won’t really know how to be happy, as I won’t know 
what is appropriate for me and what is wrong for me.  So I will accept the decrees of 
experts and advertisers, in the hopes that they know me better than I know myself.   
Many Americans work long hours, estranging themselves from their families, or 
bankrupt themselves with over-extended credit, trying to buy the confidence and 
happiness they feel lacking in their lives by purchasing the latest product, undergoing 
another procedure or buying the biggest sport-utility vehicle, or through that most 
particularly post-modern form of personal relationships: serial monogamy, in which 
one dysfunctional relationship is replaced by another once the old one becomes too 
painful or complicated.  
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The most common motivator in life is fear.  We get and stay in unsatisfying 
jobs out of fear.  We stay stuck in abusive relationships and situations because of 
fear.  We are afraid because we believe that we can’t handle life without that person, 
that title, that salary, that property….  We are afraid that we are not “enough” to deal 
with the challenges of life on our own terms because we don’t know who we are, so 
we don’t know what our capacities or terms are.  A belief in helplessness and 
victimization limits our awareness and capacity to respond to situations and 
relations.136  When obsessed with the crisis management of one’s own life’s dramas, 
things like citizen participation in government and community involvement seem 
very distant and insignificant, as civic participation carries a high price in personal 
investment of time and attention.   Yet, it is only on the foundation of citizen 
participation and community involvement that democracy thrives.  The threat to 
democracy arises when a significant percentage of the population falls prey to this 
growing malaise.  
I argue that it needn’t be this way.  If we aspire to more efficacy and 
efficiency in commerce and government, how much more should we aspire to in the 
psychic management of ourselves?  And if it is possible to teach the skills required, 
then it is incumbent upon us to learn these skills and pass on them on to our students, 
especially in public education, as a matter of public mental hygiene.  Current 
research has shown that the more self-knowledge an individual acquires, the more 
stability, empathy and integrated a self-concept is developed.137  A more mature and 
integrated citizenry is a well-informed electorate, and creates a stronger democracy.  
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Unlike other creatures in the animal kingdom, humans do not rely heavily 
upon instinct for clues about how to interact and be in the world. We receive this 
social knowledge from our family and culture, and that knowledge can vary widely.  
Our ‘everyday reality’ in which we live, move and have our being in is socially 
constructed. Sociologists note the plasticity of human nature that allows for such 
diversity as is found in the multitude of cultures around the world.  Humans can 
believe and adapt to almost anything.138  This human capacity for adaptability has 
kept us alive as a species throughout the millennia in an amazing range of conditions 
and environments.  Problems with this system of handing on family and cultural 
beliefs can originate when the belief systems handed down by family and culture are 
mistaken, outdated or miscommunicated.  But conflicting beliefs can cause the worst 
fracturing and splintering of the individual, sparking identity crisis and possible 
debility, as the individual struggles with divided loyalties (consciously or not).  The 
beliefs we pick up “on the street” in our life experience may conflict with the belief 
system we accepted as children, or we may be forced by circumstances to do 
something we feel is morally wrong, but cannot avoid doing, either through duress or 
weakness.  The persona we embody at work may violate our deepest values, but we 
may have another set of beliefs that plays upon our fears of invasion, exclusion and 
poverty, that urges us to continue to act in conflict with our values “or else.”  We 
may not realize there is even a conflict until we have played out the whole script 
dictated by the contending beliefs.  Often, it is only after the beliefs have run their 
course do we look back as we pick up the pieces and see how our beliefs precipitated 
our experiences (especially those insidious beliefs that we hide from ourselves).  
138 Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 36 - 40
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Beliefs about the self tend to become self-fulfilling prophecies – “as you believe, so 
shall you do.”139  But seventy to ninety percent of our beliefs about ourselves are 
unconscious, and therefore beyond our control until we actually take the time to 
examine them.140
Only in retrospect do we come to understand how we have hidden our true 
beliefs from our conscious mind, yet enacted them inerrantly nonetheless.  Indeed, 
much of the stuff of which soap opera and contemporary life are comprised comes 
from exactly these kinds of belief conflicts, both on the individual level and at the 
cultural level.  Communitarian Charles Taylor addresses this alienation and 
splintering of the self at length, and concludes that this alienation is socially 
derived.141
Taylor asserts that meaning only makes sense against the backdrop of 
something other than the self.  He claims that we can only understand the self 
through three primary external sources: 1) culture, 2) significant others and 3) strong 
evaluation.142  These external sources of identity entail that there exist phenomena 
that affirm the independent value of choices, in opposition to radical subjectivism.  
The values we embody are usually gleaned from these three sources, but often, these 
values contradict one another, providing the primary origin of alienation.
Yet, many conflicts can be resolved merely through the conscious recognition 
that we hold certain beliefs that conflict, and through the conscious selection of 
which beliefs we choose to continue to hold and enact in our lives.  Both 
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contemporary psychological research and the ancient wisdom of many cultures teach 
us that we can access our beliefs and belief systems from a meta-level, examine and 
weigh which beliefs we will continue to endorse and which beliefs require 
extinction, the goal always being greater integration and functioning of the self.  
As current research in the field of Social Cognitive Psychology indicates (and 
the ancient knowledge has always known), some beliefs – especially those regarding 
the self – have demonstrably predictable results.  In other words, some beliefs about 
the self and the individual’s place in the world are empirically proven to be more 
beneficial to the overall health, well-being and effectiveness of individuals, and other 
beliefs have been empirically proven to erode the individual’s health, well-being and 
effectiveness.  In essence, this research tells us that the greater the degree of integrity 
and self-knowledge, the better adjusted and happy the individual.   The more self-
examination of beliefs that an individual does, the better for their own selves and for
the relationships with the other lives they touch, spreading out into the community 
and society at large.143  If we seriously mean to equip our youth with the means to 
not only live healthy and happy lives, but also are seriously committed to the 
preservation of our democracy, then shouldn’t we provide our youth with the 
benefits of this science?  How is it that we spend vast resources to educate our 
young, with the intention of preparing them to take their place in the world, without 
ever teaching them how to get along with themselves, much less get along with 
others?  
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I contend that it is incumbent upon us to utilize the knowledge already 
present within each of us, as well as that discovered by current scientific research, to 
help our young adults develop more beneficial beliefs about themselves and their 
place in the world.  I am aware that a frank and open discussion about shaping 
beliefs is bound to be controversial in the current climate of polarized and warring 
ideologies, but I hold that such a discussion is long overdue. I believe that the so-
called ‘culture wars’ now raging could have been either avoided or greatly mitigated 
had these strategies been in wide practice.  If you are mostly secure in your beliefs 
about who and what you are, you don’t need to resort to extreme behavior or threats 
of extreme behavior to convince others that your point of view is sound.  It is only 
those who harbor secret fears that they might be horribly wrong who try to ram their 
own beliefs down the throats of others, or are threatened by the mere existence or 
proximity of differing beliefs of others.  And only those who don’t know who they 
really are or what they actually believe are easily swayed by others who are 
convinced that they know what’s best for everyone.  What is worse about this 
chronic human condition is the observation that most of this type of behavior is 
entirely unconscious.  Because this perceptual morass is the usual order of procedure 
for our culture, many discussions of the formative project often boil down to a 
question of who is to do the teaching, using what standards and criteria?  This is a 
serious question and deserves more attention than possible in this essay.  However, 
in the meantime, I contend that basing civic or moral education for young adults on 
self-knowledge avoids much of the traditional problems of the formative project as 
the individual always is the final arbiter of which beliefs truly serve the self and 
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which ones need to be eliminated.  No one can force anyone to believe anything –
that is the primary principle of Epistemic Responsibility – radical free will.144
Individuals, regardless of circumstances or status, have complete control over their 
own interpretation of their own experiences.  No belief can ever be imposed, even 
under duress.  All beliefs must be subjectively accepted in order to be activated in 
the psyche.  Acceptance of beliefs can be bribed, evoked, seduced, mistaken, 
dysfunctional or ill-founded, but it can never be forced against an individual’s will.  
Within our own psyches, we are absolute despots, and we rule our little kingdoms 
accordingly, for our own and others’ good or ill.
Do not confuse this inner freedom with individualism or subjectivism.  
Individualism is a basic value in our culture, spurring the invention and innovation 
for which this nation is famous.  However, there is a dark side to individualism as 
well, for along with the rise of individualism experienced in the West in the last five 
hundred years, we have also experienced a sense of loss of meaning, often 
manifested as a nostalgic looking back to a past perceived to be superior to the 
current experience of alienation and corruption – “the good old days....”  Taylor 
refers to this loss of meaning as the “disenchantment of the world,” the root cause to 
our existential discomfort.    When individualism collapses in on itself and excludes 
the rest of the world, neglecting its vital connections to others, it turns sour, 
becoming self-absorption and egoism.  Such subjectivism denies the validity of value 
judgments independent of the chooser, rather all value judgments are held to be 
expressions of individual taste or opinion.  While turning to the authentic self as the 
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touchstone of all beliefs and values, it can never be forgotten that the self was forged 
in the fires of family and culture.  Without connection to those sources of the self, 
the individual is vulnerable to isolation, depression and delusion.  Despite a 
superficial appeal to self-reference, without a deeper grounding in integrity and self-
examination, subjectivism and individualism do not have the cohesiveness and 
coherence needed to withstand a lifetime of conflicting external demands.
All of the currently wide-held belief systems in the world evolved in 
relatively isolated indigenous cultures, in which other cultures were seen as primarily 
enemies and rivals in rural and agricultural contexts, and not as neighbors to be 
tolerated and included.  With the rise of globalization and multiculturalism, these 
provincial and traditional ways of approaching the world are sorely threatened, as all 
the old social boundaries are cracking under the pressures of social relativism.145
Taylor identifies three “malaises of modernity”: the first is the 
aforementioned loss of meaning and moral horizon.  While modernity has had many 
major achievements, such as quantum leaps in travel, communication and medicine, 
individualism is a source of anxiety, as well as gratification.  Although the individual 
is freed from many past constraints of an inherited social status and family 
profession, we have lost our traditional moral horizons.  These moral horizons 
delineated the old ways of making sense of meaning beyond the purposes of any 
particular individual.146  The loss of these traditional horizons meant the loss of a 
larger context in life.  Isolated individuals cannot generate this larger context; it must 
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of this loss of moral horizon, the individual is sometimes held to be the sole author of 
the values that generate self-beliefs through acts of volition.  This view holds that the 
act of choosing is what imparts value, as it is believed there is no meaning beyond 
that affirmed by the individual.  Taylor holds that this type of individualism drains 
the world of meaning.  
In seeking to be above subjectivity, science has contributed to this split in its 
pursuit of an objective reality, creating a mechanistic worldview that traditionally 
has excluded any expressions of larger purpose.  This gives rise to Taylor’s second 
“malaise of modernity,” the rise of instrumental reasoning, in which circumstances 
are manipulated to fulfill desires.  Under this view, science is believed to be valuable 
for the sake of control and profit, and not for any enlightenment or moral force it 
may bring to bear on human life.  
The primacy of instrumental reasoning puts major emphasis on statistics and 
outputs, both in institutions and in thought.  In our capitalistic culture, market 
phenomena are often the ultimate determinate of policy.  Market functions are used 
as the justification of decisions once unthinkable throughout the Western culture.  
Some Americans see their government as serving the role of protector of the market 
economy.  But many a political regime has fallen due to failed economic strategies.  
Along with economic forces, technology dominates our culture as our “magic bullet” 
to solve all problems that arise.147  But we are still in need of critical evaluation of 
the relative benefits of technology.  We have yet to delineate its limits and how best 
to use it.  Moral issues about topics once considered science fiction, such as cloning 
and genetic engineering, are increasingly being decided by in our nation’s courts and 
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legislatures.  How can we be sure that the market will make the wisest choices for 
humanity’s best interest?  Both systems theory and meme theory hold that once a 
system is set in motion, its primary goal becomes the continuation and growth of the 
system, not the goals for which the system (or bureaucracy) was originally created, 
which then are demoted to secondary goals.148
The third of Taylor’s “malaises” is the threat to our freedom and democracy
when citizens only focus on themselves and blot out the rest of the world.  This leads 
to shrinkage of interest in democratic processes and participation in the world at 
large.  In a post 9/11 world, we can see that this cultural self-absorption has serious 
implications for our national security, and comes with a high cost.   Democracy has a 
high cost in participation, but if only special interest groups can be bothered to show 
up for town meetings and caucuses, if only committed partisans run for public office, 
then our democracy is in jeopardy.  If I am not alive to the wellsprings of my own 
culture and selfhood, then I will be tempted to think that my participation is 
unimportant and that my own amusements and dramas are more critical and 
gratifying.
This opens the door for the fulfillment of Tocqueville’s prediction of ‘soft 
despotism’ setting in, that is, the degeneration of meaning and participation in self-
government, as everything is run by the big machines of government and industry, 
with little citizen control.149  While the government may seem democratic and 
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moderate, perhaps even responsive, it is still a form of tyranny if the people are 
isolated from the forces that govern their lives.150
As the old traditions face growing challenges, fundamentalism, extremism 
and terrorism emerge as a knee-jerk protective responses. In a world of six billion, 
such cultural responses are maladaptive and require readjustment.  It stems from a 
polarized belief system of “us versus them,” handed down through the ages.  Any 
form of exclusivism, individual or cultural, originates from a fear of limited 
resources and not getting enough.  
On the subjective level, almost all individuals hold unexamined maladaptive 
beliefs that lurk below the level of consciousness, an identity time bomb waiting for 
the right moment to explode open the self-beliefs.  These beliefs may have once been 
adaptive in a particular situation, but have outlived their usefulness, have been taken 
out of context or have become twisted and compulsive.  Good contemporary 
examples of this phenomenon are: the parochial school lesson that all sex is dirty, 
that, in adulthood, prevents the individual from enjoying a healthy sex and family 
life; or the chubby child who becomes the bulimic young adult because they equate 
food with comfort and confuse thinness with their ability to be loved.  
Throughout the ages, self-beliefs were shaped within the cultural contexts of 
family, religion and personal experience, and the achievements of the ancients attest 
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to the efficacy of this natural evolution of the self-beliefs.  But, as the above 
commonplace examples show, this method of self development is not without flaws. 
Low social status and poverty, physical imperfections or not being a member of the 
privileged caste are well-known psychological origins of low self-esteem, 
depression, substance abuse and crime.  Humans as well as animals have their 
pecking orders.  Unwanted and neglected children grow up to commit crimes, 
seeking the attention denied them in childhood.151  Most social and personal histories 
turn on the interacting influences of such unexamined beliefs playing out their 
inexorable conclusions. 
What was true throughout history is doubly true now, with the rise of 
multiculturalism and the disappearance of the middle class.  Now, we get our beliefs 
from the media as much or more than from the traditional sources of family, religion 
and personal experience.   Often, we replace our own beliefs with the words of media 
“experts,” role models and ideologues whom we have never met or spoken with 
personally and who have no knowledge of our personal existence, much less our 
situation.  We accept their decrees without our considering whether or not the 
expert’s advice is suitable for us personally.  Peer pressure keeps us from expressing 
our true natures, as we fear ridicule and ostracizing.  If you were to go to a 
kindergarten class and ask, “How many of you are dancers?” the whole class would 
respond affirmative.  But if you put the same question to a group of sixth grade 
children, you will get only a few respondents whose parents happen to send them to 
dance classes.  If you ask the same question of a group of college age students, only 
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those few serious students of professional dance would dare to call themselves 
“dancers.”  We come to define ourselves as we think others see us, often diminishing 
our potential and capacities as we see ourselves through increasingly narrowing 
lenses.  
As a culture, we have forgotten how to evaluate and choose for ourselves 
what we want to believe.  Instead, we substitute media images for heroes and role 
models, attracted to the appearance of perfection, but we eagerly devour gossip about 
our role models’ downfalls, fueling a kind of cynicism that holds heroes in such low 
esteem that we dub anyone who has provided a professional service or survived a 
trauma to be a hero.  As the pedestals of our role models and heroes hit the ground, 
we see that they, too, are all too human and their vaunted ideologies are mere utopian 
fantasies.  If “nice guys finish last,” then it is foolish to adhere to the traditional 
values of honesty and humility.  So, where are we to turn for a model of human 
integration and potential?
We can and do choose what we believe in everyday.  We do it whether we 
are aware of doing it or not.  We are doing it all the time, whether we choose our 
beliefs wisely or whether we are deplorable at managing our belief systems.  “If you 
choose not to decide you still have made a choice,” says the old Rush song.  We 
cannot avoid choosing our beliefs.  I am advocating a more conscious approach to 
the whole choosing procedure, which usually is only done in times of crisis.  What I 
am proposing does not contradict any of the major world religions – in fact, in my 
opinion, it rather fulfills and deepens existing faith without imposing dogmas or 
doctrine.  The heart of what I am advocating is the conscious examination and 
advent of legalized abortion. Levitt and Dubner, 2005: 139
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choosing of beliefs about the self utilizing scientifically proven techniques to shed 
corrosive self-beliefs.  
It may be argued that this approach is inherently utilitarian, that is the end 
results of the self-beliefs are judged to justify the belief, and therefore in danger of 
violating the individual’s autonomy.  Why should individuals and the nation at large 
care about some idiot who harbors low self-esteem and resentment towards 
authority?  Neither the state nor the higher education system should tamper with the 
self-beliefs of students, opponents might argue, as such would be a violation of the 
students’ autonomy and force them all into cookie-cutter belief systems.  This would 
be a valid objection, if a standardized and universal belief system was the goal of my 
approach, but it is not.  As stated above - no one can force another to believe what 
they don’t want to believe.  Even if our bodies are enslaved and imprisoned, our 
minds are still our own. But very few people ever stop to consciously consider and 
choose what they believe about themselves, even after they have accumulated 
experience that proves their current self-beliefs to be insufficient or even debilitating.  
Everyone past a certain age has at least one story of self-sabotage due to fear or lack 
of faith in oneself, even those deemed highly successful by society’s standards.  If 
we are lucky, some of us may accumulate enough such wisdom in middle or old age 
to see past such fears and insecurities and to go after the lost opportunities, such as 
taking up a musical instrument for fun in middle age, going back to college and 
completing an unfinished degree after retirement or jumping out of airplanes at the 
age of eighty.  But if there are any means of ameliorating the suffering and wasted 
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potential of self-ignorance at an earlier age, isn’t it our responsibility to learn and 
disseminate this knowledge?  
There are many social and political implications tied up in this is well, for 
how high is the quality of our electorate if the masses of Americans are too caught 
up in avoidable subjective psycho-dramas to actively participate in their 
communities and nation?  How objective and well-considered are the decisions of an 
electorate and congress fueled by greed, adrenaline and fear, governed by personal 
crisis management techniques?  How engaged can the chronically depressed be?  On 
a socio-economic level, the loss of potential creativity and productivity to depression 
and neurosis in this nation is staggering to consider.  
Therefore, I argue that it is in the nation’s best interest to educate the young 
on self-beliefs in general and provide them with the techniques for choosing and 
implementing beneficial self-beliefs in the place of destructive and uncoordinated 
self-beliefs. 
Revisioning Civic Education
Before we can begin to choose more efficacious self-beliefs, we must first 
examine those beliefs and see what is contained within the belief system.  I call what 
you find when you examine your beliefs about your self: Self- Knowledge.  Self-
Knowledge is the bedrock of maturity and participation.  Those who we call “Self-
Absorbed” are such precisely because they do not know who they are or where they 
fit in, so they are constantly seeking to make the world fit what they think might be 
nice at a particular moment.  They are disconnected from their environment and 
87
community because they do not know how they fit in, leading to the attempt to 
impose their own order to make sure they are not left out.  Because they are 
disconnected, they cannot read the social clues, which makes them insecure.  Hence 
they seek to become more secure by applying more pressure, behaving more 
aggressively to make sure they are not forgotten.  A more accurate nomenclature for 
this condition of narcissistic self-absorption would be Self- Ignorance, for poor 
narcissists really have no clue of how they connect, both internally and externally.   
Self-Ignorance has many forms and symptoms, infecting this nation in epidemic 
proportions.  This is especially true for college age students, who are emerging from 
under their parents’ wings and testing their own.  They are bombarded with self-
messages from the media and their peers.  Often for the first time in their young 
lives, they are making life decisions for themselves.  If their self-beliefs tell them 
that they are losers and slackers who can’t handle anything too challenging, how 
prepared will they be to handle the shocks and emergencies of life?  If their self-
beliefs tell them that they are a precious darling who needs to be protected and is 
entitled to only the best, how will they cope with the inevitable rejection and 
deprivation in adult life?
More than any previous generation, the current generation of college aged 
students (born in the 1980s) has been taught that they were entitled simply by virtue 
of showing up. This attitude has arisen in the attempt to bolster epidemic low self-
esteem in schoolchildren.152  They have been trained to mistake the map for the 
territory, to mistake the appearance of value without the substance for authentic 
value.  The result is record numbers of teenage plastic surgery, drug addiction, 
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bulimia and obesity.  If the teens were not trying to compensate for a perceived lack 
in themselves, they would not need plastic surgery, or abuse drugs or food in either 
excess or deficiency.  They may find out decades later that the self-beliefs that held 
them captive for years could have been changed, or even avoided entirely.  You see 
this enacted daily on “The Dr. Phil Show” and “Oprah,” as well as in countless other 
media outlets, when the light bulb lights up and epiphanies ripple from the amazed 
talk show guests.   
Protection from Abuse
It might be argued that this is “soulcraft” and therefore is vulnerable to abuse 
from radicals and ideologues.   In fact, the opposite is true, as the approach of 
Epistemic Responsibility to moral education protects the students’ autonomy by 
placing all the choices and the responsibility of choosing self-beliefs back on the 
individual.  It is the individual him/herself who must do the internal examination and 
evaluation of what is turned up by the investigation into the self-beliefs.  The 
standards used for evaluation are also self-chosen.  Therefore, no single belief 
system is advocated, nor are any particular choices preferred as long as the over-
arching goal of integration and authenticity is maintained.  Throughout, the 
democratic values of liberty and equality are respected and in full force.  You can 
lead a student to the font of wisdom, but you can’t make him think.  Students are 
always free to reject the concept of epistemic responsibility, but they are not exempt 
from doing the work of epistemic review. Despite this, the option to examine and 
upgrade one’s self-beliefs would represent a profound investment in the future of 
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America, and I believe that many students would recognize and take advantage of 
the opportunity.  
Self-knowledge provides a basis for moral and civic education that cannot be 
abused or co-opted, for the final decisions always rest in the hands of the students.  
Self-knowledge provides individuals with the firm foundation from which to 
participate in the world.  Even if confronted with strange customs and beliefs,  
individuals who know that they know themselves will meet the world with curiosity, 
instead of fear and threat, as a strong grounding in Self-Knowledge imparts the 
ability to discern a true threat from a false alarm. 
Creating Whole Citizens
Everyone from Marx to Sartre to Charles Taylor bemoans the “alienation” of 
individuals from their “authentic” self, although each takes a slightly different tack in 
their approach.153  But what does this “alienation” actually mean?  A cursory 
semantic analysis yields the answer that something that is in a state of alienation 
must have had a prior state of wholeness or completion, which has been somehow 
fragmented.  For Marx, the alienation is from the fruits of the workers’ own labor 
that creates the fractured self.  For Sartre, the alienation is from the inspiration and 
potential of the self, as we seek to conform to the social expectations of our families 
and society.  For Charles Taylor, the alienation is from the traditional horizons and 
definitions of the self. For the monotheistic traditions of the Book, this alienation is 
grounded in the metaphor of the Fall of Adam and Eve.  
Whatever the original source of the split, there seems to be a universal 
agreement that something is seriously wrong with the world.  We see contemporary 
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expressions of this subliminal awareness in such books as Ishmael by Daniel Quinn, 
the widely popular Matrix movies and the record-breaking thirty-year phenomena 
that is the mythical story of Star Wars.  All of these stories are predicated upon the 
awareness that something is seriously out of balance in the human psyche.  Perhaps it 
is the optimism of fiction that places the power to correct this cosmic-human 
imbalance within the sphere of human choice.  Yet, this has been the driving 
inspiration for utopians of all stripes, from Plato to the Bible to the cutting edge 
research of Cognitive Psychology.   All seem to agree that human autonomy (a.k.a. 
Free Will) is sufficient to meet and rise above all challenges.  Examples that come to 
mind are actor Christopher Reeve’s response to the challenge of his spinal cord 
injury and subsequent paralysis, or the inspiration that Martin Luther King provided 
forth to galvanize the Civil Rights Movement.    Mahatma Gandhi changed not only 
the face of India, but served to change the world by spending his time doing very 
humble acts such as spinning thread, making salt, being hungry…  Each of these 
examples draw on some inner strength that most humans rarely experience.  In every 
case, the man was able to overcome the miasma of internal conflicts and coalesce 
into focus.  The unconventional dance teacher and mystic, G. I. Gurdjieff was noted 
for often saying “Most men cannot do anything.  Most of our experiences just 
happen to us.”  Obviously, King and Gandhi represent the few who could actually do 
something.  Reeve also accomplished something profound on the personal level 
rarely modeled in modern culture.  In all three, we see a clarity and focus extremely 
rare amongst the population at large. 
Examples such as these indicate that there is far greater potential available to 
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humans than are commonly accessed.  Disciplines such as the martial arts and yoga 
also indicate that far more is possible than is usually actualized.  Stories about the 
triumph of the human spirit over adversity abound from the 9-11 firefighters to the 
Katrina hurricane survivors.  The founding fathers embodied an American ideal of 
integrity, independence and self-sufficiency that still inspires countless bestsellers.  
All of these examples illustrate that there is something within the human spirit that 
can transcend the forces that lead to the alienation from the self.  One way I have 
heard it put is “living on full throttle,” as opposed to living a life of quiet 
desperation, so popular in these days of Prozac and Welbutrin.  In any case, it is this 
elusive élan that provides the clarity and inspiration to persevere under the most 
extreme conditions.  Concentration camp survivor and psychologist Viktor Frankl 
found that humans can withstand almost any torture or abuse if they have a self-
chosen reason to survive.154  Ultimately, whether or not we succeed and are happy as 
individuals or as a nation depends upon the quality and integrity of our choices.  
These choices are driven and conditioned by our fundamental beliefs about our 
selves and our place in the world.
Epistemic Responsibility entails the recognition that our own beliefs about 
ourselves shapes our expectations about both ourselves and about the world, and this 
affects our responses, which in turn determines our experience of both ourselves and 
the world.  For example, if I go on a job interview with the intention of securing the 
job, and if I don’t get the job, then I will have failed and my self-esteem will take a 
big hit.  But, if I go on a job interview with the intention of seeing whether or not the 
position is a place I can make a real contribution and be happy and I don’t get the 
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job, I will know that the job is not the right one for me and my self-esteem will not 
be damaged.  In the first case, my selfhood is to be defined by the environment 
alone, in an arbitrary and high stakes gamble in which the employers hold all the 
cards.  In the second case, the self is defined by my own values and the environment 
is interpreted in a holistic exchange between self and the world.  In the first case, my 
values and self-worth are defined by others, and thus are vulnerable to fear, coercion 
and abuse.  In the second instance, I define my own values and self-worth, regardless 
of the decisions of the potential employers, granting me integrity and protection 
against fear and abuse.
The majority of people are not awake to this level of personal responsibility, 
as it requires the willingness to honestly examine our experiences and motivations.  
When individuals do become alive to the experience of Epistemic Responsibility, it 
is usually in the wake of some major identity crisis, often occurring in middle age.  
The reason for the awakening of this sense of Epistemic Responsibility so late in life 
is primarily due to poor psychic hygiene and ignorance.  We are never overtly taught 
that we can choose to shed ourselves of maladaptive beliefs without creating a 
personal drama or crisis.  We can’t be held responsible for something we never knew 
we had control over… or can we?  Vast numbers of people are held captive by their 
own selves, squashed down and victimized by their own detrimental beliefs, wasting 
potential and resources, unaware that all the while they have hold the key to their 
own prisons.  As the population increases, so will this problem increase.   
While to a large extend we cannot choose what reality exists “out there,” we 
can take responsibility for choosing our beliefs and conceptual frameworks through 
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which we will filter the raw data of our experiences.  Without taking Epistemic 
Responsibility for our beliefs and interpretations of experience, we fall prey to 
manipulation and loss of self-esteem.  We can choose to be at the mercy of external 
forces or we can learn how to examine our beliefs and values, and jettison those 
which do not serve us.  We can choose to follow the ancient Delphic injunction 
“Know Thyself,” and thereby come to know how we relate to others and to the 
world.  As always, the choice is up to us, whether we are aware of and avail 
ourselves of the choice or not.
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Chapter Five
 “What we are today comes from our thoughts of yesterday.  And our present 
thoughts make the world of tomorrow.  Our life is the creation of our minds.”
~ Buddha
    500 b.c.e.
“In the province of the mind, what is believed to be true either is true, or 
tends to become true, within certain limits to be determined experientially 
and experimentally.  Those limits are further beliefs to be transcended.  In the 
province of the mind, there are no limits.”
~ John Lilly
   1972 c.e.
A) A Preliminary Model of Human Potential
I) The need for a reliable model
Current research in the field of Social Cognitive Psychology seems to be 
converging on a discernible description of human nature that is far more adaptable 
and culturally defined than is widely assumed.  Research implies that there is no 
fixed cognitive or affective orientation in individuals, but these are rather socially 
derived.  There is no such thing as a single, universal human norm, as far as behavior 
or beliefs are concerned.  Humans are capable of a broad range of capacities and 
potentialities that few ever actualize because we don’t believe in ourselves or 
because our culture does not recognize and support those capacities or potentials.  
But the nature of selfhood is not a tabula rasa that we must construct and fill from 
scratch by ourselves, for true selfhood cannot be achieved in isolation.155  Rather, we 
most learn about who and what we are in and through relationship to others.  Our 
155
 Reports of feral children, rare though legitimate ones are, often describe them as lacking a concept 
of self and being totally unable to think about themselves objectively.   Without others to model and 
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beliefs about ourselves, our abilities, and our social roles create expectations that we 
tend to fulfill through our choices, interpretations and behavior.156
There are some ways of construing the self that are pragmatically more 
adaptive ways to choose and some that are less adaptive choices.  Studies have 
shown which kinds of orientations are adaptable (that is, conducive to an individual’s 
growth and flourishing) and which are detrimental to growth and happiness (as 
measured by levels of anxiety, satisfaction, desired affect, etc.).  A review of some of 
these studies will be reviewed later in this chapter.  Counselors apply this knowledge 
daily in clinics across the world, and researchers expand the boundaries of this 
knowledge, but there are clear educational and social implications beyond theoretical 
and therapeutic applications.   If we now realize, as a culture, that we choose our 
orientations to the self and therefore the world, then shouldn’t we be teaching people 
what this means and how to make the best possible choices for themselves?  
Currently, we wait for a crisis, whether individual, community or national, before we 
begin to teach this understanding, and then, we dole it out one individual at a time -
closing the barn doors after the horses are gone.  
Clearly, then, there are also ethical questions raised, for if we possess 
knowledge that can improve individual’s lives as well as benefit society in general, 
shouldn’t we teach it to as many individuals as we can – especially our youth?  
Wouldn’t we want them to avoid many painful and unnecessary pitfalls in life?  
Don’t we want our young to grow and flourish in satisfying, peaceful, responsible 
citizenship?  Isn’t it both shortsighted and self-defeating not to teach individuals that 
reflect, what we recognize as the self does not develop.  What we recognize as the self is, at least in 
part, a social construct. Pinker, 2002: 61
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they can shape their experiences by their choices, and to withhold the tools and skills 
from them?
1)  A Model of Human Epistemic Potential
To teach these new insights to humanity, we must have a cohesive, accurate 
model that can be easily communicated, and embellished and elaborated as the 
individual’s development and current research progresses.  This model must 
sufficiently account for human thoughts, feelings and motives, as well as awareness, 
influence and autonomy, while reflecting as many facets of the psyche as possible.  
A tall order.  
I will make a start of an articulation of what principles and applications I 
gleaned from reviewing the works of Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, amongst other philosophers, as well as research on the subject of the self 
in current Social Psychology.  In this chapter, I will begin with the theoretical 
framework and then review some current empirical studies, focusing on three main 
reoccurring concepts.  These are: 1) a dualistic view of the self;  2) self-knowledge 
and its impact, including the emergent theory of the self that is implied by current 
Social Psychological research; and 3) where and how current research supports 
ancient and classical models of the self.  Both Charles Taylor and the 
Communitarian formative project rely upon a Platonic, teleological model of the self 
that seems to be confirmed and supported through emerging studies of the self.  I 
will only do this in broad, generalized strokes.  Fleshing out of all the details and 
implications for civic education could be a career!
156 Baumeister, 1999: 23
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A) A Working Definition of the Self
Ethicist Charles Taylor makes a distinction between the Authentic Self (or 
self-actualized individual who both knows itself and its place in the world, and is in 
harmony with itself and its environment) and the Alienated Self (which feels 
isolated, judged and powerless).157  Phenomenologists, such as William James, 
report a dual-natured subjective experience of self.  James describes these two as the 
distinction between “I” and “Me.”   “I” refers to the subjective sense of self as the 
experiencer and interpreter, and “Me” refers to the self seen as an object of “I’s” 
self-reflection, thus including all of an individual’s thoughts, dreams, feelings, habits 
and possessions… all those things that feel like “mine!”158  But the vast majority of 
the other articles I reviewed also used similar dualistic models, nineteen studies out 
of twenty-three, in fact.  
Each one of the nineteen studies explores some aspect in application of this 
major principle of duality. For instance, Turner presents the Institutional Self versus 
the Impulse Self.  The Institutional Self adheres to high standards of social behavior, 
where the self is perfected through personal effort. This fits very nicely with Taylor’s 
Authentic Self.  Conversely, the Impulse Self is discovered through personal choices, 
and relates to Taylor’s atomistic Individualism.  The Institutional Self corresponds to 
the social veneer of the superego (in Freudian terms), while the Impulse Self, 
sometimes seen as the ‘true’ self, correlates to the id.159  This is a common theme 
through the majority of the articles I reviewed: there are primarily only two ways of 
157 Taylor, 1991: 61 and 117
158 James, in Baumeister, 1999: 69
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regarding human nature: fixed, stable and bounded (Institutional Self/Ego) or 
malleable, adaptable and potentially limitless (Impulse Self/Id).  
The vast majority of the articles I reviewed fall into one of these two camps, 
from Dweck and Leggett’s discussion of Entity (fixed) and Incremental (malleable) 
theories of intelligence160 to Kernis and company’s discussion of High Stable Self-
Esteem and High Unstable Self-Esteem and their effects on anger, hostility, guilt and 
shame. In Kernis’ research, individuals with unstable self-esteem are revealed to be 
prone to violence, shame and hostility, while those with stable self-esteem are less 
vulnerable to emotional suffering and more empathic.161  Two studies on High and 
Low Self- Monitors162 posit self-positions in which individuals either are awake to 
the social cues and inner promptings that make social life easy and satisfying, or they 
are asleep to the notion that their own unconscious signals are effecting the way 
others respond to them, and hence, effecting their success and satisfaction in social 
and personal interactions.  
The much acclaimed theory of Emotional Intelligence also entails to a dual 
model, as high Emotional Intelligence is the ability to monitor one’s own feelings, as 
well as the feelings of others, and to discriminate between those feelings to use them 
as a guide for thoughts and actions.163  The more efficient one is at doing this, the 
better one operates in the world.   As children, we are all proficient at discerning the 
nonverbal cues of others, but by adulthood, we often lose this natural capacity.164
159 Turner, in Baumeister, 1999: 79
160 Dweck and Leggett, 1988
161 Kernis, Grannemann and Barclay, 1989
162 Markus and Wurf, 1987 and Snyder, 1979
163 Salovey, Hsee and Mayer, in Baumeister, 1999: 185
164 Salovey, et al. in Baumeister, 1999: 186
99
We begin as an integrated, self-knowing child, but we become splintered and 
alienated from ourselves as we interpret the blows of life as judgments upon us as 
persons.  We lose self-esteem when we focus excessively on the image of us that 
others perceive (Performance Motivations) and we can gain self-esteem if we risk a 
loss of face in order to learn and grow (Learning Motivations). If we can see failure 
as a challenge to meet and overcome, not as a risk to be avoided, then we can gain a 
Mastery orientation towards life that rejects the choice of helplessness.165
B) Self-Knowledge in Application and Theory
Recent Social Cognitive research is generating data that seems to support the 
practices of self-knowledge as beneficial to social and personal relations and choices.   
Markus and Kitayama’s work illustrates how the development of the self is heavily 
reliant upon the social context.166  Vast cultural differences in orientations of the self 
in the Far Eastern and Western populations indicated the malleability and 
adaptability of the self.   The self is much larger than we give ourselves credit for.  It 
is this ‘small’ thinking that creates what classical mysticism calls the ‘ego’ or ‘false 
self’ – the belief that the self is limited or somehow fixed without room for 
improvement.  In psychological terms, this kind of thinking produces low self-
esteem, a condition associated with anxiety, an unstable self-image, rigid thinking 
and behavioral patterns, and little self-knowledge.167
As we saw in the dualistic model of self, focus on the limitations makes them 
true.  Therefore, the true subject of our self-knowledge is our beliefs about ourselves,
as our capacities and behavior will be conditioned by those beliefs and any limits 
165 Dweck and Leggett, 1988: 266
166 Markus and Kitayama, in Baumeister, 1999:  341
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they might impose.168  Those with low self-esteem have a poorly articulated notion 
of who and what they are, preferring uncertainty and a fluctuating self-image to the 
feared certainty of low performance.  They are more vulnerable to shame and 
external suggestion.  With more self-knowledge, the more integrated, empathic and 
stable the self-concept becomes.169
Therefore, how we think about ourselves may be more important than what
we think about ourselves.  There are many different ways we can interpret ourselves 
to ourselves, just as a single action can be seen as belonging to several levels of 
interpretation, from physical to conceptual.170  Believing ourselves to be helpless, 
hopeless and vulnerable limits our awareness and therefore, our capacity to read and 
respond to immediate circumstances.171  Self-knowledge, in this context, seems vital 
to establishing a stable, fulfilling life, and thus, under the republican ideal of the 
formative project, should be a central part of civic education.
C)  Models of Self-Knowledge – Part One
i)  Ancient Models of the Self
Plato and Aristotle both describe at length the Greek model of a teleological 
self, whose ultimate destiny is to achieve full self- actualization (called Eudaemonia
by the ancients). The self is divided into three interactive parts, each responsible for 
fulfilling a specific set of functions in the individual.  Plato calls this division of the 
self into three functions the Tripartite Soul, consisting of the Intellect, Emotions and 
167 Baumeister, 1999: 19; Leary, et al., 1999: 91; Snyder, 1979: 98; and Campbell, 1999: 233
168 Leary, et al. 1999: 88
169 Campbell, 1999: 224; Carver, 1999: 183; and Tangney, 1999: 99
170 Vallacher and Wegner, 1987: 4 and 10
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Body.  Eudaemonia (flourishing/happiness) is achieved when each of these three 
parts work in harmony, each doing their own work without usurping the functions of 
one of the other parts.172  Central to the Greek conception of the self is the concept of 
Arête’ (excellence), in which the goal of Eudaemonia is reached through the striving 
for and the expression of personal excellence, achieved through the proper education 
of the emotions and thoughts.173  For the ancient Greeks, self-mastery is achieved 
through reason.
In the Republic, Plato attempts to answer the question “why be just?” In my 
opinion, this is the fundamental problem of ethics, for justice is universally held as 
the ideal for social interaction and modeling.  In Plato, the question of justice boils 
down to a question of the self.  Plato spends ten books describing the ideal and 
theoretical relations of the self and society.  As Plato tells us in Book II, the 
individual can be likened to the polis (city-state), in that the city embodies the same 
ideas and values as the individuals that constitute it.174  By describing the differing 
types of relations within a city, Plato also describes what he takes to be the type of 
relations within an individual self.  In the end, justice is defined as a certain balance 
of internal relationships in both the city and the individual.175  To articulate this, 
Plato describes what has been called the “Tripartite Soul,” in which the self is 
divided into three parts: 1) Reason (mind) 2) Spirit (will) and 3) the Desires or 
Appetites (body and instincts).  These three parts of the soul correspond to three 
classes of society.  Respectively, these are: 1) the Rulers (Philosopher-Kings); 2) the 
171 Dweck and Leggett, 1988: 266 and 269  
172 Plato, the Republic, Book IV
173 Aristotle, Book ii, 1106b15
174 Republic, Book II, 368d – 369a
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Guardians (the military class) and 3) the Craftsmen (everyone else).  Reason is held 
to be the highest part of the individual, as it is through the rational faculty that the 
self can grasp the ideals embodied in the forms.  Reason is the controller and 
harmonizer of the other two parts.  The Spirit or Will is seen to be the faculty which 
allows us to choose and to apply ourselves in the face of hardship, but this part can 
become discouraged or obsessive and needs the guidance of reason.  The Desires are 
the bodily drives to maintain corporeal existence and to propagate the species, which 
can again usurp the just rule of reason if out of balance.  Each of these parts has its 
own respective virtues and vices, strengths and weaknesses, which can be 
encouraged or suppressed at the choice of the rational self.  
Justice in both the polis and the individual is then defined as:
 “…with respect to what is within, and respect to what truly 
concerns him and his own.  He [the just citizen] doesn’t let 
each part in him mind other people’s business or the three 
classes in the soul meddle with each other, but really sets his 
own house in good order and rules himself; he arranges 
himself becomes his own friend, and harmonizes the three 
parts, exactly like three notes in a harmonic scale, lowest, 
highest and middle.  And if there are some other parts in 
between, he binds them together and becomes entirely one 
from many, moderate and harmonized.  Then, and only then, 
he acts…” (Republic, Book IV, 443d, emphasis added)
Plato claimed the foundation of personal and social action (aka: ethics) is in 
the harmonization and balancing of the three distinct features found within each 
individual a self.176  In his description of the tripartite self, it is clear that Plato (via 
Socrates) is not referring to a conception of an everlasting soul.  His description is of 
175 Republic, Book IV, 443c – e
176
 For my purposes, Plato’s use of the term “soul” or “psyche” is analogous to my use of the self.  
Both refer to the subjective experience of being, including the relations of that subjective being to the 
subjective beings of others.
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a pragmatic perception of the human psyche in action.  For Plato, this much-desired 
harmony of the soul is achieved by letting each internal part control that which it is 
best suited by function to control.  As Plato tells us in Book I of the Republic, a 
virtue is by definition the proper functioning of the thing in question.  For a person, 
the proper function of the soul is justice.177  For this reason, the just man is not 
attracted to vice or injustice, as the harmoniously balanced just man has no desire to 
upset his hard-won balance through lying, cheating or stealing.178  “The 
contemplation of all time and all being” undertaken by the just self makes corporeal 
desires and thrills dull by comparison.179
This description of Plato’s view of the human psyche is meant to prepare the 
ground for the later explication of my theory of self. To further my task of preparing 
a historical foundation, I now leap over two millennia to a consideration of a more
modern view of the self.
ii) Rousseau and Relations of the Self
Emile is Rousseau’s treatise on education.  It is more about the personal than 
the political, but I suggest that we find embedded within Emile an early articulation 
of authenticity.  In The Social Contract, Rousseau focuses on the issue of autonomy, 
but in Emile, he focuses on what I take to be authenticity.  Although, as we shall see, 
Rousseau’s vision is far from perfect, we can detect the beginnings of the notion of 
authenticity in modern times. 
Given the fallen nature of the world and human nature, Rousseau undertakes 
to create the least corrupt medium in which to grow citizens.  Man in the state of 
177
 Plato, Book I, 353a – e
178
 Plato, Book IV, 442e – 443a
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nature has the lowest form of negative liberty, that of non-interference.  But in Emile, 
Rousseau wants his tutee to have the positive freedom of self-government.  Whether 
or not Rousseau accomplishes his goal is debatable, as Emile is seemingly dependent 
upon the tutor for the whole of his life, first as a youth in need of instruction, but 
then later as a new parent in need of advice.  It can be argued that Emile is controlled 
and manipulated by the tutor throughout his life, so although Rousseau’s goal is self-
sufficiency, Emile is not without external control.  Rousseau is trying to protect 
Emile from what he sees are the corrupting influences of society, and to prevent 
Emile’s spirit from being broken by public opinion.  But what is originally meant as 
protection risks degeneration into deception and manipulation.   Yet, Rousseau does 
articulate a conception of how independent judgment might be fostered through 
proper education, despite Rousseau’s own difficulty in letting go of control.
Rousseau articulated two senses of self-love, both of which are important for 
understanding Rousseau’s conception of the self.  The first is amour de soi-meme, a 
preconscious sense of the intrinsic worth of being, the brute experience of the 
goodness of life.  This is a self-contained sentiment, that of the primitive self-
reliance of natural man prior to socialization, with no need of others.  It represents a 
radical emotional independence from others.  This is the emotional state of children 
prior to puberty, before the demands of peer pressure and the need to be desired by 
others and reliance upon external forces for the sense of self-worth forces the youth 
to conform to society’s enslavement to the opinions of others.  This, I believe, is a 
part of what Taylor later calls the authentic self.  It is the core self, the individual 
chooser/experiencer, but without the self-reflection required for true authenticity.
179 Plato, Book IV, 486a
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The transition from this idyllic pre-critical state of total self-acceptance, warts 
and all, comes with the onset of adolescence.  Others become more important to our 
own sense of self-worth.  Our self-value becomes dependent upon the opinions of 
others because of the strong instinctual drive for sex.  According to Rousseau’s 
conception of the self, our own opinions of ourselves become mixed up with our 
perceptions of our own desirability to others.  It is this drive that Rousseau claims 
makes civilization possible.  But the very thing that allows us to come together also 
disrupts our initial self-contained happiness.  From then on, our happiness is 
contingent upon the happiness of others.  Once we make ourselves vulnerable to the 
opinions of others that the possibilities of coercion and manipulation become 
manifest temptations.  This second kind of self-love Rousseau calls amour propre.180
Hobbes made this dual distinction, prior to Rousseau, but Rousseau systematized 
them.  Rousseau was the first to link the individual to social life, even though he 
drew on pre-existing ideas.
Emile is about the forestalling of amour propre and the growth of vanity in a 
controlled manner.  But, according to Rousseau, amour propre is necessary to live in 
a society, for to be completely free of amour propre is to be completely unattached 
to others.  So, amour propre must be harnessed to social ends.  In this manner, 
Rousseau attempts to account for human cooperation and civility.  Thus, in a 
balanced individual, the individualism of amour de soi-meme combines with the 
social awareness of amour propre to create an authentic self.
180
 Rousseau, 1984: 99
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In recent years, research into cooperation and cheating has actually revealed 
an evolutionary need for community.181  Rousseau was wrong about the solitary 
origins of humanity.  But his descriptions of amour de soi-meme and amour propre
seem to tell of the early modern attempts at articulating the concepts of an authentic, 
connected whole self, versus the false, fragmented and alienated self.  The 
degenerative effects of domestication weaken the human psyche, but these can be 
resisted if amour propre is harnessed correctly.  In Emile, Rousseau offers many 
insights into these crucial relations of self-to-self and self-to-others.  To consider the 
merits and shortcomings of them all would be an opus in itself.  Instead, I shall offer 
a few of the points I consider most salient to the issue of authenticity and civic 
education.
In Emile, Rousseau describes an approach to education designed to promote 
Amour de Soi and to forestall Amour Propre.  Rousseau seems to be saying that 
Emile is a man who has never had his spirit broken by being forced to obey against 
his will.  Emile is autonomous and able to think independently because he is taught 
to investigate for himself and not to rely on the pronouncements of the government.  
Emile is just, because he has never been oppressed and has learned compassion for 
other’s suffering through fully experiencing his own suffering.  Emile is virtuous 
because he has not been corrupted by luxury or greed.  Emile is authentic because he 
does not pretend to be something he is not in order to impress or please others.  
Emile is happy because his desires do not exceed his ability to fulfill them.  Emile is 
181
 “For hunter/gatherers, social contracts, that is, cooperation between two or more people for mutual 
benefit, were necessary for survival.” (Gigerenzer and Hug, 1992: 130)
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self-reliant because he carries inside himself the means to provide for himself 
wherever he goes, without the need for charity from others.
The education that Rousseau proposes to accomplish the shaping of Emile’s 
character is founded on the principles of self-sufficiency and personal experience.182
Rousseau’s treatise on education focuses only on the teaching and shaping the 
character of one student, not a whole school or nation of them.  Yet, many of his 
ideas of an exploratory/experience-based education are sound and harken back to 
ancient Roman and Spartan models.183  Rousseau assumes that by not breaking the 
spirit of the student by demanding mindless obedience and parroting (as is 
assiduously done in almost every educational system), the student’s nature is not 
twisted or corrupted, thus preventing the decay and development of socially-induced 
vice.184  The student is allowed to develop naturally, without force or coercion that 
warp him into a socially acceptable form.185  The goal of Emile  is to produce a man 
uncorrupted by social vice, not to produce an ideal society.  In fact, it seems that the 
educational advice given in Emile is at odds with the requirements and 
characteristics of a citizen.  The singular nature of Rousseau’s educational theory 
seems contrary to his political theory, which focuses on the collective.  It is difficult 
to reconcile these two, for Rousseau seems to claim that the individual must be 
squashed in order for the state to flourish, yet, Emile is devoted to the preservation of 
individuality.  
182
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It seems that the educational approach in Emile conflicts with the position 
Rousseau puts forth in his political works, where he advocates public education for 
the express purpose of inculcating a sense of loyalty and belonging to the 
community, rather than promoting the individual uniqueness of the citizens.186  In the 
political arena, the function of education is to instill civic virtue and obedience to the 
law and authority, in which citizens are constantly under surveillance, making 
students and citizens aware of the society’s expectations of them.187
Rousseau admonishes us to teach civic virtue, in which the individual must 
totally identify with the state,188 yet it appears that there cannot be a truly public 
education of citizens due to Amour Propre.  So Emile is educated for a private life, 
and not for true citizenship and participation in the state.  I will take another look at 
Rousseau’s views of the self and education in Chapter Six.  As we shall see later, as 
in Plato and Aristotle, there is much to be commended, but there are also serious 
problems.
Rousseau begins his theories of education as well as his social/political 
theories with pessimism about humanity’s progress.  Rousseau notes man’s need to 
“improve” nature, stamping our own will upon the world, and how often this 
improvement goes awry.189  When compared to the seamless fabric of nature, human 
attempts at controlling nature and bending her to our will seem blind and blundering.  
Nature requires no assistance from us, yet we insist, despite knowing our efforts to 
186
 “…[T]he purpose of public education is to make the nation the ground of the students’ identity.” 
Trachtenberg, 1993: 234
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 Trachtenberg, 1993: 235 – 237
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 “Individuals must be obliged to subordinate their will to their reason; the public must be taught to 
recognize what it desires.  Such public enlightenment would produce a union of understanding and 
will in the social body, bring the parts into perfect harmony and lift the whole to its fullest strength.  
Hence the necessity of a lawgiver.” Rousseau, 1968: 83
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be ultimately futile.  In humanity, we have encrusted our inherent nature with a false 
self we created to attract the approval of others.  Rousseau contrasts the natural man 
to the civil man.  The natural man lives entirely for himself, whole and unified; while 
the civil man is fractionated, dependent and relative.190  Rousseau blames social 
institutions for stripping man of his wholeness, rendering him dependent upon 
society for his survival.  The citizen, Rousseau asserts, must be willing to sacrifice 
his own self-interest to the public good.  Indeed, the citizen cannot see his own self-
interest divorced from the public good, for it would be impossible for the citizen’s 
personal interest to gain at the expense of the public good, as the loss of public good 
will eventually affect the citizen’s own interests.  The two are inextricably bound.  
But the selfless duties of the citizen conflicts with the solitary nature of man, as both 
require total commitment.  Trying to fulfill both the needs of our natures and the 
demands of living in society forces a split our natural (dare I say ‘authentic’?) selves 
and the façade we adopt to get along with others.191  This rift in the self is further 
deepened by the educational process, as the child is taught about “everything except 
how to know himself, except to take advantage of himself, except to know how to 
live and to make himself happy.”192
In Book II, Rousseau discusses some of the vagaries of the human condition: 
constant change throughout life in both our bodies and minds, and the 
overabundance of suffering as compared to enjoyment.  Rousseau agrees with the 
hedonist claim that the life of the least suffering and most pleasure is the best.  And 
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with them, he agrees that an excess of desires is the root source of unhappiness.  
Therefore, to learn to be happy consists in reducing one’s desires only to those things 
which are attainable, in the effort to limit disappointment and loss, and find a balance 
between will and power.193 Rousseau claims that imagination inflames our desires 
out of proportion to our ability to fulfill them, causing us to become miserable.  And 
the more grandiose the desire, the less the possibility of fulfillment.  It is this 
confusion between the imaginary and real worlds that constitute the majority of 
suffering in the world, according to Rousseau.  But natural man is content with 
whatever he can provide for himself, so he does not devour himself with envy or 
bitterness at the seeming injustices dealt by life.  Natural man is not defined by his 
needs, as the civilized man is. Rousseau exhorts us to trust children’s natural needs, 
and protect children from excess, as overindulgence is a sure recipe for misery 
because it teaches children to want too much.194  And when it comes about that the 
natural man suffers, he does so without inflating the intensity of his pain through 
trying to avoid it.  Because he knows himself, he also knows how to endure suffering 
without fear.195
Ultimately, we only have control over our own selves.  And as Nature and 
Freedom are the first goods, all education, Rousseau claims, must be based on 
freedom, not authority.  In teaching from authority, we teach weakness and 
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dependence, instead of teaching self-reliance.  We weaken children by creating false 
needs for them.  We force children into slavery by making them do things that will 
have little to no bearing on their lives outside of school.  Dependence upon men 
makes us into slaves, and thus, we should train children only to depend upon things, 
not upon men.196  The demand for obedience leads to coercion and manipulation, as 
control of the child becomes more important than the lesson at hand.  Rousseau 
identifies three negative results of the demand for obedience.  These are: 1) it 
destroys love by enslaving it; 2) it teaches children to become liars in order to avoid 
punishment; and 3) it inculcates a habit of deception in the child, which will bear evil 
fruit later in life.197
We should use age appropriate reasoning and natural limits to teach children.  
When we force child to begin to use reasoning before that faculty has properly 
matured, we damage the child’s psyche, subverting energies naturally designated for 
growth.  Children will never rebel against necessity, but they always will against an 
overbearing ruler.  The more control is forced on a child, the more the child will 
eventually rebel.  Rousseau sets down the maxim that “nature is always right,” and 
that it is only through perversion of nature that people become immoral.198
The ideal Rousseau is aiming for is described thus: 
“If he knows nothing by heart, he knows much by 
experience.  If he reads less well in our books than does another 




 “Let us set down as an incontestable maxim that the first movements of nature are always right.  
There is no original perversity in the human heart.  There is not a single vice to be found in it of which 
it cannot be said how and whence it entered,  The sole passion natural to man is amour de soi-meme
or amour-propre taken in an extended sense,  This amour-propre in itself or relative to us is good and 
useful; and since it has no necessary relation to others it is in this respect naturally neutral.  It becomes 
good or bad only be the application made of it and the relations given to it.” Rousseau, 1979: 92
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tongue, but his head.  He has less memory than judgment.  He 
knows how to speak only one language, but he understands what 
he says; and if what he says he does not say so well as others, to 
compensate for that, what he does, he does better than they do.  
He does not know what the routine, custom, or habit is. What he 
did yesterday does not influence what he does today.  He never 
follows a formula, does not give way before authority or 
example, and acts and speaks only as it suits him.”199
The goal is to teach the child judgment, not preparation for any particular 
social role or occupation.  The child must learn to distinguish real relations from 
apparent ones, without becoming dependent upon the opinions of others.200  This 
teaches the child to depend upon his own judgment, and gives him the experience to 
be able to know that his judgment is reliable.  To me, this sounds a lot like 
authenticity.
With the dawn of puberty, the rising passions of the youth are employed to 
teach him about human relations and the control that love can exert over nature.201
For love tames he who would be loved, yet this same impulse is also the source of 
rivalry and jealousy.  Love begets love, but it also begets hate, as some loves will 
always be unrequited.  Therefore, we should seek to instill in children the wisdom of 
the passions: 1) to know the true relations, both personal and social and 2) to order 
one’s own relations according to these true relations.202  The key to mastering the 
passions is to master one’s own imagination.
Once adolescence is engaged, the youth will tend to compare himself with 
others, but he must be taught how to do so properly, so as to not inflame his 
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imagination with grandiosity or wretchedness.203  The art of observing men well 
must be mastered.  This entails a great interest in our fellow man, as well as 
impartiality in judgment of them.  Pains must be taken to help the teen avoid ego 
inflation as well as depression when compared to others.  All this must be done 
through experiential means, for a teen filled up with abstract ideas and then set loose 
upon the world has no idea how to care for himself or to connect to others.204  Teens 
require practical survival skills, not abstractions.205
Finally, I submit the Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar.  The main 
relevant notion I wish to highlight is the idea that self-interest becomes meaningless 
when seen in the larger context of life.206
As we have seen, Rousseau starts with the concept of a whole unified self, 
which is fractured by the desire to please others.  The whole impact of Emile is to 
raise children with what we call in modern culture an intact sense of self-esteem, and 
the capacity to judge for themselves (thus, the capacity for self-government), by the 
prevention of the development of a false self.  By harnessing the natural passions of 
amour de soi-meme and amour propre in the service of reason and judgment, the 
alienation from self is forestalled instead of further shattered.  This view of educating 
the young to be self-reliant is still somewhat antithetical to our current educational 
philosophy, which stresses regurgitation, obedience and submission, although 
improvements are being made, there is still much to be remedied.
203 Rousseau, 1979: 243
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iii) Kant – Ethics and Reason
Similar to my own efforts, Immanuel Kant sought a foundation upon which a 
universal ethics can be based.  Whereas I am utilizing both a contemporary model 
(current empirical psychological research) and an ancient model (classical Greek and 
the perennial philosophy), Kant sought to predicate his ethics entirely on a universal 
human reason and good will.  Like me, Kant was seeking to ground his ethics 
empirically by conforming to what he saw as universal natural laws which are 
discoverable a priori through human reason.  Kant felt that these a priori universal 
principles cannot be discovered through the senses, hence the need for a metaphysics 
of morals, in which he assumes that we can know how to discover and understand 
universal principles by which the mind/reason function.  Kant believed that these 
rational universal principles are to be found in science and human actions.  This 
emphasis on rationality and universal principles gives rise to a view of the self 
defined within the matrix of duty.207
In this view, duty (which entails the overcoming of obstacles) is not done out of 
self-interest or personal inclination.  Duty includes overcoming impulse and 
temptation.  Indeed, the goodness of an act’s motive increases if the act is done from 
duty and not from self-interest.  In his Second Premise, Kant only ascribed moral 
worth to acts done from the motive of duty in this formal maxim.208  This concept 
takes its ultimate manifestation in the Categorical Imperative, which exhorts us to 
never act in any way that you cannot will to become universal law.  Kant saw this as 
the bare minimum required for morality.  For him, morality comes from subjecting 
207
 Kant, 1964: 13 - 24
208
 Kant, 1964: 19 -21
115
the self to a universal law, such as duty, rather than self-interest.  The Categorical 
Imperative ought to be obeyed for its own sake, Kant believed, and not because of 
any specific content or results.  The Categorical Imperative can be understood as a 
super-sized Golden Rule, in which all forms of morality are derivable from the 
universalized Imperative.
Kant held that the will is defined as a rational agent acting according to 
principles, manifesting as practical reason.  As far as an agent acts from objective 
principles, he is considered good.  But humans are imperfect beings who do not 
always act from objective, rational principles, rather, all too often we yield to the 
temptation of self-interest.  Because of this imperfection, we feel the imposition of 
objective principles as restrictions, as we are not fully rational enough to grasp their 
truth and subject ourselves to its wisdom.  A fully rational individual, Kant believes, 
would not feel the weight of the Categorical Imperative to be a burden.209
Individuals are seen to be rational agents, who are ends in themselves because 
they have unconditioned and absolute value.  In the “Formula of Autonomy,” Kant 
tells us “So act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal 
law through its maxims.”210  The law to which we are bound must be of our own 
choosing and must be universalized.  If rational beings are ends in themselves, then 
they can only follow laws chosen or made by themselves in order for those laws to 
have moral value, but those laws must also be applicable to all and be free of self-
209
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interest.  Free Will (or autonomy) for Kant, then is the willing adoption of self-
imposed laws, in other words, the adoption of morality. 211
Kant sees humanity as having a dual nature, partaking in both the Sensible and 
Intelligible Worlds.  For Kant, man is the sum of sensation and reason.  But Kant 
claims that the self cannot be known directly through introspection.  Understanding, 
although it may arise internally, is bound to the senses and not to reason.  Reason is 
the power of ideas, producing concepts spontaneously without the input of the sense.  
Because of this dual nature, humanity is not at the mercy of the senses, as the will is 
free from physical causation.212  The self cannot be sensed in the Intelligible Realm 
because the senses do not apply in the Intelligible World.  We can only experience 
our own will negatively, through freedom from constraint, and positively, through 
acting on our own principles.213
We have looked at several historical approaches to the self and the problems 
entailed in each vision to gain a sense of how we have arrived at our current 
understanding of selfhood.  Each approach construes the self as divided, which 
allows for the analysis and evaluation of values and beliefs.  Although each view 
took a different approach, all of them were trying to articulate the basic experience of 
selfhood and the foundation of morality.  As we shall see, the theory of a divided self 
is carried forth into modern and contemporary models, and will form the foundation 
of my own proposal.
211
 Kant, 1964: 41
212
 Kant, 1964: 44-45
213
 Kant, 1964: 46
117
Chapter Six
iii) Modern Selves – Egos and Archetypes
Sigmund Freud, the so-called father of psychoanalysis, like Plato, also 
divided the human psyche into three parts: the Ego, the Id, and the Superego.214  In 
Freud’s system, the Id corresponds roughly to the desire aspect of Plato’s tripartite 
soul.  Freud’s Id represents the most basic part of the psyche, which is primarily 
concerned with bodily drives – food, sex, security.  The Ego represents the center of 
the will and judgment – that which strives to maintain a balance between the three 
parts of the psyche.  
As I understand it, Plato has no exact counterpart for the ego, although some 
ego functions seem to be fulfilled by Plato’s Rational part of the soul.  The Ego is the 
conscious self, the face we show to the public, as well as the private self we are 
internally aware of.  The ego is the part of the self that rationally chooses, 
communicates and registers reactions, but all of the ego’s functions can be skewed or 
even controlled by either the Id or the Superego in dysfunction.  The Id and 
Superego can also subtly influence the ego below the level of awareness, causing the 
ego to believe it is behaving rationally and objectively, while in reality it is being 
manipulated by unconscious forces. Freud’s Superego represents the internalized 
influences of others impinging upon the individual, such as a critical parent or 
teacher.   Again, there is no direct correspondence between Plato’s and Freud’s 




embodied in the reasoning part of the tripartite soul, as well as some that can be 
located in Plato’s Spirited segment of the soul.  
Freud’s view of the self has been extremely influential upon Western countries 
and has become internalized by our culture and institutions.  Although Freud does 
not apply his work to a larger body of ethics, no account of the modern conception of 
the self could be deemed adequate without some reference to Freud’s 
groundbreaking theories.
Of greater interest to me, however, is the work of Freud’s student, Carl Jung.  
While Jung accepted much of Freud’s psychological framework and theoretical 
approach of the “talking cure,” one area in which Jung profoundly differed from 
Freud is in the understanding of humanity’s unconscious.  Freud’s treatment of the Id 
presents the psychic processes below the level of awareness as a snakepit of 
repressed desires, impulses and instincts.  Jung took an optimistic view of the self 
below conscious awareness.
Jung abandoned the more traditional triune model of the self for a simpler 
dyadic model.  Instead of three competing parts of the soul, Jung hypothesized the 
existence of only two: 1) the Ego, similar to Freud’s understanding of the rational, 
conscious self, and 2) the Unconscious, which is seen as more comprehensive and 
influential than either the Id or Superego.  
Jung’s Ego is the persona by which we present ourselves to the world, 
“meaning between our true selves and our environment, just as our physical clothing 
presents an image to those we meet.  The ego is what we are and know about 
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consciously.”215  The other side of the ego is the Unconscious, which contains ninety 
percent of our psychological being.  The unconscious contains the snakepits of 
Freud’s id, renamed the Shadow, as well as a rich inner world populated by internal 
characters and functions which embody many psychological patterns called 
Archetypes.  These Archetypes are both personal and shared.  The personal 
archetypes are embodied as the anima/animus, or the contra-sexual image-ideal 
within each individual.  The anima or animus is the locus of many motivating 
functions of self-image and sexual relations.  The shared archetypes are contained in 
what Jung called the Collective Unconscious.  They are called collective because the 
same images and functions appear in some form across all times and cultures, and 
hence seem to be universally human.216  The unconscious holds our drives, impulses 
and instincts, as well as our aspirations and inspirations.  The collective unconscious 
can be said to contain both the highest and the lowest that humans are capable of.
Because so much of our selves remain in the unconscious, the majority of our 
selves are unknown.  
“Most people confuse ‘self-knowledge’ with knowledge of their 
conscious ego personalities… but the ego knows only its own 
contents, not the unconscious and its contents… What is 
commonly call ‘self-knowledge’ is therefore a very limited 
knowledge, most of it dependent on social factors, of what goes on 
in the human psyche.”217
What we experience as a unique individual is actually informed and 
controlled by the movement of these universal archetypes below the surface of 
215 Shadow, Johnson, 1986: 3 – 4
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awareness.218   The suggestion is that the internal self is predicated upon the 
existence of an internalized community of shared psychic patterns.  
Jung is primarily an essentialist, as the ‘true self’ is contained within the 
unconscious, and must be recovered and revealed through the intentional stripping 
away of emotional accretions and defense mechanisms.  These components 
(archetypes) in the psyche compete for control and energy unless they are made 
conscious.  Through a creative interactive process within the psyche called Active 
Imagination, in which internal questions and relations are investigated subjectively, 
bringing unconscious material into awareness.  This process uses art, self-expression, 
imagination and ritual to give voice to and to dialogue with the internal 
characterizations of the archetypes. Like Plato and Freud, Jung sought harmony 
within the warring parts of the self.  But unlike Plato and Freud’s subjugation of the 
unconscious to the rational or the ego, Jung’s self-actualization consists of bringing 
more and more unconscious material into awareness and the conscious integration of 
this material into the self-consciousness.  In Jung’s view, the achievement of 
integration leads to balanced and harmonious social/interpersonal relations.
As I see it, Jung’s view of the self offers three main advantages over the 
tripartite views of Plato and Freud: 1) Simplicity – only two segments of the self are 
posited, in accord with Ockham’s Razor, although the balance of conscious and 
unconscious is not made any easier by the subsuming of elements of id and superego 
into the unconscious;  2) The Hope for Improvement/redemption as unconscious 
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processes are absorbed into the consciousness through active imagination or other 
therapeutic techniques;  3)  Compassion and Stability -  Jung’s model is more 
equitable and maintainable, in my opinion, than either Plato’s or Freud’s, as both of 
Jung’s predecessors rely on a ‘Dominator’ model of the psyche, in which the 
unconscious forces must be held under tight control by reason or the ego.  In Jung’s 
version, increased awareness performs this function by integrating the splintered 
elements of the self.  This idea of integration and unity of the self will take on more 
significance as we proceed.  Although Freud’s ‘talking cure’ was also intended to 
bring unconscious elements into awareness, Freud limited his techniques to only the 
treatment of psychological pathologies.  Jung used his techniques to bring about self-
transformation and expanded awareness to everyman, as the means to achieve 
psycho-spiritual growth or self-actualization.219  While Plato indicates that the 
reasoning part of the psyche can be educated through philosophy to harmonize with 
the other two parts, Jung claims that the struggle between the conscious and 
unconscious is part of a larger cycle of unfolding awareness of self and universe.  
This implies that the self is in a state of perpetual growth, giving hope for improved 
future prospects of increased consciousness, as increased awareness leads to 
improved communication and interaction with both self and others.  The two parts of 
the self are to be brought together and honored as fundamental components of a 
wondrous whole.  In Plato and Jung, the spiritual seeker is justified in pursuing the 
intangible balance of inner harmony and the higher perceptions that brings, but 
Freud’s focus on pathology precludes the use of his model for purposes other than 
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seeking effective psychological relief of unwanted symptoms.  For Freud, 
psychology was a medical discipline with the purpose of curing disease, not for self-
exploration.
All three of these models tend to have a bias of elitism.  For Plato, only those 
with the leisure to practice philosophy had any hope for achieving the delicate 
balance of the soul he calls justice.  For Freud and Jung, only those with the 
resources and leisure to embark on lengthy psychoanalysis could hope to achieve 
mental health or self-actualization.  But of these two, Jung’s system is more creative 
and less constrained by the therapist-patient relationship than Freud’s system.  While 
Freud’s technique depends heavily on therapeutic sessions, Jung’s technique is more 
accessible to the would-be self-actualizer. Through a multitude of excellent books 
(by Jung and his many followers) and through self-exploration in active imagination, 
an individual can begin to do “inner work” alone, without mortgaging the house to 
go into therapy, although a certain level of education and leisure is required in order 
to read, understand and apply Jung’s teachings.
iv) Social Constructivism and Social Cognitive Views of the Self
Social Constructivism is the position held in favor by current social science.  
It holds that an examination of social institutions and structures reveal a functional 
explanation of social roles apart from any contextual or subjective meaning.  The 
individual is seen as shaped and constituted by the social roles he/she fulfils.220  This 
view is called “The Blank Slate” by MIT psychology professor Steven Pinker, and is 
contrasted by him to a biological-genetic basis for understanding the human psyche.  
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The Social Constructivist position (Pinker’s ‘Blank Slate’ position) holds that the 
effects of culture are what shape an individual, lending features and distinction to an 
otherwise undifferentiated psyche.221  The social constructivists are in good company 
in holding this view of the lack of an essential human nature, also holding this view 
are the influential philosophers, Descartes and Rousseau, who believed that the 
human psyche is fashioned primarily by external social forces.
Social Constructivism holds that knowledge is personally and socially 
constructed, discovered and not made.  Interpretation is held to be prior to facts, as 
we cannot look at a fact without interpreting it first.  Therefore, truth is believed to 
be provisional and limited, not certain or absolute.  In this view, the role of 
knowledge is seen as providing frameworks for understanding the world, not direct 
access to the world (which is believed to be impossible to access directly).222
More recent philosophers like Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel have 
espoused a social constructivist view of the self.  In this view, the self is to be 
understood as having developed through the historical mediation of social 
institutions called Frameworks or Orientations.  Taylor asserts that we gain our sense 
of identity from sources both universal and individual, complex and many-layered.223
To define the self is to identify with Frameworks that provide a structure of meaning 
by giving standards for distinctions and evaluations.224  But these frameworks are 
inherited, not created, as they exist prior to being chosen by an individual.  We might 
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be tempted to hear echoes of Jung’s archetypes in the Social Constructionists’ 
frameworks were it not for a critical distinction which sets them in opposition:  in the 
Social Constructivists’ view, the self is both molded by and the medium of inherited 
social institutions (frameworks) that are imposed upon the individual by external 
sources.  These frameworks are accepted and internalized by the individual, 
imparting meaning and an orientation to experience.  The emphasis is on the relation 
to these external frameworks as the primary ‘sources of the self’ of Taylor’s book of 
the same name.  In Jung’s approach, the self is the center of focus, with the 
archetypes being internal sources of meaning and value, mediated through the 
collective unconscious and expressed within and by society.
Taylor offers external historic frameworks a remedy to the three ailments of 
modern culture, which he identifies as: 1) Individualism; 2) the Disenchantment of 
the World; and 3) the Political Consequences of the first two malaises.  To Taylor, 
individualism, while offering a new autonomy to individuals, also entails the loss of 
traditional moral horizons which delineated and gave meaning to experience.  The 
Disenchantment of the World refers to the loss of cosmic order and higher purpose 
once imparted by historic institutions.  This loss of purpose is linked to a narrowing 
of vision caused by egoism and self-centeredness.  Crucial to the success of this 
disenchantment is the rise of Instrumental Reasoning, in which rationality is focused 
on maximizing efficiency and profits.  This pragmatic modern rationalism differs 
from the Platonian model by emphasizing the enhancement of ordinary life, rather 
than focusing on abstract conceptual excellence.  In Instrumental Reasoning, others 
are seen as means to our ends, human life is devalued by impersonal institutions and 
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science and technology is glorified in the worship and hope of the ‘technological 
fix.’  The political fallout of individualism and instrumental reasoning is the loss of 
freedom due to the imposition of Instrumental Reasoning.  As self-absorbed citizens 
fail to participate in government, soft despotism is given a foothold.  Without civic 
participation, individuals face monolithic institutions alone, further discouraging 
participation and alienating them from the political sphere.225  Without this civic 
participation, we are in danger of losing our ability to control our political destinies. 
For Taylor, meaning is created through connection to others, rendering 
introspection and self-exploration a harmful exercise in self-indulgence.226  Taylor 
asserts that an individual’s values and choices are shaped by culture and caste, and 
cannot be totally self-generated, as Jung’s collective unconscious could be construed 
to be.227  Taylor links self-discovery to creative-artistic self-expression, but limits 
individual originality only to those creations which enhance social values.228  It is 
through immersion in the group traditions that the individual finds the fulfillment of
his/her self.229  Taylor’s position is consistent with his personal conservative 
Catholic beliefs.
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There is much good to be found in Taylor, especially in his diagnosis of the 
‘malaises of modernity,’ but I do not agree with the Social Constructivist view of a 
self entirely fashioned by culture and institution.  The selfish egoism identified by 
Taylor is certainly a problem prevalent in our culture, but Jung would diagnose this 
condition as one of alienation from the true self, and not necessarily as an indication 
of the entire failure of a subjective approach, as Taylor seems to claim.  Rousseau 
would argue that it is the very social forces so empowered by Taylor and Social 
Constructivism that is responsible for the corruption of man’s original state of 
natural honesty and self-reliance.
At the opposite spectrum of the approaches to understand the self is the 
Cognitive view of the self.  In the Cognitive camp, the self is seen as the result of 
brain processes, in the most recent form of Physical Reductionism.  The faculties of 
mind are believed to have evolved in response to conditions in the environments of 
our ancestors.  These faculties are characterized as modules in the mind, usually 
corresponding to specific locales in the geography of the human brain.  The self or 
“soul” is seen as the interaction of these modules.230  Our selves are, in large part, 
determined by our genetic inheritance.  It is undeniable that many personality traits 
are inherited, as science continues to discover the physical processes by which this 
occurs.  To his credit, Pinker does acknowledge some external input, in that certain 
faculties (such as language) do not develop unless the individual is provided a 
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potential-enriched environment.231  But to the Cognitive psychologist, the individual 
self is still determined and constrained by forces outside his/her conscious control.  
And, like Freud, the exercise of Cognitive therapy is limited to the correction of 
pathologies, not self-actualization or exploration.  The Cognitive view also falls prey 
to Taylor’s malaises, as the values and relations of the self are reduced to biological 
processes, devoid of significance and higher purpose.  Like Freud, the cognitive 
psychology approach utilizes and glorifies Instrumental Reasoning, and thus is prone 
to all the political and moral devolution’s identified by Taylor.
The Cognitive view of the self as multiple modules of different mental 
faculties returns us once again to a view of a splintered self.  In the Cognitive 
schema, a module or group of modules act as a ‘central executive,’ coordinating and 
controlling the other competing modules, corresponding to the Ego of Freud and 
several other systems.  Like Freud, the cognitive view is a contentious model, and 
the internal conflict is reflected in social conflict.  But like Plato, the module 
responsible for rational thought is considered superior to the other modules.
By now, it should be apparent that I am biased in favor of the Jungian view of 
the self.  It has the virtue of having both simplicity and depth.  While positing only 
two divisions of the self, it accounts for the multiplicity of drives, instincts ad 
aspirations, while affording the self not only creativity (like Taylor), but also 
spirituality – something conspicuously lacking in most of the other models thus 
discussed. From Plato, we get the idea of the self as an internal relation.  From 
Freud, we get the concept of unconscious processes requiring consciousness.  From 
Jung, we have the enhanced collective unconscious and the archetypes.  Social 
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constructivism gives us a sense of the ethical relations and connection to larger 
contexts, while cognitive psychology allows us to explore the connections between 
physical processes and personal experience.
v) The Perennial Philosophy
I now turn to a consideration of what has come to be called the “Perennial 
Philosophy,” (so called because of its perceived continuity throughout history) as 
several of its main tenets are echoed in my approach. The name, Perennial 
Philosophy, is commonly attributed to Leibniz, but this is mistaken.  The use of the 
name predates Leibniz by at least two-hundred and fifty years, and the idea goes 
back even farther than the name.232   Although the Perennial Philosophy is primarily 
theological, it contains an embedded view of the self and approach to education that 
corresponds to both ancient philosophies of character education (virtue ethics) as 
well as to emergent research in the fields of psychology and sociology.  Although in 
this work, I avoid making any theological claims about the nature of reality or 
theology,233 I will highlight how the ancient view of humanity embedded within the 
Perennial Philosophy has been validated by contemporary science.  I contend that 
this is so because the Perennial Philosophy developed over thousands of years of 
actual personal experiences, and it is for this reason Social Cognitive research is now 
catching up to the observations of saints and sages made eons ago: it now appears 
that the view of humanity found within the Perennial Philosophy is based on an 
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empirical observation of human behavior and nature, just as much as the current 
research is based on empirical observation of human behavior and nature.  Therefore, 
I discuss the Perennial Philosophy, despite its perilously close affiliation to religion, 
because the ancients, Communitarians and Social Psychology all share many 
concepts in common with the philosophia perennis and should properly be included 
in a consideration of the educational and civic applications of self-knowledge (albeit 
briefly).  The implications of this are interesting, as more and more of the ancient 
wisdom is becoming empirically validated by modern psychology and sociology.  
The syncretistic tradition of the Perennial Philosophy claims that its history 
can be traced through some of the most influential minds in western history.  Great 
philosophers claimed by the tradition include: Zoroaster, Hermes Trismegistus, 
Orpheus, Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Jamblichus, Diogenes Laertius, 
Augustine (once the tradition migrated into Christianity), Thomas Aquinas, Proclus, 
Giovanni Pico, Francesco Giorgio, Agostino Steuco, and Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz.234  More modern syncretistic thinkers in line with the tradition include 
Blaise Pascal, William Blake, Aldous Huxley, Nicholas Berdyaev, C.G. Jung, Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin, Martin Buber, William James, Paul Tillich, Karl Jaspers, Rollo
May, Gabriel Marcel, Mircea Eliade, James Hillman, and Joseph Campbell.235
It is generally recognized that there are four major tenets of Perennial 
Philosophy.  These are:  1) the Physical realm is only a part of the total reality -
Reality actually consists of an underlying unity, which is seen as the ultimate ground 
of being.  This underlying unity is identified with deity, with the individual self seen 
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as a fragment of a greater whole.  This concept is exemplified by Plato’s Divided 
Line of upper and lower realms, or Kant’s and Descartes distinctions between the 
realms of Sensation and Intelligibility (or Mind).  It is not within the scope of this 
work to consider the metaphysical claims of the existence of deity - far greater minds 
than I have considered the logical validity of a Prime Mover and I refer you to them 
for a discussion of it.236
2) The Perennial Philosophy holds that this primal unity can be directly 
accessed through the human mind.  Every individual has their own unique 
connection to this unity, whether they are aware of it or not.  The lack of awareness 
of the existence of this permanent connection to the unity does not deny its existence.  
Plato claims that we partake in the world of Forms through reason (or mind).  Jung 
emphasized a common bond in humanity through the Collective Unconscious and 
Archetypes.  Taylor recognizes a common unity of humanity grounded in equal 
capacity for moral choice.  Social Cognitive Psychology recognizes an emerging 
view of a universally malleable human nature that is shaped by whatever culture 
subjects it to socialization.
3) Humanity is seen to have a fragmented nature, divided into two or more 
realms, always including at least the physical realm and the mental/spiritual.  Some 
perennial thinkers, such as Plato and Freud subdivide the human psyche into three 
parts, while others, such as Kant, Jung and Taylor only focus on two parts. Rousseau, 
Taylor and many others emphasis an original unification of self that is shattered by 
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social contingencies, but which unity can be regained (to varying degrees) through 
proper efforts and education.
4) The perennial philosophy is unabashedly teleological and claims to answer 
many of life’s most burning and basic questions, such as “Why am I here?” - one key 
to its lasting appeal.  According to the Perennial Philosophy, the goal of human life 
is to perfect oneself, that is, to figure out your self and your place in the cosmos so 
that you might take up your proper relations to the world.  The ancient Greeks 
referred to this as Eudaemonia.  In our era, we simply call it being happy.  According 
to this view, everyone has direct access to unity and self-knowledge, even if we 
don’t know it or take advantage of it.  The goal of human existence, according to the 
Perennial Philosophy, is the attainment of self-knowledge. 
Ancient mystic tradition holds a complimentary view of the self, in which the 
self is also divided into multiple parts that were interconnected by a fundamental 
underlying unity. The part of the self that is multiple is called by many different 
names by many different teachers: the Conditioned Self, the False Self, the Ego, the 
Alienated Self, etc.  This part of the self is created through social interaction with 
others and can be characterized as consisting of multiple selves that constantly 
change according to the situation.237  The goal of mysticism is to achieve unity, both 
within the self and with the larger universe.  To achieve this unification, the seeker is 
taught to identify with the part of the self that still lies in unity.  This part of the self 
is variously called the Higher Self, the Soul, the Real/True Self, etc.  By identifying 
the self with the higher, more coherent aspects of the self, the individual seeks to 
create through their actions and thoughts the “Observer” self – an aspect/identity that 
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sees the self objectively and is capable of reflecting upon the whole of the self and 
control the multiple identities as needed.  This Observer is created through self-
observation that doesn’t get identified with any one single identity and through the 
cultivation of mystical experiences of unity, in which the atomistic individual self is 
perceived to be an illusion.  
The self is seen as possessing limitless potential that must be consciously 
recognized in order to become actualized.  It is axiomatic that the individual creates 
the reality they perceive and experience through their thoughts, choices and beliefs in 
a feedback loop (called Karma by some traditions). The false self or ego is held to 
have many layers and defense mechanisms that must be first observed and then 
accepted in order to be released and transcended.  All illusions of a separate self 
must eventually be surrendered to achieve the goal of Self-Actualization, also called 
Liberation, Enlightenment or Awakening.  Fully awakened individuals are extremely 
rare, and are completely integrated into any environment in which they might 
stumble, for they perceive no differences between themselves and others, one 
situation and another.  Since they have no ego to protect anymore, they are free to 
respond in any manner, and since they have nothing to prove, they can humbly adapt 
themselves to the situation in compassion and universal love.  This view of the self 
underlies most world religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and 
Hinduism).  
Social Cognitive theory supports much of the ancient views of the self, 




subject known through introspection), that are integrated through self-knowledge238
or the theory of the Interpersonal Self, in which schemas of the self are developed 
through social interaction and the process of increasing differentiation of the self 
from others.239  Others discuss the creation of self identifications through 
interpersonal agreement and given whatever ‘spin’ we desire to project the desired 
self-image to others.240  Like the ancients, modern theory holds that the more of 
these splintered identities that are consciously assimilated into the larger self, the 
more healthy and successful the individual.241  The creation of reality of the mystics 
is supported in modern theory, in which it is shown that we project onto the world 
what we believe about ourselves in a self-fulfilling prophecy, justifying those 
expectation and beliefs about the self.242
Apart from the theological and metaphysical considerations, both the 
Perennial Philosophy and empirical psychology emphasize the fragmentation of the 
human psyche and the goal of unity or wholeness, which pre-existed the 
fragmentation and can be returned to, given sufficient maturity and development.  
Both Social Cognitive Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy emphasize that the 
lack of self-knowledge is the root cause of most psychological and social problems.  
Both also emphasize the corrective powers of self-knowledge on moral education 
and development. 
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The Perennial Philosophy flows through and informs much of not only 
Western culture, but can be found in both the Near East243 and Far East cultures as 
well, as the syncretistic strains also found in Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism are just 
as prevalent in those societies as well.  
The ultimate metaphysical status of reality or the existence of deity is not 
necessary for the Perennial Philosophy to pragmatically function effectively in the 
individual’s psyche, as the underlying unity can fall within a range, allowing 
individuals to pursue whatever beliefs they choose (more on this to follow). 
However, for the purposes of our discussion, I will assume that there is something
larger than ourselves and of which we are all a part, whether that something be a 
sentient cosmos, the so-called “blind” forces of nature and evolution on this small 
planet or the social cohesion of the community/state/nation, I will not speculate here.  
D)  Citizen, Self and Others
i)  Common Features
The understanding of the self is central to any attempts at civic or moral 
education, and must be founded upon a model of the self that is accurate and 
effective.  Current research in Social Cognitive theories of the self reveal a view of 
the self that is consistent with many ancient and traditional models of the self.  I have 
attempted to make a preliminary articulation of the emerging model of self as viewed 
through the prisms of dualism, self-knowledge and historic models of the self.   
ii) Relation of Self to Others
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In Philosophical Arguments, Charles Taylor argues for a politics of 
recognition.  According to this belief, identity is inextricably bound up with the 
recognition we receive (or fail to receive) from others.  Non-recognition is 
tantamount to oppression.244  Over time, this external non-recognition can become 
internalized into self-hatred and discrimination against oneself.  Positive recognition 
is a fundamental human need, Taylor claims.  This is in stark contrast to Rousseau’s 
claims of man’s natural solitary self-sufficiency, but Rousseau does acknowledge the 
need for all of us to live together in society, thus making some measure of 
recognition by others necessary.245
With the collapse of traditional social hierarchies and the honors they once 
accorded, in democracy the concept of dignity is now considered universal amongst 
humanity, thus all are considered fundamentally equally deserving of recognition.  
The object of equal recognition is the authentic identity of each individual.   
Embedded within this authentic self is the original sense that gives rise to morality.  
This is an inner resource equally available to all individuals to assist in judgment.  
Therefore, morality is achieved through contact with this internal source of moral 
knowledge, not through some rational calculation or resort to an external god or 
ideal.  This inner source of knowledge is described at length in the works of St. 
Augustine.246  Rousseau also connected morality to a correct inner connection to the 
self.247
244
 Taylor, 1995: 225
245
 Rousseau, 1979: 243 
246
 “…[T]he source we have to connect with is deep within us.  This is part of the massive subjective 
turn of modern culture, a new form of inwardness, in which we come to think of ourselves as beings 
with inner depths.  At first, this idea that the source is within may not exclude our being related to 
God or the Ideas; it can be considered our proper way of relating to them.  In a sense, it can be seen as 
just a continuation and intensification of the development inaugurated by Augustine, who saw the 
136
Historically, identity has been tied to social position, but in a democracy, the 
identity is expected to be self-defined.  But, as we have seen in previous sections, it 
is impossible to get a true understanding of the self in a vacuum.  One must have 
others to engage in dialogue to discover one’s own authentic self.  It is through the 
interactions with others that our selves are called into articulation.  But the external 
recognition of inner realities is not guaranteed, it must be earned through interaction 
with others and always runs a risk of failure.248  Recognition on the intimate level is 
dependent upon our relations with significant others, while recognition on the social 
level is manifest through the struggle for equal recognition.  This equal recognition is 
crucial for democracy, and the failure to achieve it carries the risk of harm to those 
overlooked by society.
Taylor proposes that we adopt the universal capacity of all individuals for 
self-definition as the basis of a standard respect for the dignity of all persons. This 
affords all individuals, at least theoretically, an equal right to recognition because of 
their individual uniqueness.  But problems occur when this is expanded to include 
what individuals have made manifest, as well as the recognition of potential.  This 
approach, Taylor tells us, runs the risk of forced homogeneity and thus alienation 
from the authentic self.249
Rousseau warned against the dependence upon the esteem of others, but 
Taylor wants to assert that dependence upon others need not be a form of slavery and 
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oppression.  Taylor points out that Rousseau does give the esteem of others an 
important part in the creation of the potentially good society.250  The unity of a 
perfectly balanced reciprocity within a society would function to preserve both the 
equality and uniqueness of individuals.  If united for a common purpose, our 
cooperation with others, if returned in proportion, need not alienate us from 
ourselves.  This form of concern for the opinions of others is consistent with freedom 
of choice and self-government.251  To strive for individual honors is to harbor the 
enslaving kind of esteem, but to strive for universal dignity instills unity in 
individuals and societies, as it does not lead to competition for the meting out of 
limited resources, but rather it seeks to share.  Taylor notes that Rousseau’s 
concentration of dependence upon the General Will alone is what leads to tyranny 
and oppression.  But equal freedom without equal recognition is tantamount to the 
same thing.  Neutral liberalism, while granting equality of rights, cannot recognize 
uniqueness, leading to a lack of tolerance for cultural and individual differences.252
The question becomes, how can we acknowledge uniqueness without destroying 
equality?  Ultimately, the preservation and recognition of uniqueness is not a neutral 
act.
Taylor offers a new model of liberalism: one founded on how minorities are 
treated, rather than on neutrality.253  So, under this new model, a society with
collective goals could still be considered liberal if it respects the rights of its 
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dissenters, as well as the majority.  Taylor argues that the pressures of 
multiculturalism and a mobile society are making the traditional model of liberalism 
impractical.  A politics of equal recognition can be applied to education by the 
inclusion of other cultures in the curriculum.  All societies have something important 
to contribute to the world and must have recognition in order to give it.254  With this, 
we broaden our horizons to include all others, granting them the recognition they 
require while expanding our own identities.
Taylor argues that true neutral objectivity is impossible for biased humans to 
achieve – some standards will always be applied in evaluation.  The automatic 
acceptance of differences leads to the degradation and homogenization of 
differences.  Therefore, only the adoption of a universal respect preserves uniqueness 
while ensuring equality.
But all the uniqueness and recognition in the world is worthless if we hate 
ourselves.  All true self-esteem is based on our opinions of ourselves.  Rousseau 
knew this when he tried to halt or at least slow the influence of the opinions of others 
upon the emerging self.  We fear looking at ourselves most of all.  We want total 
acceptance exactly as we are from others, but how can others accept us exactly as we 
are, when we don’t accept ourselves exactly as we are?
We seek approval from the world, but we will never really accept any 
approval we do receive from others if we don’t approve of ourselves.  We project 
this onto the world and believe others don’t like us – in our fear and frustration, we 
may even feel that the world has turned against us, believing it to be a dark and 
dangerous place.  No amount of positive regard from others will change this, because 
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we will find some way to reject any positive regard we might receive because it is 
alien to us if we don’t believe we truly deserve it.  We are constantly trying to make 
the grade, to get the job, to find the right mate, to get that promotion… all attempts 
to seek approval from others that we are incapable of accepting because it conflicts 
with our fundamental beliefs about ourselves and what we deserve from others.  We 
use externals such as career, money, status, relationships, etc. to prove to ourselves 
that we are worthy.  We keep ourselves at bay from ourselves (lack of self-
knowledge) because we’re not sure if that which is within us is worthy or not.  But 
we won’t know the true nature of what lies underneath the mask and armor we use to 
protect ourselves from others.  We are always trying to make ourselves look good 
enough and to understand enough to “make” others accept us.  But unless we accept 
ourselves at the level of naked being, without using social props and expectations as 
armor, no achievements or relations will have real meaning for us, because it will all 
stem from an alien acceptance of someone else’s conception of the good, and not 
from our authentic selves.
We must accept ourselves beyond the level of manifestations and 
accomplishments: at the basic level of being.  Here we find the universal basis for 
universal respect.  Without an underlying experience of our authentic selves and the 
knowledge that that self is fundamentally good, we will try to identify with externals, 
further splitting from ourselves.  Proof of humanity’s intrinsic goodness is 
impossible to prove scientifically, and must be an article of belief.  In the Judeo-
Christian tradition, man is corrupted by choice from an originally pure state.  
Technology cannot prove or disprove whether or not humanity (and hence the self) is 
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intrinsically good or evil.  It still requires a leap of faith.  But when the consequences 
of not leaping are considered, the risk of erroneously judging human nature to be 
good is negligible when weighed beside the known evils caused from alienated 
selves (shades of Pascal’s Wager). If we think we are good because our performance 
is good or because we have fulfilled the expectations of others, our self-esteem is 
dependent upon our perception of the opinions of others, not upon our authentic 
selves.  We play games to get the approval from others and go to extremes to get a 
certain group of people to think we are worthy.  But pretense of any kind is the 
absence of authenticity.
There are no exterior features, skills or accoutrements that conclusively 
indicate the presence of authenticity.  Authenticity is a certain inner relation of the 
self, based on an appreciation of individual uniqueness apart from any mode of 
expression, without the attempt to “armor,” or the creation of mental buffers to 
protect the self from the threat of others.  We are always on guard to defend against 
the dangers of the world.  But we create what we defend against: in trying to defend 
against the rejection from others, we create that rejection.  We cannot live our lives 
trying to please others because this causes us to create a false self, leading to the loss 
of meaning, connection and moral horizon, as Taylor noted.  In defending against
disapproval, we actually create disapproval by overcompensating for those lacks we 
believe others see in us.  The belief that we must put forth the best face we can to 
others is a defense against what would happen if we were to just let go and trust that 
our authentic self is sufficient, regardless of the approval or disapproval of others.
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To live as an authentic self means not trying to be any particular thing at any 
particular time to meet some preconceived ideas of what is required to fulfill one’s 
own interests.  It means living moment to moment, spontaneously  in trust that 
whatever comes along, the authentic self can deal with it without resort to plotting, 
manipulation or obsessing about the details.
The culture and our egos fear that without conscious control and 
manipulation, all our structures and institutions will lapse into chaos.  But as 
Rousseau admonishes us, nature is always right, and people are naturally good.255  If 
we relax and quit trying to control everything, there is a natural order to things which 
will reassert itself once we take our hands off and quit trying to micromanage the 
cosmos.  
Ultimately, we must look into the self and see what is there to be convinced 
whether or not the self is fundamentally good.  But before we can do this, we must 
overcome our fear of rejection and vulnerability.  We think we must ally ourselves 
with others and remain in their good graces because we are too weak to survive 
alone.  The divided self does not give up its control easily.  Rousseau recognized this 
in his discussion of amour propre.  This is why he wanted to forestall its creation as 
long as possible to allow the individual long enough to establish a strong connection 
to the authentic self (amour de soi-meme) to withstand the challenges posed by the 
opinions of others.  The false self (ego/amour propre) does not want us to see how 
strong and powerful we are in our natural state.  But once recognition of the 
authentic state is actualized, we are able to relate to others without armoring against 
them; without trying to defend against their possible rejection of us. 
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The discovery of the authentic self leads to a more stable individual who is 
not swayed by the opinions of others, and who has good judgment because they can 
look past their own fears and limitations.  Such individuals are desirable in 
democracy because they are able to make wise decisions for themselves and their 
community (self-government) because the can see their own private interests as 
connected to the interests of the whole community at large.
This authentic self is not the responsibility of the individual to create – it 
already exists.  Instead, what is required is the removal of the armor that serves as 
buffers to keep others at arm’s length, lest our vulnerability cause us pain, to remove 
all that prevents us from being our authentic selves.  It is exactly this authentic but 
vulnerable stance which is the source of our true connection to others and to the 
community.  This lack of artificial façade in relating to others by definition respects 
differences without homogenization.  It respects equality because it is founded upon 
the fundamental recognition that everyone has an authentic self worthy of respect, 
regardless of how we present ourselves behaviorally.  It preserves democracy and 
self-government while avoiding the risks of bias and coercion because the authentic 
self cannot be manufactured or coerced by authorities or peer pressure without 
ceasing to be authentic.  As the self is understood in terms of a unique expression of 
a larger natural order, the self is not isolated, but rather seeks articulation through 
participation in relations and community.
Nature has provided an interdependent web of life that is self-regulating and 
self-renewing.  If we take the lessons of the physical sciences seriously, we must 
admit this interconnection of life has evolved into the complex ecosystem that gave 
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rise to the evolution of both humanity and democracy.  It does not require human 
intervention, but humans do require participation in and cooperation with nature to 
survive.  If we accept a biological model of life, then we must be alive to its intrinsic 
order and beauty, and be willing to apply that to ourselves.  Just as our government 
and the world at large is facing the dilemma of how to balance industry and ecology, 
so are we as individuals seeking a balance between the demands of living in a 
community and the demands of our authentic selves.  If we accept nature as our 
maxim, we must see ourselves as self-contained organs within a larger body.  When 
we try to determine for ourselves what our function is according to our own desires 
and the opinions of others, we impede or stop the function nature intended and thus 
render ourselves irrelevant to nature’s plan for evolution.  In trying to control the 
world, we cut off our own future potential before it can even begin to materialize.
Building on the ideas of thinkers such as Rousseau, Taylor and Sandel, I have 
attempted to show that authenticity is not only desirable in democracy, but to suggest 
that it is actually a necessary condition for the long-term preservation of democracy 
and freedom, because only authentic selves are capable and willing to make 
considered judgments for the long-term good of themselves and their communities.  
The means I propose to achieve this is through the formative project, modeled and 
based upon self-knowledge and authenticity.  Through the foundational use of 
authenticity, bias and coercion is avoided and autonomy is preserved.  By improving 
the individual citizen’s capacity for judgment through connection to the authentic 
self, we improve their capacity for critical evaluation and wise choices, hence 
improving the overall prospects for the future of democracy.  By reuniting the 
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fragmented self, we reconnect with self and community, seeing one as an expression 
and extension of the other, and thus cease behaving as atomistic agents with no 
moral obligations to others.  Once we recognize ourselves as part of a larger, planet-
wide web of life, we will cease to anthropomorphize the world and will return to the 
authentic ecological niche encoded within the natural forces of evolution.  
As the recurrent flooding of the Mississippi Basin, with its intricate system of 
dams and locks, has shown, nature will not bow to man’s will for long.  Eventually, 
the natural order reasserts itself, often with calamitous devastation.  This devastation 
can be avoided if a return to authenticity is undertaken and attempts at the control of 
nature are harmonized to cooperate with nature or are stopped.  It is ridiculous to 
suppose that nature was capable of creating this wonderfully interconnected system 
of life on this planet for billions of years, but it all came to a grinding halt as soon as 
humanity came on the scene, and so our micromanagement is necessary to ensure 
our rights and comfort.  It is only when we ignore or violate the ways of nature that 
we exclude ourselves from the evolutionary process.  If we, as a nation, see the 
world as the larger context of our being and not as our market to be exploited, we 
will cease many of the more offensive capitalistic practices.  If others who do not fit 
the mold are not marginalized and alienated, individuals will not be driven to 
extremes or violence to receive the recognition denied them.  Thus, an adoption of 
the authentic stance should be considered a critical need for the preservation of our 





Currently throughout American culture, there is much concern and hand-
wringing about the threat to our traditional values made by our post-modern 
multicultural world.  Conflicting beliefs, lifestyles and cultures have challenged 
historical approaches to everything from politics to education, rendering many of 
these approaches either obsolete or inappropriate.  One of these past approaches is 
the Formative Project – the conscious effort to shape future generations through 
education, in order to prepare them to take part as active citizens within a functioning 
democracy.  In America, this effort was traditionally undertaken by public education, 
but in the last fifty years, this approach has fallen out of favor for a number of 
reasons, including fears of indoctrination, colonization, elitism, and the separation of 
church and state.  These fears have been proven to be historically valid, as the 
Formative Project has usually been undertaken in a homogeneous and nationalistic 
setting, with quasi-religious overtones, as evidenced by the Greek Paideia’s approach 
to civic education.  But, as we have seen, such approaches are not suited to our 
highly heterogenic twenty-first century technocracy.  Yet the need for such civic 
education has not changed – citizens still must be prepared to take up their civic 
responsibility in order for our democracy to continue to function.  The rise of Neutral 
Liberalism, however, undermined much of the traditional means of accomplishing 
this, and in the fifty years since the dawn of the Civil Rights Movement, very little 
progress has been made in replacing traditional civic and moral education.  This task 
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has been primarily left to family and church, with at best mixed and inconsistent 
results, as witnessed by increasing voter apathy and alienation.  Without engaged 
citizens endowed with the capacity to make good decisions on behalf of themselves 
and others, a democracy flounders.
The challenge I have sought to answer in these pages is to fill the dire need 
for preparing citizens for active participation in democracy through public education
at the college level, through the application of current psychological and sociological 
research to teach students skills in decision-making and self-knowledge.  Backed by 
current Social Cognitive Psychology research, I contend that the lack of self-
knowledge is at the bottom of many of our current social problems, and that the 
teaching of self-evaluation and values evaluation skills can alleviate many of the 
problems now facing our country, not only politically, but socially as well.  How well 
we know our values is just as or even more important as what values we hold.  
Recent research suggests that some ways of thinking about the self are more efficient 
and efficacious than others – specifically, that the lack of self-knowledge renders an 
individual vulnerable to manipulation, coercion and depression (which can lead to 
alienation and isolation).  All of these are deadly to the preservation of democracy, 
as well as individual happiness.  By encouraging students to question their own 
belief systems (without advocating any one specific belief system apart from the 
basic democratic values of liberty and equality), as well as teaching basic critical 
thinking skills whereby students can evaluate the desirability of their beliefs, I argue 
that many social ills can be remedied and our own culture safeguarded against many 
of the dangers of civic apathy and political manipulation.
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II)   Objections and Responses
As with all approaches to the touchy problem of civic education, there are 
unanswered question and potential problems with this approach.  In this section, I 
shall try to enunciate and respond to concerns that naturally arise with the proposal 
of a controversial endeavor such as this.
A)  The Religious Objection
Our culture, indeed, the whole world, is undergoing a major challenge to 
determine the role of religion in a postmodern multicultural world.  Traditionally, 
moral education had taken place under the aegis of religion, and the values imparted 
were mostly if not completely derived from religious origins.  Many writers in the 
fields of ethics, values and character all bemoan the loss of a homogeneous culture 
with clearly defined values and boundaries, such as those provided by a Christian 
paradigm.  Philosopher Charles Taylor and Sociologist James Davison Hunter are 
exemplars of the view that the loss of a religious context is equated with the loss of 
values and character.256   Both point to the rise of multiculturalism and the 
displacement of Christian values with secular values as the culprit for many social 
ills, ranging everything from political disaffection to crime to ethical relativism.  
This question is indicative of a larger debate going on in the world, but rarely 
recognized.  This deeper question is: What is the role of religion in a postmodern 
multicultural world?  This question has spawned many other burning issues in our 
time that, in my opinion, are merely smokescreens for the pains of displacement felt 
by those who advocate traditional belief systems as science and secularism encroach 
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upon their traditional territory.  Emerging issues related to this central question 
include, but are not limited to the raging debate over evolution versus creationism, 
school prayer and terrorism.  This issue is far too broad to completely address here, 
but I shall attempt to respond to how the loss of the traditional unifying role of 
religion relates to moral and civic education.
Both Taylor and Hunter assume that moral education is best done in a 
religious atmosphere, and the loss of the universality of that context is tantamount to 
the permanent loss of character in culture, as neither of these authors seems capable 
of imagining something else as capable of fulfilling the ethical function of religion.  
For these two, the only recourse is a return to traditional religion in order to 
recapture any semblance of social morality.  This view assumes that without religion 
as a basis for ethics, ethics is impossible.  I argue that this is an unwarranted 
assumption.  While religion has been the historical source and vehicle for ethics, I do 
not hold that it is the only one.257  Underlying the ethics of all religions is what is 
known in Christianity as “The Golden Rule,” which holds ‘Do unto others that which 
you would have others do unto you."  All major religions have some version of this 
sentiment.  But as universal as this idea seems to be, it also carries a fatal flaw – it 
relies upon the prior existence of self-love.  But the ugly truth is that most people do 
not love themselves, hence their ability to commit acts of violence and abuse.  
Although all major religions carry this idea, proponents of every religion are guilty 
of violations of this idea, exactly because of the scarcity of self-love.  I contend that 
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the religious context for moral education is highly over-rated, as many of the most 
heinous acts of violation and torture against other humans were committed in the 
name of religion.  Evidence of this ranges from the Crusades and pogroms to acts of 
religious terrorism, as witnessed in every major religion.  No, religion alone is not 
sufficient to found a universal ethic upon.  If it were, it would have already been 
achieved during the thousand plus years of Christian dominance in Europe and some 
two hundred years in America.  The lack of universal morality and the existence of 
crime and corruption in religiously homogeneous cultures is strong evidence that a 
homogeneous religious culture is not a sufficient or even necessary condition for the 
formation of morality and ethics. 
Another argument in favor of the need for a religious context for moral 
education is that the threat of eternal damnation or incurring unfavorable karma and 
the promise of eternal reward or a favorable reincarnation is needed to goad people 
into being moral or developing character.  But the evidence extant in the world 
would suggest that these bribes and threats are not sufficient to prevent the 
occurrence of violence, crime and corruption.  The Salvation-Damnation position 
makes the same fatal error of assuming a prior self-love that may not actually exist 
even in self-professed believers.  
Indeed, the religious motivation for morality will only function if the 
individual has a favorable self-opinion upon which the carrot-and-stick or the Golden 
Rule approach can work.  I have observed that traditional religious approaches work 
great for those who already have a good store of high self-esteem and self-love, but 
rational.  The majority of humanity will not base their values and decisions purely on rational 
premises.  For this reason, Utilitarianism is also doomed to failure.
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tend to erode and undermine those with low self-esteem and lacking in self-love.  
Telling someone who already feels badly about themselves that they are a damned 
sinner is not likely to motivate them to like themselves better.  Under these 
circumstances, the injunction to “Treat others as you would have them treat you” can 
be disastrous, for if I feel that I deserve punishment, then I will be more open to 
abusing others, projecting my own guilt outwards onto others.  Therefore, I argue 
that epistemic responsibility is a critical prerequisite for the effective application of 
religious morality.
Science and Ethics
In the previous section, I examined the religious approach to the foundation 
of ethics.  In the following two sections, the adequacy of science to ground ethics 
will be explored.
Reason is a great thing – it has given us the “miracle of science,’ but is reason 
sufficient to ground an ethics upon?  As we saw in the previous historical review, 
Plato, Kant and Rawls all seem to think so.  But Aristotle, Berlin, Sandel and Taylor 
disagree.  Plato, Kant and Rawls all assume reason to be above personal interest and 
accessible to all.  But Berlin and Taylor question this assumption, while Aristotle and 
Rousseau seem to take a middle position and incorporate some measure of reason, 
mitigated by emotion.  Reason itself is neutral and can be turned to the achievement 
of any goals, moral or not, as we saw evidenced by the murderous efficiency of the 
Nazis in the Holocaust.  Reason alone may be intrinsically pure, but that does not 
necessarily carry over to its application.
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B)  A Normative Objection
A major issue in normative ethics is the source or grounding of ethical 
theory.  One important objection to my position essentially states that it is a mistake 
to infer that an intrinsic value is equivalent to a judgment value – we cannot get 
ethical values from physical descriptions.  In our case, this would mean that just 
because there is scientific evidence suggesting that people would likely be happier 
and more successful if they were to apply these findings to their own lives, we 
cannot claim any moral authority for the institution of these findings in our colleges 
and universities.  Clinical results cannot be translated into an endorsement of the 
approach and techniques I advocate, and people should not be forced into epistemic 
responsibility merely because there is some research that seems to support it.  
While it is true that you cannot derive “ought” from “is,” it is also true that 
there is a lot of unnecessary suffering in the world due primarily to ignorance of this 
knowledge of the self.  A moral imperative cannot be claimed by the existence of the 
research cited in this study, nor can it be claimed that this is the only valid approach 
to take to solve many of the problems this approach seeks to address.  My response 
to this objection is to appeal to functionalism – some things observably work better.  
I do not propose the teaching of values, rather, I advocate the education of evaluative 
skills and techniques, including functional models with empirical research to back 
them up.  There is widespread need for some kind of approach to the solution of 
these issues, especially concerning the implications for the future of our democracy.  
Without some attempt to deal with the observed results of widespread suggestibility 
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and the low self-esteem that is presumed to cause it, it could be difficult to preserve 
the quality of our liberty.  
C)  Scientific Unreliability 
For every study supporting a particular point of view, other research can be 
found that would seem to indicate that the exact opposite point of view is equally 
valid.  The goal of science is not to prove any one particular agenda, but rather, it is a 
means to seek the observable state of affairs through trial and error.  Science seeks 
truth with a lower case “t,” rather than seeking a higher Truth, such as that claimed 
by religious teachings of divine revelations.  Therefore, the truths revealed by 
science can be confusing and contradictory since they do not claim to emanate from 
any single source apart from natural means.  Hundreds of thousands of scientists are 
conducting research around the world, testing an infinite number of hypotheses.  No 
one single human being can locate and assimilate all of the existing research at any 
given time.  And even if one intrepid graduate student was capable of such a feat, by 
the time she finished reading all her accumulated research, a whole new slew of 
studies would have been completed, and graduation would become an ever-receding 
goal.  With so much information available, much of it conflicting, how are we to 
evaluate which research is correct and should be applied, and which is spurious and 
should be ignored?  What kind of criteria should be applied and under what 
conditions?
Obviously, in a study such as this, only research supporting my position is 
cited, and I am forced to acknowledge the limitations of this approach.  A broader 
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study would seek out and examine any conflicting data that may exist, and evaluate 
whether that conflicting data would mount a serious challenge to the approach taken 
in this dissertation or not.  However, I am a philosopher, not a cognitive 
psychologist, therefore, the criteria and evaluation methods I utilize are those that 
seem to best support my arguments, based on establish modes of ethical and social 
philosophy.  As I am not constrained by the traditions, regulations and methods of 
clinical science, I have not produced any original empirical studies to prove my 
claims.  Rather, I have made a general study of the field of social cognitive 
psychology’s research on the self under the guidance of a trained psychologist and
specialist in the study of the self.  My goal is not to prove any particular scientific 
hypothesis, but rather, my goal is to look at the broader picture of the state of human 
affairs, given the scientific observations, and to consider the social and political 
implications of the current state of affairs and to use the scientific evidence to 
construe an optimal ideal based on the data.  Amongst the studies I examined, an 
obvious trend emerged, which I endeavored to describe in these pages and none of 
the studies examined contradicted this approach, but a broader study may yet reveal 
such in the future.  However, a review of all extant literature in this field would be a 
larger project than can be undertaken at this time.
D)  Impossibility of Implementation
In his critique of Derek Bok’s advocation of a return to civic education in 
higher education, Michael Beatty notes that as long as higher education holds values 
that displace the paideia, moral education is impossible in higher education.  Bok 
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notes that modern moral education teaches only moral reasoning, which results in 
generating students that excel in arguing, but believe in nothing – in other words, 
teaching moral relativism.  However, Beatty claims that these moral problems 
evident in higher education reflect a larger split in the nation’s perspectives.  In order 
to fulfill Bok’s proposal of increasing civic education, each university is forced to 
choose a particular morality to adhere to and force the university population to live 
with it – from students to faculty.  Such a stance would require universities to hire 
their faculty based upon the candidates’ personal beliefs and the degree of fit with 
the university’s espoused moral code – clearly a violation of the candidates’ civil 
rights.  Beatty argues that such a move would serve to marginalize universities, as 
each would focus only on its own chosen moral code to the exclusion of all others –
a seemingly arbitrary move in a world of increasing multiculturalism.258  In Beatty’s 
estimation, these challenges are insurmountable; with the end result that moral 
education cannot be implemented in higher education.
If Bok’s view of a return to a religiously construed or a nationalistic based 
civic education is adopted, then Beatty is correct and moral education at the college 
and university level is doomed.  However, I advocate a different approach, with a 
different grounding.  The model outlined in this dissertation draws upon a more 
functionalist perspective, using the utilitarian goal of maximization of happiness.  As 
such, the approach is both individualistic and universal.  It is individualistic, in that 
individual cohesion and integrity is used as the means to furthering social and 
democratic cohesion and integrity.  It is not reliant upon any religious or nationalistic 
beliefs or agendas, nor does it require the acceptance of any specific belief system.  
258
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The techniques proposed are based on personal experimentation and experiences, not 
upon any pre-defined belief system, therefore eliminating the need for the choice and 
adoption of a particular moral code and the accompanying marginalization that 
would naturally follow.
E)  Illusion of Self - impossibility of integration- Milgram
A classical “Candid Camera” episode illustrated how individuals in an 
elevator, when confronted with a group of people facing the back wall, would turn to 
likewise face the wall in order to avoid being different from the crowd.  A recent 
study showed that people, when required to give answers out loud to a group, will 
tend to change their responses in order to conform with the group, even if it means 
changing their answer from the correct response to an incorrect one.  It is interesting 
to note that, when met with a group response, individuals tend to question their own 
abilities and responses.
Psychologist Stanley Milgram produced research in the 1960’s and 70’s 
about the effects of authority on individual conformity.  He found that people are 
often quite willing to inflict painful electric shocks on human “victims” when 
ordered to do so by an authority figure or expert, despite their own personal 
misgivings.  This phenomenon accounts for the banality of Nazi cruelty, which 
almost uniformly claimed “I was only following orders.”  Both of these all too 
human responses to social pressure point to a serious objection to the possibility of 
epistemic responsibility – the common lack of autonomy in everyday people which 
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prevents the possibility of integration.  This objection claims that belief in a truly 
autonomous self is only an illusion.  
Under research conditions, Milgram found that roughly eighty percent of the 
population will concede to external pressure, in spite of their own convictions or 
conscience.  But Milgram also found that some twenty percent of the population 
resisted the influence of external forces.  Rather than disproving my position, I 
consider this support for my claims, for Milgram found that those who resisted were 
most commonly those who were acting from personal experience.259  In other words, 
mere beliefs and convictions were not strong enough to help individuals stand up to 
authority figures or peer pressure.  The more actual experience individuals have 
examining their beliefs, the more resistant they are to coercion and manipulation by 
others.260  So, rather than refuting my arguments, the Milgram research actually 
supports and underscores the urgent need for widespread implementation.  
III)  Final Thoughts
A) Is Humanity inherently good or evil? 
Throughout history, there has been a debate whether the inherent nature of 
humanity is good or is the inherent nature of humanity evil?  Most of the surviving 
traditional religions of the world hold to the position that humanity was created to be 
good, but have somehow fallen from our original pristine state.  Many philosophers 
also hold to this position, including Plato, Rousseau, Mill, Smith and Taylor.  These 
philosophers hold that humanity is fundamentally good, but has become corrupted, 
primarily because of social conditions.  This fundament belief in the goodness of 
259
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humanity is necessary, otherwise, we risk becoming genocidal and cruel if we 
believe that humanity is basically evil and deserving of punishment.  
The necessity of living under conditions of scarcity and temptation are 
blamed for the fall of mankind, and those conditions are only created when there is a 
gathering of human population living in proximity with limited resources.  Daniel 
Quinn argues that it is the artifice that we call “civilization’ that is responsible, in 
that it creates condition of artificial fear and greed, giving rise to violence and 
scarcity.261  Rousseau would seem to agree, yet Rousseau believed that civilization 
was necessary for humanity to achieve its full potential, as Natural Man gives up his 
Natural Liberty to become Civil Man and gain the protection and rights therewith.262
Christianity holds that the fall of humanity is due to human weakness in the face of 
temptation – placing the blame on free will.  And in that tradition, it is the same free 
will that is touted to be the salvation of a doomed humanity.
The goal of ethics throughout the ages has been an effort to discover the ideal 
conditions under which humanity’s basic goodness could be expressed, and 
philosophers to this day (including this author) are still engaged in that worthy goal.  
Even with all its failings and shortcomings, civilization is the primary mode of 
human existence, and it looks to continue to be the primary mode for the foreseeable 
future.  Many of the flaws, failings and problems faced by both individuals and 
communities in our modern era are at least exacerbated by social conditions, if not 
caused by them.  Yet, with over six billion of us on the planet, it is highly unlikely 
that we shall be able to avoid the negative influences of those pressing social
261
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condition without some sort of conscious effort to do so.  While religion is quite 
helpful, in our secular age, many cannot hold to an ancient belief system, founded 
millennia ago and formulated in medieval conditions.  Plus, there is the problem of 
conflicting and rival belief systems.  In our own age, the conflicts between cultures 
and beliefs have turned violent and dangerous.  Within our own culture, we find a 
broadening rift between traditional believers and more secular individuals.  Some 
means must be found to transcend these conflicts and rifts if our culture, indeed, 
humanity and our planet, is to survive.
I contend that the answer to the age-old question of the inherent goodness of 
man is that, in reality, we have vast potential for either good or bad.  Far too often 
these days, we find the potential for bad being exercised more often than our 
potential for good.  Yet, we have astonishing capacities and abilities built in us that 
we have yet to begin to tap and explore.  This study is a beginning movement to 
develop some of those untapped potentials for good.
B)  Self as Responsible Being 
The foundation of Western ethics is a belief in free will and the responsibility 
of individuals for making choices and for the consequences of those choices.  
Christianity teaches us that humanity chose the fall.  It is evident that Germany chose 
to follow Hitler, even when rumors of atrocities were confirmed.  Why do we 
conform to evil, or even with unsavory forces when our consciences and belief 
systems would indicate otherwise?  As we have seen, we often are influenced and 
conform when we do not have a strong enough acquaintance with our own deep 
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selves – the wellsprings of conscience and true faith.  We give into evil when we fear 
our fellow man, when we lose our sense of common humanity and believe that we 
can truly benefit at the expense of another.  Evil may be a vital force in the world, 
but it is born of human weakness and alienation. 
Socrates taught us that the unexamined life is not worth living.  The vast 
majority of us have never examined our lives, much less our beliefs.  There are many 
reasons for this, but a primary reason is that most people do not have the conceptual 
skills to perform such a task.  Many are frightened by what might be revealed by 
such a probing examination – that underneath the veneer of their conditioning and 
social mask, there lay a cesspool of unconscious and dark emotions, too powerful to 
control.  This view was supported in the modern era by figures such as Freud.  Yet, 
to not examine those dark emotions and inner forces is to become the slave of them.  
The task of teaching the approach and skills of epistemic responsibility may be a 
logistic impossibility, but the consequences of continuing to ignore our own inner 
selves are too dire and awful to allow.  
160
Bibliography
Aristotle,  Nicomachean Ethics.  Trans. Irwin, Terence.  Hackett Publishing 
Company, Indianapolis and Cambridge  1985
Baumeister, Roy,  The Self in Social Psychology: Key Readings in Social 
Psychology.  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates,  Hillsdale, New Jersey 1999
Berger, Peter and Luckman, Thomas,  The Social Construction of Reality: a Treatise 
in the Sociology of Knowledge.  Anchor Books, New York  1967
Berlin, Isaiah.  The Proper Study of Mankind. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, New York 
1997
Blass, Thomas, ed.  Obedience to Authority – Current Perspectives on the Milgram 
Paradigm.  Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, London and New Jersey 2000
Bloom, Allan, ed.  The Republic of Plato. Basic Books, New York  1968
Bok, Derek,  Beyond the Ivory Tower – Social Responsibilities of the Modern 
University.  Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London  1982
Bok, Derek,  Universities and the Future of America.  Duke University Press, 
Durham and London  1990
Bourdeiu, Pierre and Passeron, Jean-Claude.  Reproduction in Education, Society 
and Culture.  Sage Publications, London, Newbury Park, New Delhi  1977
Frankfurt, Harry G.  On Bullshit.  Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford 
2005
Frankl, Viktor,  Man’s Search for Meaning, Washington Square Press, New York 
and London,  1985
Gall, John,  Systemantics, first ed.  Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 
New York  1975
Gilbert, Daniel; Fiske, Susan and Lindzey, Gardner, eds.  The Handbook of Social 
Psychology, fourth ed.  McGraw-Hill, New York, 1998
Hunter, James Davison.  The Death of Character – Moral Education in an Age 
Without Good or Evil.  Basic Books, New York  2000
Huxley, Aldous   The Perennial Philosophy.  Perennial Classics Division of 
HarperCollins, New York  1945/2004
161
Jaeger, Werner, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture Vol. I, G. Highet, trans. Oxford 
University Press, New York  1939
Jaeger, Werner, Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture – In Search of the Divine 
Centre Vol. II, G. Highet, trans. Oxford University Press, New York  1943
Johnson, Robert A.  Inner Work – Using Dreams and Active Imagination for 
Personal Growth.  Harper and Row,  San Francisco, Cambridge, Hagerstown, New 
York, Philadelphia, London, Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Singapore, Sydney  1986
Jung, C.G.,  Memories, Dreams, Reflections. Vintage Books, New York   1961
Jung, C.G.,  The Undiscovered Self,  Mentor Books, Boston, MA   1957
Kant, Immanuel, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Harper & Row 
Publishers, New York  1964
Laidelman, Alan M.,  The Other Perennial Philosophy: A Metaphysical Dialectic.
University Press of America, Lanham, New York, Oxford  2000
Levitt, Steven D. and Dubner, Stephen J.  Freakonomics, HarperCollins Books, New 
York  2005
Lilly, John C.,  The Deep Self – Profound Relaxation and the Tank Isolation 
Technique,  1977.  Warner Books, New York
Lilly, John C.,  Programming and Metaprogramming of the Human Biocomputer, 
Julian Press, New York  1967
Macedo, Stephen,  Liberal Virtues – Citizenship, Virtue and Community in Liberal 
Constitutionalism.  Clarendon Press, Oxford  1991
MacIntyre, Alasdair.  After Virtue – A Study in Moral Theory. University of Notre 
Dame Press, Notre Dame, Indiana  1984
Marx, Karl. “The Meaning of Human Requirements,” in The Marx-Engels Reader, 
second edition.  Ed.Tucker, Robert c.  W.W. Norton and Company, New York and 
London  1978
Mead, George H.,  Mind, Self and Society- From the Standpoint of a Social 
Behaviorist.  University of Chicago Press, Chicago  1934
Mill, John S., On Liberty.  Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Indianapolis, 
Cambridge  1978
162
Ouspensky, P.D.  The Psychology of Man’s Possible Evolution.  Vintage Books, 
New York  1973
Palmer, Parker J.,  The Courage to Teach: Exploring the Inner Landscape of a 
Teacher’s Life.  Jossey -Bass Publishers, John Wiley and Sons, Inc.  San Francisco, 
1998
Pals, Daniel L.  Seven Theories of Religion.  Oxford University Press, New York, 
Oxford  1996
Pervin, Lawrence, Goal Concepts in Personality and Social Psychology.  Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, New Jersey, 1989
Pinker, Steven,  The Blank Slate – The Modern Denial of Human Nature.  Viking 
Press, New York  London, Victoria, Ontario, New Delhi, Auckland, Johannesburg  
2002
Plato,  the Republic.  Trans. Bloom, Allan.  Basic Books 1968 and 1991
Polanyi, Michael,  Personal Knowledge – Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy.  
University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL  1957
Polanyi, Michael,  The Study of Man.  Phoenix Books, Chicago, IL   1959
Quinn, Daniel,  Ishmael, An Adventure of the Mind and Spirit.  Bantam/Turner 
Books, New York, Toronto, London, Sydney and Aukland  1992
Rawls, John,  Collected Papers.  Harvard University Press, Cambridge and London  
1999
Rosenberg, Alexander.  Philosophy of Social Science.
Westview Press, Boulder, CO,  Oxford, England   1988
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques,  trans. by Allan Bloom.  Emile, or On Education.  
Basic Books, USA 1979
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques,  trans. by Maurice Cranston.  A Discourse on Inequality.
Penguin Books, London, New York, Ontario, Victoria, Auckland  1984
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques,  trans. by Maurice Cranston.  The Social Contract
Penguin Books, London, New York, Ontario, Victoria, Auckland  1968
Sanford, John A.,  The Invisible Partners – How the Male and Female in Each of Us 
Affects Our Relationships.   Paulist Press, New York  1980
163
Sandel, Michael.  Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public 
Philosophy. The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.  Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England  1996
Sartre, Jean-Paul,  Existentialism and Human Emotion, Carol Publishing 
Group/Citadel Press, New York and Toronto  1994
Sommers, Christina H. and Satel, Sally   One Nation Under Therapy - How the 
Helping Culture is Eroding Self-Reliance.  St. Martin’s Press, New York  2005
Taylor, Charles.  The Ethics of Authenticity.  Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England  1991
Taylor, Charles.  Philosophical Arguments.  Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, London, England  1995
Taylor, Charles.  Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity.  Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts  1989
Toffler, Alvin.  Future Shock. Bantam Books, New York, London, Toronto, 1971
Trachtenberg, Zev M.  Making Citizens, Rousseau’s Political Theory of Culture.
Routledge, London and New York  1993
Wright, Robert,  The Moral Animal – Evolutionary Psychology and Everyday Life.  
Vintage Books, New York 1994
Articles
Abbarno, John M.  “Corporate Sponsored Education: the Limits of Social 
Responsibility”  Paideia  http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Educ/EducAbba.htm, 
accessed 2/15/05 
Annas, Julia  “Virtue Ethics” unpublished paper
Baumeister, Roy   “The Self.”  in Gilbert, Fiske & Lindzey (listed above)
Baumeister, Roy   “How the Self Became a Problem: A Psychological Review of 
Historical Research.”  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol. 52, No.1  
1987
Baumeister, Roy, Bratslavsky, Ellen, Muraven, Mark and Tice, Dianne   “Ego 
Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?”  in Baumeister  (listed above)
Beaty, Michael  “Paideia: Moral Education in the University?”  Paideia
http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Mpsy/MpsyBeat.htm, accessed 6/27/04
164
Campell, Jennifer   “Self-Esteem and Clarity of Self- Concept.”  in Baumeister  1999
Carver, Charles   “Self-Awareness.”  in Baumeister  1999
Cummins, Denise Dellarosa, “Cheater Detection is Modified by Social Rank: The 
Impact of Dominance on the Evolution of Cognitive Functions.” Evolution and 
Human Behavior, Vol. 20   1999
Dweck, Carol and Leggett, Ellen  “A Social-Cognitive Approach to Motivation and 
Personality.”  Psychological Review, Vol. 95, No. 2 1988
Fish, Stanley  “The Case for Academic Autonomy.”  The Chronicle of Higher 
Education online  http://chronicle.com.jobs/2004/07/2004072301c.htm, accessed 
7/05/04
Gigerenzer, Gerd and Hug, Klaus, “Domain-specific reasoning: Social contracts, 
cheating, and perspective change.”  Cognition, Vol. 42  1992
Grosch, Paul D.  “Paideia: Philosophy Educating Humanity through Spirituality.”  
Paideia http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Educ/EducGros.htm
James, William   “The Self.” in Baumeister 1999
Kernis, Michael, Grannemann, Bruce and Barclay, Lynda   “Stability and Level of 
Self-Esteem as Predictors of Anger Arousal and Hostility.”  in Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, Vol. 56  1989
Leary, Mark, Tambor, Ellen, Terdal, Sonja and Downs, Deborah   “Self-Esteem as 
an Interpersonal Monitor: The Sociometer Hypothesis.”  in Baumeister  1999
Lipton, Bruce  “The New Biology.” Unpublished, 2005
Markus, Hazel and Cross, Susan   “The Interpersonal Self.”  in Pervin 1989
Markus, Hazel and Kitayama, Shinobu   “Culture and the Self: Implications for 
Cognition, Emotion and Motivation.”  in Baumeister 1999
Markus, Hazel and Wurf, Elissa   “The Dynamic Self-Concept: A Social 
Psychological Perspective.” Annual Review of Psychology, Volume 38 1987
Melzer, Arthur M, “Rousseau’s ‘Mission’ and the Intention of his Writings.” 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 27, Issue 2  1983
Meyer, John W., “The Effect of Education as an Institution.”  The American Journal 
of Sociology, Vol. 83, No. 1  1977
165
Moulakis, Athanasios  “Civic Humanism.”  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/humanism-civic/
Neuberg, Steven and Newsom, Jason   “Personal Need for Structure: Individual 
Differences in the Desire for Simple Structure.” Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, Vol. 65 1993
Ryan, Richard and Deci, Edward   “On Assimilating Identities to the Self: A Self-
Determination Theory Perspective on the Internalization and Integrity within 
Cultures.” in Baumeister 1999
Salovey, Peter; Hsee, Christopher and Mayer, John   “Emotional Intelligence and the 
Self-Regulation of Affect.”  in Baumeister 1999
Schlenker, Barry and Weigold, Michael   “Goals and the Self-Identification Process:  
Constructing Desired Identities." in Pervin 1989
Schmidt, James  “Civility, Enlightenment and Society: Conceptual Confusions and 
Kantian Remedies.”  The American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 2,  June. 
1998 
Schmitt, Charles  “Perennial Philosophy: From Agostino Steuco to Leibniz.”  Journal 
of the History of Ideas, Vol 27, No. 4 (Oct - Dec., 1966) 505-532
Sedikides, Constantine   “Assessment, Enhancement, and Verification Determinants 
of the Self-Evaluation Process.”  in Baumeister  1999
Snyder, Mark   “Self-Monitoring Processes.” Advances in Experimental Social 
Psychology, Vol. 12  1979
Steele, Claude   “The Psychology of Self-Affirmation: Sustaining the Integrity of the 
Self.” in Baumeister  1999
Swann, William, Griffin, John, Predmore, Steven and Gaines, Bebe   “The 
Cognitive-Affective Crossfire: When Self-Consistency Confronts Self-
Enhancement.”  in Baumeister  1999
Tangney, June Price   “Self-Conscious Emotions: the Self as a Moral Guide.” In Self 
and Motivation: Emerging Psychological Perspectives.  Tesser, Abraham, et al, ed.  
American Psychological Association, Washington, DC  2002 
Turner, Jeffery S.  “The Project of Self-Education in Plato’s Protagoras, Gorgias, and 
Meno.”  Paideia.  http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/AnciTurn.htm, accessed 7/26/04 
Turner, Ralph   “The Real Self: From Institution to Impulse.”  in Baumeister  1999
166
Uhrmacher, P. Bruce  “The Curriculum Shadow.”  Curriculum Inquiry, Vol 27, No. 
3 Autumn 1997
Vallacher, Robin and Wegner, Daniel,  “What Do People Think They’re Doing? 
Action Identification and Human Behavior” Psychological Review. Vol. 94, No. 1, 
1987
